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In this dissertation I show that Aristotle’s moral psychology is grounded in his natural
philosophy of the living body.  Moral psychology studies the ways in which agency
and moral responsibility are rooted in the functional structure of the psyche.  For
Aristotle, the psyche – that is, the soul (psychê) – is unified with the living body, and
its functional structure is integrated with the dispositional propensities of the body’s
material constituents.  On account of this, “the soul neither does anything nor has
anything done to it without the body...” (DA I.1, 403a 5)  Accordingly, Aristotle
considers it an “absurdity” of the accounts of his predecessors that “they attach the
soul to the body and set it into it, determining no further what the cause of this is or
what the condition of the body is…” (DA I.3, 407b 14)  However, most contemporary
interpretations of Aristotle’s moral psychology suffer from essentially this same
problem: they interpret Aristotle’s explanation of, say, voluntary action or lack of
self-restraint (akrasia) in entirely psychological terms, and say nothing about the
physiological processes that Aristotle takes to partially constitute, and to critically
influence, these phenomena.  Here I address this imbalance by exploring Aristotle’s
view of the somatic dimension of moral psychology.  More specifically, I examine
Aristotle’s so-called “hylomorphism” – the view that a living thing’s body and soul
are its material and its form (respectively) – and his account of the physiological
functions underlying “incidental perception” (roughly, “seeing as” or perceiving
particulars under a description), voluntary action, practical reasoning and its role in
moving us to act, lack of self-restraint, and moral development.
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“[O]ne must ask what purpose and what obvious utility the Aristotelian
philosophy has for us.  We answer that it is to ascend to the common principle
of all things and to be aware that this is the one goodness itself, incorporeal,
indivisible, uncircumscribed, infinite and of infinite power.”
Ammonius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 6, 9
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Introduction
The Practice of Ethical Philosophy
0.1 Dissertation Overview
“But the following absurdity goes with… most [accounts] that concern the
soul.  They attach the soul to the body and set it into it, determining no further
what the cause of this is or what the condition of the body is…”1
This dissertation examines the physiological foundations of Aristotle’s moral
psychology.  Moral psychology is the subdivision of ethical philosophy that is
concerned with the ways in which agency and moral responsibility are rooted in the
functional structure of the psyche.  For Aristotle, the psyche – the soul (psychê) – is
imminent in the living body (sôma); a living thing is an indivisible psychosomatic
whole.  This fact, so I shall argue, is crucial to all aspects of Aristotle’s moral
psychology.  More specifically, I will outline Aristotle’s view of the psychosomatic
unity of the living thing, and show how physiological processes are integral to
Aristotle’s interconnected explanations of voluntary action, practical reasoning and its
efficacy, and lack of self-restraint (akrasia).
Chapter 1 concerns the psychosomatic unity of living things, according to
which the soul and body are inseparable aspects of a single entity – a plant, an animal,
or a human being.  It is on account of this fact that, with regard to virtually all of its
attributes, “the soul neither does anything nor has anything done to it without the
                                                 
1 Aristotle, DA I.3, 407b 14.  See also DA II.2, 414a 18ff.
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body...” (DA I.1, 403a 5)  This is because the attributes of soul “have materiality in
their very definitions” and “[they have] to be in a certain sort of material if [they are]
to be at all.” (DA I.1, 403a 25; 403b 3)  Therefore, it is “absurd” (atopos) to “attach
the soul to the body and set it into it, determining no further what the cause of this is
or what the condition of the body is…” (DA I.3, 407b 14)  In the remaining chapters
we are seeking to identify those causes and conditions in the body, as Aristotle
understood them, that are integral to voluntary action, the efficacy of practical
reasoning, and lack of self-restraint.
The one perplexing exception to the soul’s inseparability from the body is the
activity of intellect (nous).  At the outset of our investigation we must demarcate
between those activities of soul that are embodied, and the one special sort of
thinking that is not.  In short, I understand Aristotle to hold that virtually all soul-
functions that we are familiar with in ordinary experience – including the experience
of passions (pathê) as well as processes of discursive reasoning (such as dianoia,
logismos, and syllogismos) – are embodied soul-functions of the individuated person.
On the other hand, the immaterial intellect is none other than the immortal and
undifferentiated noetic luminosity that is the Divine Mind, the Unmoved Mover,
God.2  The focus in this dissertation is Aristotle’s understanding of our work and
                                                 
2 In addition to many passages that are to come in this dissertation – passages detailing the integration
of discursive reasoning and the experience of emotion with physiological processes – the above
interpretation is briefly supported by the following remarks.  Aristotle distinguishes between Intellect
(Nous) and the individual possessor of intellect (nous) – the Divine Mind and the individuated person
respectively.  (See DA I.4, 408b 18ff for a crucial passage.)  The thought processes and experiences of
the individuated person involve change (we think or feel one thing at one time, another thing at another
time), and, according to Aristotle, all things that involve change have or involve matter. (Metaph.
XII.2, 1069b 25.)  In contrast, the Divine Mind is a luminous insight (nous) that does not undergo
change – it does not think one thing at one time, another thing at another time – and is entirely
“unaffected.” (For example, see Metaph. XII.9.)  Therefore, we must remain clear on Aristotle’s
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functioning on the human side of the ambiguous line between the human and the
divine.
Chapter 2 examines the psychosomatic sources of voluntary action,
particularly actions that are voluntary but not chosen.  Aristotle distinguishes between
actions that are voluntary (ekousin) and those that result from choice (proairesis),
claiming that all chosen actions are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions are
chosen.3  Roughly, the tokens of these two action types originate from different
activities of the imagination (phantasia), namely one that is sensory (aisthetikê) and
another that is rational or calculative (logistikê).4  According to Aristotle, although
human beings, and human beings alone, have a capacity for rational imagination,
most of the time most of us do not exercise it.5  Instead, like non-human animals, in
many of our actions we are “mere followers of the phantasms.”6  In this chapter I will
construct an Aristotelian explanation of the way in which sensory imagination
governs unchosen voluntary actions, based upon Aristotle’s view that the
“phantasms” that guide our actions are bodily impressions and motions in the blood.
Chapter 3 turns to the other subset of voluntary action, chosen actions, and the
exercise of rational imagination generally called “practical reasoning.”  In outline, the
                                                                                                                                            
distinction between the individual possessor of nous and Nous itself, and on the associated distinction
between the discursive reasoning and intellectual insight.  The former represents a human expression
of reason, and is conditioned by our material embodiment, whereas the latter is something divine in
which we partake to a greater or lesser extent through contemplation (theoria).  Proclus beautifully
characterizes the relationship between discursive reason and intuitive insight in his Commentary on
Euclid’s Elements, §4: “[Discursive reasoning (dianoia)] traverses and unfolds the measureless content
of Nous by making articulate its concentrated intellectual insight, and then gathers back together again
the things it has distinguished and refers them back to Nous.” (Morrow 1970, p. 3)
3 NE III.2, 1111b 6.
4 See DA III.10, 433b 30.
5 For example, see DA III.3, 429a 4; III.10, 433a 11; NE VII.7, 1150b 28.
6 See On Dreams 1, 459a 8 for this phrase.  “Phantasms” is Beare’s translation of phantasmati, which
is variously translated as “images,” “appearances,” “impressions,” and “presentations.”
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argument of this chapter has three main parts: (1) deliberation turns wish into choice
(that is, deliberation turns one’s desire for an end into a desire to do things that
promote the end); (2) it achieves this by altering or “marking” the appearances
(phantasmata) of incidental perception (in more modern terms, deliberation alters the
descriptions under which the particulars are perceived); and (3) this perceptual
alteration and marking of the appearances takes place along with, and partly on
account of, specific physiological conditions in the living body.
Furthermore, the physiological conditions that underlie the processes of
reasoning leading up to chosen actions physically necessitate the bodily motions
involved in those actions.  This is brought out, among other places, in Aristotle’s
discussions of the so-called “practical syllogism.”  The conclusion of the practical
syllogism is the agent’s action, and it follows the premises “necessarily,” “at once,”
and “straightaway.”  Here I am departing from interpretations, such as that of
Nussbaum, according to which Aristotle is referring to a “conceptual” or “logical”
necessity in these contexts.  Against this view, I point to passages such as those from
On the Motion of Animals where Aristotle directly states that the reason why the
animal moves at essentially the same time that it thinks it should or wants to move is
because of the active and passive powers of the material constituents of its body.7
This explains why “necessarily,” “at once,” or “straight away” the animal moves, like
an “automatic puppet.”
On certain occasions, however, our reasoning does not move us to act but is
overpowered by irrational desires.  Thus, in the second part of Chapter 3, we turn to
                                                 
7 MA 8, 701a 33ff, MA 11, 703b 36, etc.
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Aristotle’s account of weakness of will or lack of self-restraint (akrasia).  This takes
place when practical reasoning fails to sufficiently motivate the agent to act, so that
he knows what is best to do, in some sense, but does something else.  I will show that,
for Aristotle, in cases of akrasia, the action motivated by rational deliberation is
prevented by irrational passions because these passions physically overpower one’s
desire to do what one knows to be best.  Irrational passions render one’s practical
knowledge ineffective by “deranging the body.” (NE VII.3, 1147a 16)  This is
because “the instrument by which desire causes motion is already part of the body”
(DA III.10, 433b 19), and “at one time this desire wins out and knocks away that one,
and at another time that one wins out and knocks away this one, like a ball.” (DA
III.11, 434a 16)  Thus, “the [irrational] desire takes the lead, since it is able to set in
motion each part of the body.” (NE VII.3, 1147b 1)  For these reasons, the
explanation of the ineffectiveness of the akratic’s knowledge is the same as the
explanation for the ineffectiveness of knowledge that takes place when one falls
asleep or gets drunk; it is an explanation “which one needs to hear from people who
study nature (dei para tôn physiologôn akouein).” (NE VII.3, 1147b 5)
We conclude by reflecting upon the foregoing account’s implications for
moral development.  The stability and malleability of character are based upon the
plasticity of organic matter.  In a variety of passages throughout his biological and
psychological works, Aristotle explains that the constitution of the body, particularly
that of the heart and the blood, “pave the way” for character.8  One reason for this is
that the soul’s affections are embodied (DA I.1, 403a 26), and virtue (and vice)
                                                 
8 For example, see PA II.2, 648a 3, and II.4, 650b 19 – 651a 16.
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pertains to bearing oneself well (or badly) in relation to these affections. (NE II.5,
1105b 28)  Therefore, moral development is not an alteration of the soul in its own
right, but follows upon an alteration in the body that brings the soul to rest in its
natural condition.  (Physics VII.3, 248a 5)
Moral development is a process of struggling to master the unthinking
elements within us, to “master the appearances,” rather than to be “mere followers of
the phantasms.”  Our noetic passivity explains the fact that, according to Aristotle,
most people are “completely slavish” and pursue a kind of life “that belongs to fatted
cattle” (NE I.5, 1095b 20); that is, a life of pursuing any random impulse for pleasure
that arises.  This fact calls out for explanation since “each person would even seem to
be this part [nous]; it would be strange, then, [i.e., it would make no sense] if anyone
were to choose not his own life but that of something else.”  (NE X.7, 1178a 2)  It is
in this sense that Plato’s Socrates states that “the power of appearance (phainomenou
dunamis) makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds
about the same things and regretting our actions and choices, …the art of
measurement [which employs rational imagination], in contrast, would make the
appearance (phantasmata) lose its power by showing us the truth...and would save
our life…”9
                                                 
9 Let me repeat that: “save our life” (sotêria ephanê tou biou)!  (Protagoras 356D)  This passage is
discussed nicely by Jessica Moss in “Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the Soul”
(Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXXIV (summer 2008), 35-68), and by Rachel Singpurwalla in
“Moral Psychology in Plato’s Republic,” §III.2 (Blackwell Philosophy Compass, forthcoming).  For
Aristotle, reason does not make the appearances lose their power per se; rather, just as the artisan uses
the non-rational power of fire in accordance with a rational art to produce some artifact, the person of
practical wisdom (the phronimos) transforms the appearances such that what makes an appearance to
him and what is truly so are one and the same.  He thereby uses the power of the appearances in
accordance with insight and right reason so as to live and move in ways that realize the human good.
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Thus, Aristotle’s moral psychology is grounded in his natural philosophy of
the body in ways that make the latter integral to an understanding of the former.  The
transformative process through which one develops virtue is a visceral, sensuously
felt, concrete bodily transformation – a sort of psychosomatic alchemy – through
which non-discursive insight (nous) and active rational intelligence master and are
fused with our passions and become the principal sources that move us through the
world.
0.2 The Practice of Ethical Philosophy
“The fathers… kept the commandments; their successors wrote them down;
[and] we have placed their books on shelves.  And even if we want to read
them, we do not have the application to understand what is said and to put it
into practice; we read them either as something incidental, or because we
think that by reading them we are doing something great…”10
As mentioned above, moral psychology is the subdivision of ethical
philosophy that is concerned with the ways in which agency and moral responsibility
are rooted in the structure and functioning of the psyche.  In order to appreciate the
significance of this enterprise, it will be necessary at the outset to briefly consider the
nature of ethical philosophy and of moral responsibility, as understood by Aristotle.
In particular, we must contrast Aristotle’s view with the contemporary notion that
ethical philosophy is, as one leading introduction to the subject describes it, “the
attempt to achieve a systematic understanding of the nature of morality and what it
                                                 
10 St. Peter of Damaskos, “That Stillness is of Great Benefit to those Subject to Passion,” in The
Philokalia: The Complete Text Vol. 3 (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 169.
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requires of us…”11  In this section we will consider various reasons why this
conception is significantly ill-suited to characterize ethical philosophy as Aristotle
understood it.12
An ethical philosophy aimed at “systematic understanding” is unlike
Aristotle’s for at least two reasons.  First, Aristotle’s ethics is not aimed at
understanding but at action, the development of virtue, and the attainment of
eudaimonia.  Second, and because of this fact, the understanding or knowledge
component of ethical philosophy cannot be entirely “systematic,” if by that term we
mean that the knowledge in question can be precisely articulated in a consistent set of
propositions generated and organized through logical deduction.  Aristotle makes
many remarks concerning the limited exactitude of ethical discourse.  For example,
                                                 
11 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy 5th edition, with Stuart Rachels (New York:
McGraw Hill, 2007), 1.
12 Here we will principally concern ourselves with the first part of Rachels’ statement.  However, its
second part – that ethical philosophy concerns “the nature of morality and what it requires of us” – is
potentially misleading when entering into the study of ancient Greek ethics.  For this formulation
invites a deontological interpretation according to which moral responsibility means doing one’s duty
and conforming to an obligatory set of moral requirements.  We can contrast this outlook with that of
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (as well as virtually the whole of ancient Greek philosophy) by analogy
to the distinction between technological production and natural growth.  An artifact’s principle of
organization originates in the craftsman and is imposed upon the artifact’s material from the outside.
By contrast, the principle of organization that brings a living organism into being is at work within the
material of which that organism is composed, and thus comes forth from within it and makes itself
manifest through its embodiment.  Likewise, ancient Greek ethical philosophy is not primarily about
imposing an external standard of behavior upon the individual, but about serving the individual’s
inmost nature and providing for its coming forth in the realization of itself – which is happiness.  (We
will return to this briefly in the Epilogue of this dissertation.)  As Julia Annas notes, “Plato
(revealingly) has no terms that answer happily to the notions of moral duty and obligation…” (An
Introduction to Plato’s Republic, p. 61) The same is true of Aristotle, and it is so because, for them,
being morally responsible virtually amounts to being autonomous and happy.  One does not have a
duty or obligation to be happy, and, while everyone pursues happiness, no one pursues it out of duty or
obligation.  This connection between being good and being happy is beautifully expressed in a poem
attributed to Aristotle, written as an encomium to Plato called “On Friendship”: “[Plato], alone or first
of mortals, showed clearly / by his own life and by the courses of his arguments / that a man becomes
good and happy at the same time; / but now none can grasp this anymore.” (The Complete Works of
Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2463.  Additional discussion of this poem can be found in Werner Jaeger’s
Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development 2nd ed., p. 106ff.)
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“But let this be acknowledged in advance – that every discourse that concerns
actions is obliged to speak in outline and not precisely – just as we said also at
the beginning [in NE I.3] that one ought to demand that discourses be in
accord with their material, while matters that are involved in actions and are
advantageous have nothing rigidly fixed about them, any more than do matters
of health.  And since the general discourse is of this sort, still more does the
discourse that concerns particulars lack precision, for it falls under no art nor
under any skill that has been handed down, but it is always necessary for those
who are acting to look at the circumstances surrounding the occasion
themselves, just as is the case also with the medical art or the art of steering a
ship.”  (NE II.2, 1104a 1-9)
Thus, both abstract principles and particular judgments concerning ethical
matters elude exact formulation in a general discourse.  In NE I.3 Aristotle illustrates
this by pointing out that things that are good involve a sort of inconsistency in the
sense that many of them also bring harm for many people, such as those who are
undone because of their wealth or courage.  Therefore, though wealth and courage are
generally good, they are not good without qualification.
Furthermore, although practical reasoning is surely indispensable, at both its
general and particular extremes, ethical knowledge is not an act of discursive
reasoning (e.g., dianoia, logismos, syllogismos), but of insight into first principles, on
the one extreme, and perceptual apprehension of relevant characteristics of particular
circumstances, on the other (both of which Aristotle’s identifies as nous).13  Here, as
in every body of knowledge, the first principles are not grasped by demonstration or
deductive proof, but by intellectual insight (nous); and the practical wisdom
                                                 
13 For example, see NE VI.11, 1143a 35 – 11443b 8: “And intellect is directed at what is ultimate on
both sides, since it is intellect (nous) and not reason (logos) that is directed at both the first terms and
the ultimate particulars, on the one side at the changeless first terms in demonstrations, and on the
other side, in thinking about action, at the other sort of premise, the variable ultimate particular; for
these particulars are the sources from which one discerns that for the sake of which an action is, since
universals are derived from the particulars.  Hence intellect is both a beginning and an end, since the
demonstrations that are derived from these particulars are also about these.  And of these, one must
have a perception, and this perception is intellect.”  We will return to this passage in Chapter 3.
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(phronêsis) that finally grasps the particulars, at the other extreme, is not knowledge
(epistêmê) but a perceptual recognition that, with the help of practical reasoning,
relates the particular fact of the present situation to the ultimate principles concerning
the human good.  These considerations will be investigated further in Chapter 3 when
we discuss practical reasoning, but for the present they suffice to indicate that the
most crucial knowledge or understanding that is sought in Aristotle’s ethics cannot be
called “systematic” without danger of misrepresentation.14
 The foregoing concerns the sort of knowledge or understanding relevant in
ethics.  But, whatever the nature of that knowledge turns out to be, knowledge is not
the final aim or telos of Aristotelian ethics.  In short, for Aristotle, ethical philosophy
is not the attempt to gain an understanding of what is good; rather, it is the deliberate
                                                 
14 If one makes the un-Aristotelian assumption that ethical philosophy consists of nothing but ethical
discourse, the limited precision of such discourse might seem to imply that the standards of ethical
philosophy are less rigorous than those of sciences, such as mathematics, in which deductive
exactitude is attainable.  However, when we drop this un-Aristotelian assumption, the opposite
conclusion follows. When we conjoin the limited precision of ethical discourse with the view that the
full practice of ethical philosophy entails an extremely specific course of actions – difficult both to
identify and to perform – the consequence is that the true practice of ethical philosophy is the
proverbial “path as narrow as a razor’s edge,” and cannot consist of mechanical rule-following; instead
it requires ongoing, dynamic, vigilant attention and spiritual discipline.  Limitations on the precision
with which ethical principles and rules can be articulated in discourse gives rise to the need to
deliberate over what to do, since there is no pre-established art or algorithm that can guide you, but the
action to be done is something exact – an action that falls in “the mean.”  Since virtue “discovers and
chooses” this action, “virtue is something more precise and better than any art.” (NE II.6, 1107a 7;
1106b 15)  Thus, even though discourse about virtue lacks precision, virtue itself is as precise in
knowledge and skill as anything of which we are capable.  We should also note that, in the same way
that the art of politics encompasses other arts and sciences by being in charge of creating the social
conditions that advance these endeavors (see NE I.2, 1094a 28; also Politics I.10, 1258a 27-34), so on
the individual scale, ethical philosophy encompasses all other forms of study and action, and indeed
the whole of life – and is thus a “way of life” – for even the decision to undertake mathematical study
or to engage in meditative philosophical contemplation are themselves practical decisions.  In this
sense, ethical philosophy, encompassing all aspects of life, encompasses all of its rigors.  (Practical
wisdom’s role as “steward” of theoretical wisdom is discussed with subtlety by C. D. C. Reeve in
“Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought” (Reeve 2006, 211ff).)
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and strategic attempt to become good.  Its practices are designed to transform human
character and to awaken human intelligence to itself and its proper objects.15
So, like ancient Greek philosophers both before him and after him, Aristotle
sees ethics as practical rather than theoretical.  That is, it is a form of practice that
involves action and is not simply designed to acquire knowledge (whether or not that
knowledge concerns practical matters).  Practical knowledge – particularly
knowledge of those principles that articulate the nature of the human good – has a
great influence on life since it gives one a mark or target (skopon) at which to aim.
(NE I.1, 1094a 22)  However, practical knowledge alone has little or no power,
whereas the conditions that come to be present in the soul through repeated actions
have all the power.  (NE II.4, 1105b 2)  As Aristotle explains,
“Even if practical judgment (phronêsis) is concerned with things that are just
and beautiful and good for a human being, these are the things that it belongs
to a good man to do, and we are no more able to perform these actions by
knowing about them, if indeed virtues are active conditions of the soul [which
they are: NE II.5-6]; it is just as it is with things that are said to belong to
health and to being in good shape, not in the sense of producing those states,
but the things that result from one’s active condition, for we are no more able
to do those things by having the arts of medicine and gymnastic training.”
(NE VI.12, 1143b 22-27)
                                                 
15 For Aristotle, ultimately the proper object of all intelligence is the Divine Mind or God – which is
also the ultimate subject behind all intelligence (although that is a topic for another dissertation: among
other places, see DA III.5, 430a 25; “without [the Divine Mind] nothing thinks.”).  On the Divine Mind
as proper object of intelligence, see Metaph. VI.11026a 22, where Aristotle states that contemplative
knowledge is more worthy of choice than other kinds of knowledge, and among contemplative studies
– the natural, the mathematical, and the theological – it is the theological that is the most worthy of
choice and the most honorable.  In addition, at EE VII.15 / VIII.3, 1249a 21-b23 Aristotle states that
“whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature – whether goods of body or
wealth or friends or the other goods – will best promote the contemplation of God (poiêsei malista tên
tou theou theôrian), that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest (kallistos); and any mode of
choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from serving and from
contemplating God – that is a bad one.”  As I will indicate in Chapter 3, contrary to the “inclusivist” /
“exclusivist” debate, this does not entail a life of isolated “study” as opposed to action in the world.
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Just as knowing the cure does not make one healthy, and knowing the regimen
does not make one strong, so knowing what virtue is does not make one virtuous.16
And so, practical knowledge is of no use if its principles cannot be implemented
because they are constantly overpowered by whatever impulse happens to arise.  (NE
I.3, 1095a 5)  Therefore, although it involves the articulation of practical principles,
ethical philosophy is not finally aimed at knowing these principles, but at virtue
attained through action that springs from and is in accordance with these principles.
(NE I.3, 1095a 7)
In this sense, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was written to help people
become good.  We are to study it, he says, “not in order to [merely] know what virtue
is but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no
use.” (NE II.2, 1103b 28; trans. Ross)  Understanding ethical principles is completely
useless – or worse – unless this understanding is also worked into the very fabric of
one’s character as a living wisdom (phronêsis) that moves one through the world.  As
the long and difficult discourse of his Nicomachean Ethics comes to its close,
Aristotle reminds us of this all-important aspect of his ethical philosophy:
“If these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, have been
dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that our program has
reached its end?  Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done
the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do
them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to
                                                 
16 Socrates would object to this statement in connection with his view that, strictly speaking, there is no
such phenomenon as akrasia – in short, performing an action at the same time that one knows it is not
the best course of action open to one to perform.  One subtlety that may be relevant here is the
distinction between knowing what, say, justice is, versus knowing that this action now would be just or
unjust.  For Socrates, or Plato, the Form of Justice serves as a standard or model for correctly judging
particular actions to be just or unjust.  For Aristotle, the weakness of knowledge in the case of akrasia
pertains to the particular judgment and not the universal.  Aristotle’s account of this phenomenon will
be discussed in Chapter 3.
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have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good.” (NE
X.9, 1179a 33; trans. Ross)
Thus, even though the discourse is done, the program or course, in a sense, is
just beginning.  And so we must not imagine the sole and paradigm practice of ethical
philosophy to be the mere articulation of true propositions concerning ethical issues,
whether this takes place while sitting at a computer, while standing at the front of a
classroom, or in conversation with others.  Of course, such practices are integral
elements of ethical philosophy; however, it is qua practices conducive to the
development and exercise of virtue, and not qua acts of articulating ethical
propositions, that they are so.17  In this sense, the practice of ethical philosophy, as I
take Aristotle to understand it, is better exemplified when, having articulated ethical
principles to oneself, in the moment of action these principles spring back and involve
themselves in the governance of one’s action by having become the organizing
principles of one’s affective dispositions; when, under the influence of a misdirected
and intelligence-lacking impulse, you turn around against yourself and say “No!” –
                                                 
17 What I have in mind here is reminiscent of the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus in
Book I of Plato’s Republic (340Dff).  There the distinction is made between the physician qua
physician and the physician qua moneymaker.  Strictly speaking, Socrates and his interlocutor agree,
whatever the physician does qua physician conduces to the health of his patient, and it is these actions
and these alone that constitute the practice of the medical art.  The fact that these actions are
accompanied by the earning of wages is extrinsic to the medical art, and insofar as the accompanying
wages constitute the individual’s primary motivation, he is not acting in his capacity as a physician but
as a moneymaker.  Likewise, the true actions of ethical philosophy are those that improve the health of
the soul; insofar as one is discussing or writing about ethical principles in order improve one’s
reputation or resume, strictly speaking, one is not acting as a philosopher but as something else.  Of
course, this does not imply that one’s action is unethical per se, only that it does not exemplify the
practice of ethical philosophy in the true sense.  See also Aristotle’s Physics II.3 on causes that are
“incidental” (kata sumbebêkos): just as it is only in an incidental sense that the doctor built the house
(because the one who built the house happened to be a doctor), whereas in the strict sense it is the
builder who builds the house, so it is only in an incidental sense that one practicing ethical philosophy
is also a moneymaker or an author or a professor.  See also Politics I.9, 1257b 34 – 1258a 14 where
Aristotle mentions those who turn every art into a means of acquiring money.  For example,
generalship is aimed at victory and to use it as a means to acquiring money is “contrary to nature.”
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this is ethical philosophy, and it is through its practice that the mind (nous) moves
into the heart, and, as Empedocles described, its principles take root in your blood
and guts and become a living wisdom that moves you through the world.18  Thus,
Aristotle writes:
“It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just person is
produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate person; without doing
these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.  But most people
do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being
philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like
patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they
are ordered to do.  As the latter will not be made well in body by such a
course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course
of philosophy.”  (NE II.4, 1105b 9-19; trns. Ross)19
Thus, an ethical philosophy composed entirely of words and not also of deeds
is hopelessly inadequate to attain the goal.  Once again, though, we must note that to
say something and to write something are actions too.  If the aim toward which one
directs these actions is the promotion or exercise of virtue in oneself or in others, this
utterance or act of writing is an act of ethical philosophy; if not it is something else.20
                                                 
18 As Debra Hawhee remarks, in her magnificent book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient
Greece (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), “The learning dynamic described by Aristotle
approximates an Empedoclean fragment wherein Empedocles exhorts Pausanius to approach his
teachings with a certain intensity: ‘If you push them (ereisas) firmly under your crowded thoughts
(prapidessin), and contemplate (meletêisin) them favorably with unsullied and constant attention,
assuredly all these will be with you through life, and you will gain much else from them, for of
themselves they will cause each thing to grow into the character (auta gar auxei taut’ eis êthos
hekaston), according to the nature (phusis) of each.’ (DK 31 B110; [trans. M. A. Wright]” (Hawhee, p.
145)
19 Regarding those practice ethical philosophy versus those who take refuge in theory and mere talk,
compare Iamblichus’ reference to Pythagoreans versus Pythagoreanists.  (The Life of Pythagoras §18,
in The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library, compiled and translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie
(Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1988), 76)
20 This is so because, as Aristotle indicates at NE III.1, 1111a 18, the end for the sake of which
something is done (e.g., wage-earning, or showing off one’s intellectual skills), and that in which the
action consists (e.g., producing spoken or written ethical discourses), together constitute the “most
controlling circumstances” in the determination of what action was performed.
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Now, what of these “acts of ethical philosophy,” and their relation to acts of
wage-earning, and whatever else may come to be done in the course of life?  Apart
from the intrinsic importance of the fact that Aristotle’s ethics concerns knowledge-
in-action and not simply knowledge about action, why make such a fuss about it here
in the introduction to this dissertation?  Because, ultimately, it is the psychosomatic
sources of these very actions – actions performed in the practice of ethical philosophy
– that we are hunting for in the chapters that follow.  On the one hand, as mentioned
above, the practice of ethical philosophy, as a “way of life,” encompasses the whole
of life and, ultimately, all actions fall within its scope.  Thus, every action, whatever
else it may be, is also an opportunity to practice ethical philosophy, to practice and
exercise the virtues.  As we will see in Chapter 3, this unification of all actions into
one total action that exercises virtue is happiness.
On the other hand, when you perform such actions, when you restrain or
impel yourself against the grain of your impulses or inhibitions, in the direction
indicated by insight, physical processes are taking place in the body that go along
with and partly constitute these actions, these resistances, these “countermotions.”
We want to decipher Aristotle’s view of what these processes are.  Where do the
actions that constitute the true practice of ethical philosophy come from?  They do not
simply come out of the head or the mouth, but from the heart and blood and guts –
from the whole person as a psychosomatic totality.
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Chapter 1
The Physics and Metaphysics of Living Things
1.1 The Metaphysics of Psychosomatic Unity
Aristotle views living things as unified psychosomatic wholes.  This is crucial
to his understanding of the causes and effects of their actions, thoughts, desires, and
experiences.   In this chapter we will look at the metaphysics of psychosomatic unity
through Aristotle’s so-called “hylomorphism,” according to which body and soul are
the material (hulê) and form (morphê, eidos) of a living thing, respectively.  In the
subsequent chapters we will turn to Aristotle’s empirical account of various
phenomena in which living things function as unified psychosomatic wholes.
For Aristotle, a living thing – such as a human being or a bird or a tree – is an
individual entity (ousia) with a soul (psuchê) and a body (sôma).  This view is well
known but easily misinterpreted.  First, the soul and the body are not entities (ousiai)
in addition to the living thing that has them.  Thus, a man, his soul, and his body are
not three different entities.  Secondly, however, his soul and his body are not two
different entities (ousiai) either!  The only full-fledged entity under consideration
here is the man himself.  In Aristotle’s ontology, primacy goes to the psychosomatic
whole, as opposed to the derivative aspects of this entity – its psychê and its sôma.
In what sense, then, are the soul and the body not full-fledged “entities” or
“beings” (ousiai)?  According to Aristotle, in the primary sense a “being” (ousia) is a
particular, self-subsistent, persisting entity – a “this” or “this something” (tode ti).  In
a secondary sense, the “being” (ousia) of some particular thing is “what it is” (ti esti).
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For example, the individual man and the individual horse are “beings” in the primary
sense, whereas man and horse are “beings” in the secondary sense.21  The former are
“things,” and the latter are what it is to be (ti ên einai) things of their kinds.  These
senses of “being” are employed when we single out this thing here and identify what
it is, e.g. “This thing here is a horse” or “Socrates is a man.”22
Aristotle begins his account of the soul by distinguishing these senses of
being, and indicates that neither the soul nor the body is a “this” – an ousia in the
primary sense.  He states, “one sort [of ousia] has being as material, which in its own
right is not a this, but another sort is the form (morphê) or look (eidos) of a thing,
directly as a result of which something is called a this, and the third sort is what is
made out of these [i.e., the union of material and form].” (DA II.1, 412a 6-10)23  In
other words, the stuff of which a thing is composed, qua material, is not a
“something” in its own right.  Rather, the thing composed of that stuff is the
“something,” and it is its form that determines what this “something” is.  For
example, a statue may be composed of clay.  Insofar as the clay is what the statue is
                                                 
21 See Cat. 5, 2a 11.  I should note here that there is debate concerning possible differences in
Aristotle’s views of ousia as expressed in the Categories and in the Metaphysics.  Some scholars argue
that in the Categories Aristotle gives primacy to particular compounds of matter and form, and in the
Metaphysics he assigns this primacy to form.  On my own interpretation of Aristotle, forms are
presented in the Metaphysics not as self-subsistent things or beings, but as the thinghood of things or
the being of beings.  (I have come across the work too late to consider it thoroughly but Michael
Wedin’s Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Z (Oxford University Press,
2002) is an extensive book on these issues that argues for the consistency of these two Aristotelian
works and seems to defend an interpretation similar to the one I have presented very briefly here.)
Although this issue requires more discussion than I can present here, we are about to see in the next
paragraph that Aristotle’s account of the soul in De Anima, which is our central concern, harmonizes
with my reading of the metaphysical issue.
22 Later we will see that the combined deployment of the primary and secondary senses of “being” are
central to the implicit predication that takes place in perceptual recognition of particular things as
instances of universals.
23 The usual translation here is morphê = shape and eidos = form.  Sachs explains his translation,
convincingly in my opinion, in his glossary to the De Anima (p. 193) and elsewhere.
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made of, the clay is not the “thing” in question – the statue is.  What differentiates a
clay statue from mere clay is the presence of the statue’s form.  Of course, we could
regard the lump of clay in its own right as a thing, but in that case we are not
considering the clay as what anything is made out of – clay is not made of clay, it is
clay.  If we regard a lump of clay simply as clay (and not as material of which
something is made), we are treating clay as the form of the thing in question and not
as its material.
In a similar way, according to Aristotle, the soul is not a self-subsistent
“entity” in its own right in the primary sense; it is the “what it is to be” (to ti ên einai)
of the living thing – it is the living entity’s “being” in the secondary sense.  This
means that, for Aristotle, the union of soul and body is virtually a foregone
conclusion:
“…it is not necessary to seek out whether the soul and body are one, any more
than whether the wax and the shape molded in it, or generally with the
material of each thing and that of which it is the material…  [For example,]
just as the eyeball and the power of sight are the eye, so here the soul and the
body are the living thing.”24
Being wax and being cylindrical are conceptually distinguishable, but this
wax and its cylindrical shape are not distinct entities.  Like a piece of wax and its
shape, and like the eye and the power of sight, the soul and the body are two aspects
of an indivisible unity – the living thing.  In the Metaphysics Aristotle subsumes all
examples of this kind – all hylomorphic compounds (compounds of material and
form) – under the following general statement: “the highest level of material and the
                                                 
24 DA II.1, 412b 6 – 413a 5.
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form are one and the same thing, the former potentially, the latter actively, so that
looking for what is responsible for their being one is like looking for a cause of one
thing…”25  We will consider the earlier part of this passage below.  Regarding the
later part, Aristotle is saying that in looking for what is responsible for a given
combination of form and material, we are simply looking for what is responsible for
this one thing’s existence (since the form and material are not two independent
entities that have been brought together, but are conceptually distinguishable aspects
of this one entity).
For example, consider the Great Pyramid at Giza.  Looking for who made this
limestone take on this pyramidal shape, or looking for who made this pyramidal
shape out of this limestone, is just looking for who made the Great Pyramid at Giza.
We can consider this entity qua composed of limestone or qua pyramidal, but “this
limestone pyramid” and “this pyramidal limestone” are two descriptions of one entity.
Likewise, this ensouled body and this embodied soul are not two things but one thing
– e.g., the individual man or horse – considered from two different perspectives.
Thus, ontologically speaking, the soul and the living body are not two different things
or entities.  To imagine them as existentially separable would be like considering the
power of sight to be a self-subsistent thing with existence independent of the eye
(analogous to a soul without a living body), or like considering some random blob of
transparent jelly in the eye socket, without any power to serve as an instrument for
seeing, to be an eye (analogous to a living body without a soul).
                                                 
25 Metaph. VIII.6, 1045b 18.
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It should be noted that to assert the existential unity of body and soul in this
way is not to “reduce” either to the other.  The soul and body are not two things, but
they are not one thing either – they are not “things” at all.  As R. D. Hicks comments,
“We cannot be too often reminded that matter and form are not things, but ‘causes’ or
‘principles’ of things, distinguishable in thought or reasoning and in rational
description (logôi) but not by sense [perception].”26  The soul is not identical to the
body, and the body is not identical to the soul.27  They differ in being (that is,
“whatness,” ti esti), but they are not two different beings (that is, “thisness,” tode ti).
The soul and the body are thus like the concave and the convex curvatures of the
circumference of a circle, or like a road going from Athens to Thebes and the same
road going from Thebes to Athens: they are one, but they differ in being.28
John I. Beare presents a nice formulation of these points in a passage that
links the concepts of ousia (substance, being, thinghood), sôma (the living body),
hulê (material, raw material), eidos (form), zôon (living thing), and tode ti (“this
thing”).  Beare writes, “Accordingly we may see what Aristotle meant by speaking of
the animate body as ousia of which the sôma per se is the hulê, while the soul per se
is eidos.  For the sôma to have life is to have realized in it certain antecedent
                                                 
26 R. D. Hicks, commenting on DA II.1, 412b 6 – the above quoted passage on the unity of soul and
body as analogous to the unity of the wax and its shape or form and matter generally.  See Aristotle:
De Anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes (Salem: New Hampshire: Ayer Company
Publishers Inc., repr. 1988, originally published in 1907), 314.
27 See DA II.1, 412a 15-22.
28 As Heraclitus states, “The road up and the road down are one and the same.” (DK  22B60, translated
by R. McKirahan in Philosophy Before Socrates, p. 122)  For Aristotle, the road up and the road down
are one primary substance, but as secondary substances they are not one and the same.  See Metaph.
XII.9, 1066a 32: “…the interval from one to two and from two to one is the same, and the uphill and
downhill road, though the being of them is not one [i.e., they are one, but they differ in being]…”
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potentialities, which belonged to the hulê from which the living body has sprung.
Psuchê is the realization of such potentialities.  The zôon is the tode ti.”29
1.2 Strata of the Living Thing’s Composition
An elaboration of these claims, and the earlier part of Aristotle’s passage from
the Metaphysics quoted above (with its reference to “the highest level of material”),
will introduce us to the important concept of the stratification of the living thing’s
constitution.  This, in turn, will point to the relativity of material and form, and to the
fact that Aristotle’s concept of material (hulê) must not be confused with the notion of
corporeality.  The upshot of the analysis in this section will be that all strata of a
living thing’s composition contribute to the explanation of its functioning (in
particular, such functions as voluntary action, experiencing emotion, deliberation,
etc.).
The body (sôma) of a living thing (zôon) is composed of various strata of
material (hulê).  In Aristotle’s view, a living thing (from the top down) is an organism
endowed with the capacity to use its parts or organs as instruments in the performance
of life activities.  This total organism is composed of non-uniform parts (e.g., head,
heart, hands), which are composed of uniform parts (e.g., blood, flesh, bone), which
are composed of the natural elements (earth, water, air, and fire), which are composed
of the primary powers of hot, cold, moist and dry.30
                                                 
29 Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Mansfield Center, CT:
Mansfield Centre, repr. 2004 , originally published in 1906 by Oxford Clarendon Press), 220-221.
30 For the distinction between the uniform and non-uniform parts, see On the Parts of Animals II.1,
646a 13ff.  Further useful discussion is presented by James G. Lennox in Aristotle: On The Parts of
Animals I-IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 179-181.  In the table below I vary the terms
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Table 1: Strata of the Living Thing’s Composition (from the top down)
1. Individual Human Being, Animal, or Plant
2. Living body
3. Collection of non-uniform body parts (heart, hands, arms, eyes, etc.)
4. Combination of uniform materials (blood, tissue, muscle, flesh, bone, etc.)
5. Mixture of natural elements (earth, water, air, fire)
6. Blend of primary powers (hot, cold, moist, dry)
On Aristotle’s view, at its lowest stratum of composition the living body – like
all other terrestrial bodies – is qualified in terms of the primary powers (dunameis)
the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry.  Of these powers, the hot and the cold are
active (poiêtika), while the moist and the dry are passive (pathêtika).  In other words,
hot and cold are propensities to cause change or to act in certain ways, while moist
and dry are propensities to undergo change or be acted upon in certain ways.31  More
specifically, the actions of the hot and the cold are to bind things together.  The hot
does this by bringing together things that are alike and separating them from unlike
things, which makes the materials acted upon more compact, thicker, and drier,
whereas cold indiscriminately brings things together whether or not they are alike.32
The passive modes of being affected associated with the moist and the dry, on the
other hand, are receptivity and resistance to change (respectively).33  Since these
                                                                                                                                            
“blend,” “mixture,” and so forth on account of technicalities in Aristotle’s theory of material
substance.  For instance, see GC I.10.  For a classic paper see H. H. Joachim’s “Aristotle’s Conception
of Chemical Combination” (Journal of Philology 29 (1904), 72-86).  Also see Chapter IV of Gad
Freudenthal’s Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul (Oxford:
Clarendon Paperback, Oxford University Press, 1995).
31 See Meteor. IV (especially Chapters 1, 2, and 4) and GC II.2.
32 See Meteor. IV.2, 380a 4; Meteor. IV.8, 384b 24; GC II.2, 329b 24-31; [On Breath] 9, 485a 28.
33 Over the course of Meteorology IV.8-9 Aristotle considers a number of aptitudes for being affected
that are attributable to the ratio of moist and dry in a body’s constitution.  He considers being
solidified, melted, softened, bent, straightened, broken, fragmented, impressed upon, squeezed, being
malleable, being fissile or easily split, being easily cut, being viscous, being compressible, being
combustible, and giving off fumes.  Additional passages of relevance to these aptitudes for being
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powers are the principles or sources (archai) of the natural elements, they are
“practically the causes (aitiai) controlling life and death, not to mention sleep and
waking, prime and age, disease and health…” (PA II.2, 648b 3)
Thus, on its next stratum of composition, the living body consists of
combinations of primary qualities that comprise the natural elements: earth, water,
air, and fire.  On Aristotle’s view, earth is cold and dry, water is cold and moist, air is
                                                                                                                                            
affected are found in Physics VII.2, where Aristotle describes various forms of motion or change
(kinêsis) involving change of place.  There are two important points I would like to make here.  First,
the reader may consider such recondite details concerning Aristotle’s theory of material powers to have
little or no relevance to issues in moral psychology.  As this dissertation will show, this is a mistake
that has led to misinterpretations of Aristotle’s views of incidental perception, the efficacy of practical
reasoning, and lack of self-restraint or weakness of will (akrasia).  Thus, we will see that such material
aptitudes are crucial to Aristotle’s moral psychology.  For instance, on Aristotle’s view, fumes turn out
to be the key to explaining akrasia (in spite of the fact that, compared to the massive secondary
literature on akrasia, the secondary literature on Aristotle’s theory of fumes is minimal).  In short,
passions are partly constituted by the presence of heat in the body; in most bodies this heat produces
fumes that disrupt the condition of the blood.  The blood is the medium in which our sensory
impressions are preserved and communicated to the center of awareness (the heart), and we think and
conceptualize the circumstances of action through the use of these images.  On Aristotle’s view, then,
it is by producing fumes that passions disrupt the weak-willed person’s thoughts and temporarily
impair his knowledge that what he is doing is unwise.  More generally, as Aristotle explicitly states,
attempting to account for psychological phenomena without determining how they are realized in the
functions of the living body is “absurd” (atopos).  (DA I.3, 407b 14, quoted above at the opening of the
introduction.)  The second point I would like to make here concerns material necessity.  The actions of
the hot and the cold are necessary, and yet have different effects on different occasions.  This is
because they work upon materials with varying aptitudes or passive dispositional propensities on
different occasions.  When the conditions are the same, the effects are always the same: “the same
cause in the same relation cannot have opposite effects upon the same thing.” (Meteor. IV.6, 383a 8;
see also [On Breath] 9, 485b 15 for the idea that the same agent always produces the same activity and
that “nature is always constant.”)  This fact forms the basis of material necessity, which is also echoed
in Aristotle’s description of “non-rational potencies” (dunameis alogoi) in Metaph. IX.5, where it is
claimed that, in the case of these potencies, “when the agent and the patient meet in the way
appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted on.”  (1047b 35 – 1048a
10)  The same notion of material necessity is presented, among other places, in this passage from On
the Generation of Animals: “When a pair of factors, the one active and the other passive, come into
contact in the way in which one is active and the other passive (by “way” I mean the manner, the place,
and the time of the contact), then immediately both are brought into play, the one acting, the other
being acted upon.”  (GA II.4, 740b 22-25)  As we will see, for Aristotle these features of the active and
passive powers of material bodies are extremely important to the explanation of animal motion and
various psychological processes and conditions such as memory, emotion, incidental perception, the
efficacy of practical reasoning, falling asleep, becoming intoxicated, and akrasia, among others.  For
instance, remembering involves the formation of an impression and thus depends upon a suitable
material aptitude to be impressed upon.  If the material constitution into which the impression is made
is too moist the impression will not remain, and if it is too dry no impression will be formed in the first
place.  (On Memory and Reminiscence 1, 450b 1ff)
24
hot and moist, and fire is hot and dry.  The commonalities amongst the elements are
critical because they provide for the transmutability of each element into the others.
For instance, when water (cold and moist) is heated it becomes air (hot and moist).
This mutual transmutability, in turn, is the key to the motion of the elements toward
their natural places in the cosmos,34 and, what is more relevant to our purposes, to the
propagation of changes through the living body.35
On the next level of composition, the living body consists of blends of the
elements that constitute uniform or homoiomerous stuffs such as tissue, blood, flesh,
bone, and muscle.  The blend (krasis) of the these materials is important, particularly
the blend of one’s blood since, in Aristotle’s view, not only is blood the material that
nourishes and replenishes each of the body’s parts, but the images or appearances
(phantasmata) of sensory perception move through the blood to the center of
awareness in the heart.  On this view, having excessively watery blood causes an
animal to be timid (since water is cold and being afraid involves chilling), whereas
having many thick fibers in the blood makes the animal especially liable to outbursts
of anger (because such fibers make the animal susceptible to heating up suddenly and
                                                 
34 In Aristotle’s cosmology, the four elements have natural resting places in the cosmos: earth in the
center, surrounded by water, surrounded by air, surrounded by fire.  Aristotle describes the motion of
each sublunary element toward its natural place as motion toward its form. (DC IV.3, 310a 34)  When
the expression of their natures is unhindered, the elements move toward these places and come to rest
in them when that motion has “come to term,” so to speak, in the attainment of its telos.
35 See Phys. VIII.4, Meteor. IV, and GC II.  To foreshadow the relevance to moral psychology,
affections of soul, thinking, and “imagination” (phantasia), are necessarily accompanied by heating
and chilling in the body (cf. MA 8, 701b 34).  These episodes catalyze elemental motion and changes
within the body that lead to bodily motion and the alteration of perceptual dispositions that are integral
to character.  (For instance, see Phys. VII.3 and MA, 7-8.)  We will discuss these matters in the
chapters that follow.
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being angry involves heating).36  Of particular interest are a variety of passages in
which Aristotle states that the blend of an animal’s material composition accounts for
its possession of intelligence.  For instance, blood that is thin and cold, Aristotle says,
is conducive to intelligence (noesis) (PA II.2, 648a 3).37
Yet higher in its composition, the living body consists of combinations of
uniform stuffs that constitute the non-uniform parts such as the heart, hands, arms,
eyes, etc.  The transition from the uniform to the non-uniform levels of composition is
critical, we will see, in endowing the living thing with functional capacities
characteristic of living things.  For anything that is entirely uniform or homogeneous
in its constitution is incapable of moving itself.  (Physics VIII.4)  A living thing’s
organs must be connected but discontinuous in order for the active and passive
powers combined in the body’s material constitution to act and be acted upon by one
another in ways that endow that whole organism with functional capacities for life
                                                 
36 Among other places, see PA II.4 and DA I.2, 403a 25ff.  For an excellent discussion of this subject
see Gad Freudenthal’s Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, especially §2.1, “Psychological
Effects of the Constitution of the Blood.”
37 There are a variety of passages in which Aristotle links the blend of a living thing’s material
constitution and its psychological characteristics.  For example, “The fineness of the blend (eukrasia)
in man is shown by his possession of [discursive reasoning] (dianoia).” (GA II.6, 744a 30)   Young
people are in a condition similar to intoxication and “their bodies are continually being stung” and
excited by desire for pleasure because of the way they are blended. (NE VII.14, 1154b 10)  The human
being is the most intelligent animal because the constitution of his flesh gives him the greatest
precision in discriminating by touch.  “A sign of this,” Aristotle states, “is that within the human race,
being naturally well or badly endowed with intelligence depends on the organ of this sense [the organ
of touch, i.e. flesh] and not on the others, for those with tough skin are badly equipped by nature for
thinking (dianoian), but those with tender skin are well equipped.” (DA II.9, 421a 20-26) The wasting
away of our power for contemplation and insight is also accounted for by the fact that, though Intellect
itself is unaffected, “something else in us is destroyed [in the body as it decays with age].” (DA I.4,
408b 24)  More generally, “There are many points both in regard to the temperament of animals and
their power of sensation which are controlled by the character of the blood… This is what we should
expect.” (PA II.4, 650b 19-651a 19) The constitution of the heart – its being large, small, hard, or soft
– influences the animal’s temperament. (PA III.4, 667a 7-23)  The cause (aition) of the chameleon’s
“habit of soul” (psychê ethous) is the quantity of its blood. (PA IV.11, 692a 20)  Each of these passages
presents aspects of the animal’s material constitution as causes of its enduring psychological
characteristics.  Also of relevance is Aristotle’s reference to physiognomy (reading features of the
body as signs of qualities in the soul) at Prior Analytics II.27, 70b 7-38.
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activities.38  Finally, then, at its highest level of composition the living body is the
combination of its non-uniform parts into one unified totality possessing the
functional capacity to put its parts to use in the performance of life activities –
namely, the living thing (zôon).
There are a number of things we should note about this stratification of the
living thing’s composition.  First, each stratum is material relative to the one above it
and form relative to the one below it.  Thus, an eye represents form in comparison to
the eye-jelly of which it is composed, but represents material in relation to the living
being of which it is a part.  A thing exemplifies form insofar as it is a completed
something, and exemplifies material insofar as it has the potential to become
something, or a part of something, other than simply itself.
The relativity of the material / form distinction underscores the fact that this
distinction must not be confused with the distinction between the corporeal and the
incorporeal, with its emphasis on magnitude and spatial extension.  Aristotle’s
conception of material (hulê) is better captured by the notion of raw material as
opposed to the finished product made out of that material.  Some things that are
material, in this sense, are not corporeal.  For example, an argument’s premises –
surely not corporeal objects – are the material causes of its conclusion (Phys. II.3,
                                                 
38 On the need for a multiplicity of uniform stuffs in the body, note this: “And inasmuch as the actions
and movements both of an animal as a whole and of its parts are manifold, the substances out of which
these are composed must of necessity possess diverse [powers (dunameis)].” (PA II.1, 646b 15) With
regard to the joining of each non-uniform organ into the total living body, the problem of being
discontinuous but connected is solved by the joints, for which reason Aristotle gives the joints a very
special significance in his explanation of animal motion. Thus, Aristotle states that “if the forearm
were the animal, somewhere in this joint [i.e., the elbow-joint] would be the movement-imparting
origin of the soul…” (MA 8, 702a 33).  This is so because the joints are “where the same thing is a
beginning and an end, like a hinge.” (DA III.10, 433b 22; also see MA 698a 16-b 6 and On the
Progression of Animals 6, 706b 18-24)
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195a 18), in the sense that the information in the conclusion is “put together out of”
the information in the premises.39  Another example of material that is not a corporeal
stuff is the sound of vocalized letters, which are raw material in relation to syllables.40
This relation holds because these uttered letters can be arranged in various ways and
become different syllables.  Syllables, in turn, exemplify form in relation to letters
and material in relation to words, which are form in relation to syllables and material
in relation to, say, a comedy or a tragedy.  As Aristotle remarks, “Tragedy and
comedy are both composed out of the same letters.” (GC I.2, 315b 15)  Similarly,
when it is said that a book or compact disc “contains previously released material,”
the claim is not that the corporeal stuff of which the book or compact disc are
composed has been previously released, but that the written works or songs have been
issued in some other context.  The words or songs are material that has been re-
arranged into the present compilation, but they are not corporeal extended objects.41
Alternatively, some things that are corporeal are not material.  For instance, a
house is corporeal – a physical, spatially extended object.  But a house need not be
material (hulê), just so long as it is not to become a constituent part of some greater
totality such as a housing development.  The wood of which the house is made is
                                                 
39 Also see MA 7, 701a 10 and Plato’s Republic VII, 533C.  We will see this notion of a judgment
being “put together” in connection with Aristotle’s analysis of “incidental perception” in Chapter 2.
40 See Phys. II.3, 195a 18.  It is worth noting that Aristotle is referring to sounds (essentially,
phonemes) rather than written letters.  At Poetics 20, 1456b 22, he states “Now a letter (stoicheion) is
an indivisible vocal sound (phônê), though not every such sound, but one out of which a composite
sound [i.e., a syllable] naturally comes about...” And note Metaphysics VII.12, 1038a 5: “the voice
(phônê) is a genus and material, and its differentiations make forms and letters (stoicheia) out of that.”
In general, the Greek word stoicheia is used in reference to the elementary building blocks of things in
a given domain – in the domain of words, letters; in that of the cosmos, the natural elements; in that of
geometry, the axiomatic definitions and propositions that are the principles or sources (archai) of
geometrical truths (hence the title of Euclid’s Elements – Stoicheia).
41 Less corporeal still, Aristotle refers “intelligible material” as opposed to perceptible material.  The
former comprises, among other things, the objects of mathematics.  (Metaph. VII.10, 1036a 9-12; DA
III.7, 431b 17; see also the Prologues of Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements.)
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material but since the house is not something that will be incorporated into some
other entity that will be made out of this house, the house is not material for any
further product.  Additionally, a living thing is corporeal in the sense that it has a
physical body but it is not material.42
I emphasize that the material / form distinction should not be equated with the
corporeal / incorporeal distinction because confusing these distinctions leads to a
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s hylomorphism.  In particular, Aristotle’s
hylomorphism does not involve the notion that soul-activities take place in some
incorporeal medium whose relation to the corporeal body is very problematic.  When
Aristotle states that the body is a living thing’s material and the soul is its form, he is
not saying that the body is a corporeal thing and the soul is some incorporeal thing.
This is a Cartesian way of thinking that we should dispense of in interpreting
Aristotle.  In reading Aristotle, we must not reify the form: the form is not a thing
(primary ousia), it is the thinghood of a thing (secondary ousia).  The form of a chair
is not a chair, it is the thinghood or being or essence or “what” of each individual
chair.  Thus, in stating that the soul and body are the form and material that constitute
a living thing, Aristotle is saying that the body is the ground of potentialities that is
completed and unified into one total entity by the functional capacity for life activities
that is soul.  (This will be elaborated below.)
A second thing to note about the strata of a thing’s composition is that, for
Aristotle, it is the highest level of composition – that is, form – that constitutes what a
                                                 
42 In “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion,” Aryeh Kosman distinguishes a formal and a material sense of
“of,” as when we refer to “a statue of Pericles” and “a statue of bronze.”  As he remarks, “A statue of
Pericles in the material sense is imaginable, but too macabre to describe.” (p. 48, n. 16)
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given thing most fundamentally is, its being (ousia) in the secondary sense.  At
Physics II.1, 193a 10ff, and at various places throughout On Generation and
Corruption, Aristotle is at pains to show that, although “nature is twofold” (Phys. II.2,
194a 12), that is, involves material and form, form is nature more than material is
nature.  The highest stratum of a thing’s composition is not a raw material but is the
fully formed entity, the definable essence of which is determined by its characteristic
function (ergon).  It is at this highest level, rather than at the lowest, that we find the
thing’s nature – the governing principle of its growth and of its becoming and
continuing to be what it is.  While the Presocratics sought for the source and
governing principle (archê) of things in the lowest level of material out of which all
things are made, Aristotle points to the highest level – to form – for the identification
of the source and principle of change of things; that is, nature (physis).43
In accordance with this view, Aristotle often notes that, e.g., a bed is not
simply wood but wooden, a statue is not simply bronze but brazen.  Strange though it
may seem, this idea is critical to understanding how virtue is acquired.  Aristotle’s
basic idea in this regard is that, if we change the shape of a lump of clay from
rectangular to circular, strictly speaking the subject undergoing alteration is the clay,
not the rectangularity of the clay.  (This is indicated, Aristotle says, by the fact that
what undergoes alteration is called by the same name throughout the alteration.  As
the clay is being reshaped it is still clay, but the rectangular thing is no longer present
                                                 
43 This view has important metaphysical implications that are difficult to articulate and cannot be
considered in detail here.  In short, though, from Aristotle’s perspective the “existence” or being of a
thing is not to be understood in terms of an inert extended mass of bulk stuff out of which it is made,
but in terms of the intelligible principle, definable essence, or form that it is at work holding onto
throughout its “being-at-work-staying-itself” (entelecheia).
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as the circular thing is being brought into being.)  Similarly, Aristotle explicitly states,
when a person develops virtue (intellectual virtue or virtue of character) strictly
speaking the subject of alteration is the body, not the soul.  (This view is argued for in
Physics VII.3.)
Additionally, a thing’s material cause is properly identified with that which is
“nearest” to its form: in looking for the causes (aitiai) of a human being, Aristotle
says, “we must state the nearest causes: What is the material?  Not fire or earth but
the material peculiar to the thing [e.g., human hands, human heart, etc.].” (Metaph.
VIII.4, 1044a 32)44  The opening of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics describes a
sequence of arts, techniques, or technologies (technai) that form a nested hierarchy of
ends and means.  Thus, the goal of the bridle-making art is the bridle, which is used
as a means in the practice of the art of horse riding, which is performed as a means in
the practice of the art of battle, which is undertaken for the sake of victory, which is
ultimately sought because it is believed to promote happiness.  In this sense, each of
these arts produces material that one of the others puts to use (except the highest in
the hierarchy).  In listing things that a rider makes use of in the practice of riding we
would include instruments such as the saddle, but we would not include leather (even
if the saddle is made of leather).  For it is not qua made of leather that the saddle is
used, but qua serviceable in providing a seat on the horse.  The saddle-maker works
with leather, the horse rider works with a saddle.  Likewise, the proper material of the
living thing is not to be identified with the most basic constituent but with those
                                                 
44 The notion of proximity to one or another extreme of a thing’s composition – its most basic material
substratum or the form that defines the total being as a whole – is elaborated upon in Meteor. IV.12,
390a 4-9.
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organs that are readily serviceable in the exercise of the life-activities that define what
this living thing is.45
The living thing’s being alive or being ensouled consists in the facts that (a)
its material constituents have certain correspondingly stratified powers or potencies
(dunamies) and (b) in combination, these powers actualize one another in ways that
endow the living thing with the ability to perform life activities.  The living thing’s
possession of soul is what makes its body what it is (a living plant, animal, or human
body), and therefore soul is the living thing’s form (eidos); on the other hand, the
living thing’s body is the ground of potentiality out of which its soul-power is
actualized and comes to be present, and therefore the body is the living thing’s
material (hulê).  Thus, the attributes of soul “[have] to be in a certain sort of material
if [they are] to be at all.” (DA I.1, 403b 3)46
On the other hand, the body parts of a corpse are not what they were before
the animal died, except in name.  As Aristotle writes, “no soul will be present
elsewhere than in that of which it is the soul; [and] no part of the body will be such in
more than name unless it has some soul in it (e.g., the eye of a dead person).” (GA
II.1, 735a 6)47  An eye is essentially a bodily organ that endows its possessor with the
power of sight.  Strictly speaking, anything that does not do that, is not an eye.  As
                                                 
45 There are various places in Plato and in Aristotle where it is stated that the authority on whether an
instrument is good is the one who uses the instrument and not the one who makes it.  If the saddle does
not serve its function for the rider well, it is not a good saddle however much the maker of the saddle
may insist that it is.  Likewise, the excellence of the soul serves as a higher and more authoritative
criteria for bodily excellence.  The peculiarly human power is analogous to the “most architectonic”
science and master art governing over all other, which for Aristotle is politics.  (See NE I.2 for politics
as the master art.)
46 In particular, natural heat is critical to possessing soul: “Everything living has soul, and it, as we
have said, cannot exist without the presence of natural heat [in the body].” (On Youth and Old Age 6,
470a 20)
47 See also Meteor. IV.12, 389b 31ff.
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Aristotle states, “What a thing is is always determined by its function [its ergon: that
is, its characteristic activity or work]: a thing really is itself when it can perform its
function; an eye, for instance, when it can see.”48  Thus, the functional capacity for
seeing is the form (eidos) that makes the eye what it is.  Holding onto that capacity is
what being an eye consists in; the being (secondary ousia) of an eye is the ongoing
activity (energeia) of maintaining that capacity.  Thus, although a human being’s eye,
a fish’s eye, and a fly’s eye are very different structurally, they are all eyes because
they are organs that procure for the organism a functional capacity to see.
The point of the previous paragraph is very important and should be borne in
mind throughout the course of this dissertation, as we stress the importance of bodily
processes for the explanation of moral responsibility: for Aristotle, the body is not
simply an inert bulk mass of extended stuff, but a dynamic, functional, responsive
system of organs or instruments.  An animal body is necessarily living, for Aristotle,
and when the animal is dead, strictly speaking, its body no longer exists!  The corpse
that remains may be the same bulk matter but it is not the same thing that it was
before.  As Aristotle states, “…when the soul departs, what is left is no longer an
animal, and… none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere
configuration, like the animals that in the fable are turned into stone…” (PA I.1, 641a
18)  For instance, when an animal dies, the orbs of jelly that remain in place of the
animal’s eyes are not eyes but, like the eyes in a statue or a painting, they are eyes “in
                                                 
48 Meteor. IV.12, 390a 10.  In the Epilogue of this dissertation we will consider the application of this
concept to the human being as a whole entity: we are not really ourselves if we have not developed our
peculiarly human powers.
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name only.”  The living body is the soul's manifestation in material, the soul's
presence in the realm of phenomenal appearance.
Accordingly, the psychosomatic unity of the living being should not be
interpreted as a “reduction” of the soul to corporeal bulk.  As Aristotle remarks, “no
part of an animal exists without matter, nor is it matter alone; neither will a body in
any [random] condition whatsoever be an animal, nor will any of its parts, as has been
said repeatedly.” (PA I.3, 643a 24; trans. Lennox)  Thus, the ensoulment of the body
is no less essential than the embodiment of the soul.  This may seem to dangerously
blur the distinction between soul and body but this is the very point: soul and body
are not two separate things, but two different aspects of one thing.  Neither the soul of
this animal nor the body of this animal can exist without the other.
As mentioned above, according to Aristotle whenever we think, we do so
along with “images” (phantasmata) that facilitate our apprehension of given
intelligible contents.  For example, when one thinks about triangularity, one fashions
an image of some particular triangle that assists one in contemplating triangularity in
general by holding before the mind’s eye a particular instance of triangularity (i.e., a
particular triangle).  Insofar as this is the case, the kinds of “images” to be employed
in the service of grasping what is being said in this dissertation are not merely visual
snapshots of bodies or their interior parts, but moving pictures of living bodies in
action and memories of the visceral sensations that accompany action and experience.
The focus is obviously not on, say, what the heart looks like but on what it does, for,
like the whole body and its other parts, the heart “really is itself” only when it is
doing its job (ergon).
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1.3 A Hierarchy of Powers: Propensities and Capacities
Just as its composition is stratified into a hierarchy, as described above, the
powers (dunameis) held together in the living body are correspondingly stratified.  To
clarify this point, we need to distinguish between dispositional propensities and
functional capacities.  A functional capacity is what a thing can do or can be used to
do.  A dispositional propensity, on the other hand, is what a thing will do, or will tend
to do, if left to its own devices.  The distinction here is essentially equivalent to
Aristotle’s distinction between a power or potency in general (dunamis,
corresponding to a functional capacity), and the particular kind of power that is a
thing’s nature (physis, corresponding to a dispositional propensity – more
specifically, its nature proper would be the central dispositional propensity that causes
and governs its growth and change so as to move it toward its end (telos)).  In
reference to this distinction, Joe Sachs notes that “A doctor doctors himself as
another, as a patient who happens to be himself, but a cut in his finger heals itself in
its own right; medical skill is a potency, while the self-maintenance of a being as a
whole is a nature.”49  The doctor does not spring into action and begin healing his
patient (whether that patient is himself or another) in the way that his wounded hand
begins to automatically repair itself.50  (We can characterize a thing’s second nature in
                                                 
49 Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 167, n. 3.
50 Compare DA III.9, 433a 3-6: “And generally we see that one who has medical knowledge does not
necessarily heal anyone, since it is something else that governs one’s doing anything in accordance
with the knowledge and not the knowledge itself.”  The far-reaching significance of this observation
will become apparent later.  One noteworthy implication here is that the phenomena of akrasia is
possible exactly because knowledge alone does not govern action and, as Aristotle states at NE II.4
1105b 2 “for having the virtues, the knowing [of what is virtuous] is of little or no strength, while the
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these terms as a functional capacity that has been transformed into a dispositional
propensity through repetition of that functional capacity’s exercise.  We will return to
this in the Epilogue of this dissertation.)
For example, a well-formed ax has a functional capacity or potency to serve as
an instrument for chopping wood, but it does not have a dispositional propensity or
nature that moves it to do so – that is, it will not simply tend to chop on its own.51  On
the other hand, iron has a dispositional propensity to hold up under pressure, but iron,
qua iron, does not have a functional capacity to serve as an instrument for chopping –
it must be fashioned into an iron ax with a sharp blade.  Now, both propensities and
capacities come in active and passive forms, being specific ways of tending or being
able to act or re-act in determinate ways.  Examples are as follows:
Table 2: Dispositional Propensities and Functional Capacities
Dispositional Propensities Functional Capacities
Active Iron has an ADP to fall until its
motion is impeded (as opposed
to, say, fire, which has an ADP
to rise).  In short, iron is heavy.
Because of iron’s ADP, an anchor
made out of iron has a functional
capacity to effectively serve as an
instrument for holding a ship in place.
Passive Iron has a PDP to remain rigid
under pressure and to maintain
its structure.  In short, iron is
hard.
Because of iron’s PDP, an ax made
out of iron has a functional capacity to
effectively serve as an instrument for
chopping with.
                                                                                                                                            
other conditions [of desire and character] have not a little but all the power…”  Compare also Metaph.
IX.5, 1047b 35 – 1048a 15 on rational versus non-rational potencies, discussed below in §2.2.
51 If it were composed of materials that also gave it a propensity to chop, and it had the functional
capacity to control that propensity and could thus arrest itself as well, this functional capacity would be
its soul. (DA II.1, 412b 10 – 413a 5)  In a different context, in Politics I.4, Aristotle presents vivid and
enchanting images of instruments that can accomplish their own work (ergon), “like the statues of
Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, ‘of their own accord entered the assembly
of the gods.’” He states that “if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the
lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.”
(1253b 33)  The notion presented in De Anima, with the example of the axe, is that if an instrument has
the power to perform or to not perform its function, then that power is its soul.
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In order for an instrument to have a specific functional capacity, it must be
made of material with appropriate dispositional propensities.  A material’s
dispositional propensities result in its generating certain necessary consequences that
arise in one way or another depending on the conditions in which it finds itself.52
Functional capacities, on the other hand, depend upon a set of necessary conditions
that must be fulfilled for an instrument to become serviceable for the performance of
its function (ergon).  Thus, the functional capacities that constitute an instrument’s
form arise out of the successful exploitation, by a craftsman or by nature, of the
dispositional propensities of its materials.53  What a thing can do or can be used to do
depends upon what its material constituents do or tend to do.  By skillfully mastering
the dispositional propensities of appropriate material, the functional capacity that
constitutes a thing’s form comes to be present.54
                                                 
52 Recall footnote on material necessity in §1.2.
53 One additional factor to note here is that the instrument’s design must establish a balance similar to a
combinatorial optimization problem.  That is, some of a material’s dispositions may make it
serviceable for constructing an instrument with a certain capacity, while others of its dispositions may
have the opposite effect.  For instance, the rigidity of iron makes it ideal as material for axes, but its
heaviness is much less welcome since an ax that is so heavy it cannot be lifted or swung easily will not
serve its function well no matter how sharp the blade is.  Thus, as the blade’s sturdiness is increased
(which is desirable), so is its weight (which is not desirable).  To construct the optimal blade, the
appropriate balance between sharpness, sturdiness, and weight must be established.  In recent years
there has been a growing appreciation of the need to make instruments and technological artifacts out
of materials that are environmentally friendly.  Creative ways of exploiting the powers of various
materials is thus highly valued (e.g., the recent invention of a water bottle made of paper rather than
plastic).
54 It is worth noting here that Plotinus characterizes beauty as involving the complete mastery of
material by form.  (See Enneads I.6, especially §§2-3.)  In the chapters that follow, we will come to see
that the human being’s mastery of the dispositional propensities of the body’s material constituents is,
from Aristotle’s perspective, a fundamental problem of the practice of ethical philosophy and of
human happiness.  For it is through this process of the psychosomatic self-mastery of its material that
the human being’s form – that is, its soul – can actualize itself in the unimpeded expression of its
nature.  Insofar as this fails to be attained, the body’s dispositional propensities are calling all the shots,
and the soul – particularly, that specifically human part of the soul (namely, intellect or nous) – is just
passively along for the ride.  In this case, the lower powers have the upper hand in determining the
trajectory of one’s life-course.  We will return to this idea briefly in the Epilogue of this dissertation.
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The principles described above are applicable to the living body as well as to
artificial instruments.  The difference, of course, is that the forces that govern the
generation, growth, and functioning of the living body work from within that very
living body’s material.  This is the sense of Aristotle’s claim that if the shipbuilding
art were in the wood, ships would come about naturally – ships would not be built,
they would be grown.  (Physics II.8, 199b 28)  The principle of change at work in a
living thing’s material that governs its growth is its nature – i.e., its soul.  Now, the
necessary conditions that underlie a thing’s functional capacities are described in
many contexts in terms of the so-called “hypothetical necessities.”  Just as an ax’s
functional capacity to chop depends upon the dispositional propensities of its
constituent material, so a living thing’s functional capacity to perform life activities is
dependent upon the dispositional propensities of the stratified material constituents of
which it is made.  Thus, Aristotle states:
“A hatchet, in order to split wood, must, of necessity, be hard; if so, then it
must, of necessity, be made of bronze or of iron.  Now the body, like the
hatchet, is an instrument; as well the whole body as each of its parts has a
purpose, for the sake of which it is [namely, soul (see below)]; the body must
therefore, of [hypothetical] necessity, be such and such, and made of such and
such materials, if that purpose is to be realized.” (PA I.1, 642a 10)
It is in this sense that Aristotle criticizes his predecessors as falling into an
“absurdity” (atopos) by trying to account for the soul without paying attention to the
body, “just as though, in the manner of the Pythagorean myths, any random soul were
to be clothed in any random body.  For while each body seems to have its own proper
look (eidos) and form (morphê), they talk as if one were to say that carpentry is
transmigrated into flutes; but the art has to use tools and the soul has to use the body.”
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(DA I.3, 407b 21)55  Just as one cannot build a house with a flute, one cannot live as a
human being without a human body.56  Human intelligence cannot awaken in a flea’s
body: the relationship between the soul and the body is not arbitrary.  Furthermore, as
indicated above, according to Aristotle, even from person to person, differences in
material constitution are mirrored by differences in the degree to which intelligence
can awaken in the given person. (DA II.9, 421a 20-26)57
These points concern the fact that there are necessary conditions (or
“hypothetical necessities”) in terms of what material can support what functional
capacities.  However, we must not lose sight of the fact that, for Aristotle, there are
also necessary consequences that result from the material conditions at hand.  These
necessary consequences result from the specific active and passive dispositional
propensities of the material involved.  Throughout On the Generation of Animals, and
also in numerous passages in On the Parts of Animals, Aristotle repeatedly identifies
processes of embryonic development, for instance, and states that they occur “both by
necessity and for a purpose.”  Here I strongly agree with Mary Louise Gill, who notes
                                                 
55 A parallel passage is found in DA II.2, 414a 19-24: “those who think the soul neither has being
without a body, nor is any sort of body, get hold of it well, for it is not a body but something that
belongs to a body, and this is why it is present in a body and in a body of a certain kind, and those
earlier thinkers did not think well who stuck it into a body without also distinguishing which bodies
and of what sort, even though there is no evidence that any random thing admits of just any random
thing within it.”
56 As we will see in the Epilogue of this dissertation, although a human body is necessary for living life
as a human being, it is not sufficient.
57 We should note that “intelligence itself” is always awake.  In De Anima I.4, Aristotle distinguishes
between Nous itself and the individual possessor of nous.  The former is the self-subsistent, immortal,
unchanging, undifferentiated noetic luminosity that is the Divine Mind.  In the individual possessor of
nous, the immortal noetic luminosity is attenuated by individual’s psychosomatic conditions.
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that the necessity in question in such passages is not hypothetical necessity but
material necessity.58
For example, “The same thing may exist for an end and be necessitated as
well.  For example, light shines through a lantern (1) because that which consists of
relatively small particles necessarily passes through pores larger than those
particles… and (2) for an end, namely to save us from stumbling.” (Post. An. II.11,
94b 27ff)  The sense of necessity referred to in (1) here is certainly not hypothetical
necessity but physical necessity.  In the context of biological development, consider
Aristotle’s explanation of the formation of teeth taking place by necessity and for a
purpose.  The purpose for which the teeth form is to reproduce the father’s form by
endowing the growing offspring with the power to chew its food.  In saying that they
also develop by necessity, Aristotle is not pointing out that possessing teeth is a
necessary condition for having the power to chew one’s food (although that is the
case).  Rather, he is saying, when the material conditions are suitable, the
dispositional propensities of the material undergoing change invariably give rise to
the organ in question, by necessity.
The primary active source of change in the development of the body is the
body’s internal heat.  This catalyzes a process of “concoction” (pepsis), which he
                                                 
58 Mary Louise Gill, “Material Necessity and Meteorology IV.12” in Kullmann and Föllinger, eds.,
Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), pp. 145-
161 (esp. p. 146).  See also GA V.1, 778b ff; PA I.1, 642a 33; PA II.14, 658b 3.  There are so many
examples of this idea throughout GA that it is virtually unnecessary to provide references.  However,
one of the many pertinent passages is found in the closing page of the work: “Democritus, however,
omitted to mention the Final Cause, and so all the things which Nature employs he refers to necessity.
It is of course true that they are determined by necessity, but at the same time they are for the sake of
some purpose, some Final Cause… And there is nothing to prevent the teeth being formed and being
shed in the way [Democritus] says [as Peck notes: “i.e., ‘of necessity,’ as a result of mere mechanical
causation”], but it is not on that account that it happens, but on account of the Final Cause, the End…”
(GA V.8, 789b 3, my emphasis)
40
defines as “a process in which the natural and proper heat of an object perfects the
corresponding passive qualities [the moist and dry], which are the proper matter of
any given object.  For,” he continues, “when concoction has taken place we say that a
thing has been perfected and has come to be itself [that is, it has come to be a thing of
its kind; e.g. a human being].  It is the proper heat of a thing that sets up this
perfecting.” (Meteor. 2, 379b18)59
In his account of animal generation, Aristotle emphasizes that the material
conditions must be appropriate for the right effects to come about as a result of the
innate heat’s action.  He states,
“This heat, however, to produce flesh or bone, does not work on some casual
material in some casual place at some casual time; material, place and time
must be those ordained by Nature: that which is potentially will not be
brought into being by a motive agent which lacks the appropriate actuality; so,
equally, that which possesses the actuality will not produce the right article
out of any casual material.  No more could a carpenter produce a chest out of
anything but wood; and, equally, without a carpenter no chest will be
produced out of wood.” (GA II.6, 743a 21)
Thus, the reason that dispositional propensities are propensities, and not
absolutely inevitable consequences in any and every circumstance, is because the
material conditions in which they are situated vary from occasion to occasion.  The
author of On Breath makes similar observations with the example of fire and its use
                                                 
59 I will add here that, as I understand Aristotle’s view, moral development is continuous with
biological growth.  The natural growth of the human organism falls short of the full realization of
human nature, and moral development – to borrow a phrase from Aristotle’s Physics II.8, 199a 17 –
completes what nature cannot bring to a finish.  The transformation that turns a biologically human
animal into a fully realized human being is a sort of psychosomatic alchemy through which the inner
heating and chilling that takes place in the experience of the soul’s affections and the exertion of
voluntary attention alters the symmetry of powers in the body’s inner organs, which alters the agent’s
mode of perception, which leads to the agent’s possession of virtue.  (See Phys. VII.3.  We will touch
upon these issues in the chapters that follow, particularly Chapter 2 and the Epilogue.)
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as an instrument in the arts for producing different effects: the goldsmith, the
coppersmith, the carpenter, and the cook make use of fire in different ways and on
different materials.  While the arts use fire as an instrument, nature uses fire as a
material as well.  ([On Breath] 9, 485b 6)60  In each case, the effects of fire’s use as
instrument or as material are dependent upon its dispositional propensities and the
dispositional propensities of the material that it works upon.  For instance, wood and
stone have different passive dispositional propensities, and it is on account of this that
setting fire to the wood and setting fire to the stone will have very different results,
even though the action of fire is the same in both cases.  As Aristotle states in On
Generation and Corruption, “the character of the process is determined by the
character of that which undergoes it.”  (GC II.11, 338b 16)61
At [On Breath] 9, 485b 9, the author marvels over the fact that nature
establishes the “proper symmetry” (rhuthmon) in living organisms such that their
constituents function as instruments in the performance of life-activities.62  In the life-
activity of reproduction, the proper symmetry in question is the balance of active and
passive powers in the material constituents of the fertilized egg (which Aristotle calls
a “fetation”), organized precisely in the way required for that material to grow into a
                                                 
60 Although [On Breath] is in the Aristotelian Corpus, it is generally agreed that Aristotle himself is not
its author.  (For this reason, we place its title in brackets.)  Nevertheless, it was written in an
Aristotelian framework and the passages that I quote from it are matched by passages in authentic
works of Aristotle that speak to the same point.  For a recent study of this work, and an argument that
it is “entirely Aristotelian,” see Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu) (Boston: Brill, 2008),
Abraham P. Bos and Rein Ferwerda.
61 A corresponding passage involving the generation of the living body is found at GA III.11, 762a 27:
“The object which thus takes shape may be valuable in kind or less valuable; and the differences herein
depend upon the envelope which encloses soul-principle; and the causes which determine this are the
situations where the process takes place and the physical substance which is enclosed.”  Relevant
discussion is also to be found in GC I.5.
62 As we will see in the next chapter, the idea of proper symmetry is presented by Aristotle, e.g. at MA
8, 702a 7, with regard to the organization of the interior conditions of the body that enable the
organism to move itself in intelligent ways.
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reproduction of its parents (particularly, for Aristotle, a reproduction of its father).  As
Marcus Aurelius declares, “A man deposits a seed in a womb and goes away, and
then another cause takes it, and labors on it and makes a child.  What a thing from
such a material!” (Meditations X.26)  Aristotle models the process of generation with
the example of “miraculous automatic puppets”:
“And it is possible that A should move B, and B move C, and that the process
[of animal reproduction] should be like that of [the motion of] the miraculous
automatic puppets: the parts of these automatons, even while at rest, have in
them somehow or other a potentiality, and when some external agency sets the
first part in movement, then immediately the adjacent part comes to be [in
motion] in actuality.  The cases then are parallel…” (GA II.1, 734b 9)
Aristotle goes on to list two respects in which they are parallel: in each case,
(1) in one sense the source of motion is the external agent (i.e., the father or the one
who pushes the automaton forward), and (2) in another sense the source of motion
resides within the growing animal or moving automaton itself (i.e., the passive and
active dispositional propensities of its constitution).  We will return to this principle
in connection with voluntary action shortly, but for the moment I want to emphasize a
third parallel: in each case, (3) the processes of change or motion that unfold on a
given occasion are a necessary sequence of causes and effects.  In a later chapter,
Aristotle refers to the automatic puppets once again and states that “As the parts of
the animal to be formed are present potentially in the matter [provided by the female],
once the principle of movement has been supplied [by the male], one thing follows on
after another without interruption, just as it does in the miraculous automatic
puppets.”  (GA II.5, 741b 8)
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1.4 Stratification of Actions and Experiences
It is now time to draw together some of the preceding material and to briefly
foreshadow its relevance to moral psychology.63  The central point I would like to
make clear before embarking upon our study of the physiological foundations of
Aristotle’s moral psychology is this: although a living thing is certainly not merely
flesh and bones, much less merely earth, air, fire, and water, the powers of each strata
of its composition are held together within it.  Thus, human thinking, action, and
experience take place and are generated by the human being as a psychosomatic
whole, and all strata of its composition are involved.64
Thus, at one and the same time I hail a cab, I raise my arm, my muscles tense
and relax in a specific way, the hot and the cold interact and transform each into the
other in some specific way.  None of the events in this hierarchy is “reducible” to any
of the others. Wittgenstein famously intimated that this is the case in his
Philosophical Investigations: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm
goes up.  And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm
goes up from the fact that I raise my arm? ((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my
                                                 
63 I will take this opportunity to note that the use of “material” in the above sentence is obviously not a
reference to any corporeal substance.  In this sense it exemplifies what was said earlier about the
problem of confusing Aristotle’s notion of material (hulê) with the notion of corporeality or “matter”
(in a Cartesian sense).  It is not qua corporeal that Aristotle refers to a thing as material, but qua that
out of which something can be made (whether corporeal or not).  It is true that many or most sorts of
raw material are corporeal stuffs, but that is beside the point.  The literal and original meaning of hulê
is simply wood, a paradigm of raw material since it can be fashioned into a variety of different things
that are no longer merely wood but wooden: ships, beds, houses, etc.
64 Thinking poses special problems.  It will be sufficient to point out here that Aristotle explicitly states
that if thinking requires an image, then it requires or involves the body.  (DA I.1, 403a 9)  And he
states that thinking does require an image.  (On Memory and Reminiscence, 1, 449b 31; DA III.7, 431a
14; DA III.8, 432a 7) It follows by modus ponens that thinking requires or involves the body (even if
thought or mind itself, as opposed to an individual person’s thought or mind, has no bodily organ and
is ultimately a mind embodied in itself – a mind whose form is its material and whose material is its
form).  Also recall Aristotle’s claim that the blend (krasis) of an animal’s body has a direct bearing on
its intelligence and ability to think discursively. (DA II.9, 421a 20-26)
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willing?))”65  There is something left over, and so my moving my arm is not reducible
to my arm going up.  (We will comment upon kinaesthetic sensations briefly below.)
However, in spite of this irreducibility, there is a relationship amongst them
such that I cannot hail a cab unless I raise my arm, I cannot raise my arm unless my
muscles contract, my muscles cannot contract unless the hot and the cold interact in
the appropriate way.  Thus, these lower-order and higher-order descriptions of the
episode in question are irreducible yet, in a given instance, do not refer to separable
or independent events.  We can depict this action / event in correspondence to the
stratification of the living thing’s composition in Table 1.66
Table 3: Stratification of Action(s) / Event(s)
Strata of Composition Stratified Action(s) / Event(s)
1. Human being I hail a cab
2. Living body I set my body in motion
3. Non-uniform body parts I move my arm
4. Uniform materials My muscles contract and expand
5. Natural elements Transmutation of elements
6. Primary powers Heating / chilling coincident with desire
As mentioned above, heating and chilling necessarily go along with the
passions (pathê), “imagination” (phantasia), and thinking.67  Furthermore, these
                                                 
65 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 3rd ed. §621, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1958), 161.
66 Notice how the language changes when our description moves from the non-uniform to the uniform
levels of composition.  As mentioned above, while uniform parts are continuous stuffs, a self-mover
must parts that are connected but discontinuous.  This seems to generate a paradox: how can
voluntarily self-moving wholes be composed of parts that cannot move themselves, and the changes of
which are involuntary?  Although I cannot treat this problem fully here, the resolution of this difficulty
would involve some account of the transformation of material powers when constituents form
“mixtures” and parts are combined into wholes.  As one intimation along these lines, consider the bars
and pegs that comprise an “automatic puppet.”  When these material pieces are combined in the right
way, “even while at rest, [they] have in them somehow or other a potentiality” for moving and being
moved in ways that these same parts when disconnected do not possess.
67 For instance, see MA 8, 701b 34.
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functions of soul are not incorporeal events that cause corporeal events; rather, they
have materiality in the very definitions of what they are. (DA I.1, 403a 25)  For
instance, the physiological surge of heat experienced by an angry person is not caused
by anger, but is a constituent of anger (and so on for the other affections of soul).
Similarly, “the instrument by which desire causes motion is already a part of the
body….”68  Before, during, and after voluntary action, there are concurrent
physiological changes integral to the origination, performance, and repercussions of
the action.  Actions do not originate in disembodied thoughts and desires that
somehow, just at the moment of action, relate themselves to the body and cause it to
move.69  The psychological processes that are the generators of action are embodied
the whole time; they do not become bodily just as the action takes place.  Thus, there
is a seamless flow from the thoughts and desires relevant to action to the motions that
take place when one acts, for there is a seamless flow of physiological processes that
takes place from before the action takes place, while its going on, and after its over.
So just as one walks with one’s legs (and cannot walk without them), and sees
with one’s eyes (and cannot see without them), likewise, the individual human being
feels and reasons along with processes within the body and cannot feel or reason in
their absence.  Furthermore, just as one’s gait is influenced by the condition of the
legs, and one’s visual acuity by that of the eyes, so too the qualities of a person’s
                                                 
68 DA III.10, 433b 19.
69 For Aristotle, there certainly are no disembodied desires, and, as I read him, there are no
disembodied thoughts other than the immortal, undifferentiated, unchanging luminosity of the Divine
Mind.  Either way, as the MA passage just referred to shows, for Aristotle thinking is accompanied by
bodily changes of heating and chilling.
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character and intelligence are grounded in and inseparably bound up with the
conditions within the living body.
Human intelligence, recall, cannot awaken in a flea’s body.  Neither can moral
responsibility (which is associated with intelligence).  If moral responsibility is a
function of psychological capacity, and psychological capacity depends upon the
fulfillment of specific necessary conditions in the dispositional propensities of the
living body, then moral responsibility can only be exercised by agents with
appropriate bodies.  Attempting to explain moral responsibility without accounting
for the relevant conditions in the living body, from Aristotle’s point of view, would
be “absurd.” (DA I.3, 407b 14)
As we will see later, the plasticity of its organic matter is a critical factor that
makes a living thing capable of the self-control that makes it responsible for its
actions.  For the present, the following brief illustrations will help to convey what is
being said here.  According to Aristotle, one experiences anger and fear and the other
passions or affections (pathê) of soul within the physical body (more specifically, in
the region of the heart).  Aristotle defines anger, in abstraction from the conditions of
its actual existence, as “a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a
conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s
friends.”  (Rhetoric II.2, 1378a 31)  But it is “absurd” to speak of anger, or any such
emotion, as if it is an incorporeal entity in its own right, just as it is absurd to imagine
that the power of sight is a self-subsistent entity existing separately from the eye.
While its content is defined in terms of desire for revenge, the actual occurrence of
anger is experienced together with a boiling of the blood and a sudden rush of heat
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around the heart. (DA I.1, 403a 32)  These bodily changes are integral to the anger
itself.  Just as walking depends upon and is partly constituted by the motion of one’s
legs, so anger depends upon and is partly constituted by a surge of heat around the
heart that is experienced along with thoughts of revenge.
I must reiterate here that, for Aristotle, soul-functions and affections do not
simply cause bodily processes; they are partially constituted by such processes.  We
can discuss them in entirely psychological terms, but in their actual existence they are
psychosomatic in nature.  An additional example: in the abstract, Aristotle defines
fear as “a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the
future.”  (Rhetoric II.5, 1382a23)  The actual conditions in which this affection is
experienced, according to Aristotle, involve chilling around the heart – a “horror to
freeze the heart!”70  For Aristotle, the fear does not cause a freezing chill around the
heart; the fear is a freezing chill around the heart, painfully experienced in unison
with images of some expected future evil.
Although their understandings of human physiology differed greatly from
Aristotle’s, William James and Henri Bergson each held views on this issue that are
comparable to Aristotle’s.  Bergson quotes Herbert Spencer: “Fear, when strong,
expresses itself in cries, in efforts to escape, in palpitations, in tremblings,” and
Bergson adds, “We go further, and maintain that these [bodily] movements form part
of the terror itself: by their means the terror becomes an emotion capable of passing
through different degrees of intensity [as opposed to being a vapid and vacant thought
                                                 
70 From Homer’s Iliad (6.407-409), translated by Robert Fagles in Homer: The Iliad (New York:
Penguin Classics, 1990), 207.
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that something bad is about to take place].”71  Bergson distinguishes the relevant idea
and the full extent of the emotion.  For instance, the idea that someone has insulted
you is not anger, and this idea does not change, Bergson maintains, as the anger
becomes more or less intense.  The emotion of anger necessarily involves sensuously
felt bodily changes and it is the nature and extent of these sensations that account for
the relative “intensities” of the emotion.72  The thought “I have been insulted”
combined with a sensation of sudden heating and clenching of muscles is experienced
as rage, whereas the same thought-content (or “idea”) combined with a relatively
                                                 
71 Time and Free Will, p. 30.
72 I say that these bodily changes are sensuously felt and not simply that they take place: the change or
motion (kinêsis) in the body does not play the same role without the corresponding sensation
(aisthêsis) of that motion.  This is important, and goes back to Wittgenstein’s reference to kin-
aesthetics.  However, we must note that we do not generally acknowledge these sensations directly or
recognize the role that they play, just as one does not generally attend to the sensation in one’s feet
while walking, or in one’s tongue while talking, although these sensations are nevertheless present in
some sense.  To borrow a phrase from elsewhere in Bergson’s Time and Free Will, these physiological
changes are “not unperceived, but rather unnoticed.” (p. 169)  On this theme, in Greek Theories of
Elementary Cognition From Alcmeon to Aristotle, Beare writes: “Our aisthêseis [sensations] are more
numerous than our aisthêta [objects of sensation]… because we do not notice the former unless we
notice the latter.  In modern terms, we do not notice sensations which, not being referred to an object,
are not perceptions.  There are, in this way, many aisthêseis which pass without being attended to or
coming ‘into consciousness.’” (p. 207)  Compare this with the following from William James: “We
notice only those sensations which are signs to us of things which happen practically or aesthetically to
interest us, to which we therefore give substantial names, and which we exalt to this exclusive status of
independence and dignity.” (Psychology: The Briefer Course (=PBC), pp. 21-22, and also see p. 38)
Becoming mindful of such bodily sensations as they happen along with one’s emotions is one strategy
for gaining some traction in struggling with a wayward emotion.  In the discourses of the Buddha,
mindfulness of the body – particularly mindfulness of one’s breathing – is given an important place.
Thus, the Buddha says, “when anyone has developed and cultivated mindfulness of the body, Mâra
[here a personification of non-virtuous emotions and delusion] cannot find an opportunity or a support
in him.” (“Mindfulness of the Body” (Kâyagatasati Sutta), from The Middle Length Discourses of the
Buddha, §26, p. 955)  Samuel Beckett also presents a vivid depiction of coming to be aware of oneself
in the body in the following segment from his play “Not I” (the entirety of which significantly features
a completely dark stage save for one narrow spotlight illuminating just the actress’s mouth): “… after
long efforts . . . when suddenly she felt . . . gradually she felt . . . her lips moving . . . imagine! . . her
lips moving! . . as of course till then she had not . . . and not alone the lips . . . the cheeks . . . the jaws .
. . the whole face . . . all those– . . what?. . the tongue? . . yes . . . the tongue in the mouth . . . all those
contortions without which . . . no speech possible . . . and yet in the ordinary way . . . not felt at all . . .
so intent one is . . . on what one is saying . . . the whole being . . . hanging on its words . . . that feeling
was coming back . . . imagine! . . feeling coming back! . . starting at the top . . . then working down . . .
the whole machine. . .” (Samuel Beckett: The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 379-380)
49
uneventful physiological condition is experienced as a mild anger or none at all.73
William James expresses a similar view:
“I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: If we
fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of
it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind,
no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold
and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains.”74
This distinction between the thought content and the total experience that is
the emotion is crucial.  The fact that the physiological contributions to that total
experience are integral to the emotion itself means that the purely physical properties
of the body make a governing contribution to the structure and functioning of the
psyche.  Such a view, shared in its essentials by Aristotle, James, and Bergson
(among others), has enormous implications for moral psychology, which seeks to
explain how agency and moral responsibility are rooted in the structure and
functioning of the psyche.  As was shown earlier in this chapter, for Aristotle the
functional capacities that constitute the psyche are conditioned by the body and the
dispositional propensities of its constituents.
Like the passions, discursive reasoning also takes place in unison with, and is
partially constituted by, bodily changes since, according to Aristotle, it necessarily
involves the use of “images” (phantasmata) that are present within the blood and
                                                 
73 A completely speculative thought: the practice of constructing advertisements so that they are funny,
rather than informative, may be an effective method because it momentarily combines the thought of
the product with the pleasurable physical sensation of laughing.  This experiential association greases
the rails such that one is inclined to have a favorable attitude toward the product in question.
74 PBC, p. 246.  As James notes in the next section, in spite of first appearances, his view is not
“materialist.”
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heart.75  Even a person’s capacity for non-discursive contemplation (theoria) is
conditioned by his or her bodily state, in spite of the fact, according to Aristotle, that
non-discursive contemplation is not a bodily process.76
So for Aristotle it is as psychosomatic wholes that we think discursively,
perceive, experience emotions, perform actions, and shape our characters.  With
regard to virtually all of its attributes, “the soul neither does anything nor has
anything done to it without the body...” (DA I.1, 403a 5)  Recall the metaphor from
above about the concave and the convex.  Like the body and soul, they are
conceptually distinguishable but existentially inseparable.  Thus, when you bend a
stick, its concave and convex aspects bend together.  Likewise, when a person acts, or
thinks discursively, or experiences emotion, the soul and body act as one: the person
is at work as a psychosomatic totality.  Attending to a particular intelligible content
and sensing certain physiological changes in the living body are one existentially
indivisible event: getting angry, feeling distressed over money problems, being
stunned by some marvelous discovery, being inspired by some heroic deed, straining
                                                 
75 Recall the following references: DA I.1, 403a 9; DA III.7, 431a 16; DA III.8, 432a 7; On Memory
and Reminiscence, 1, 449b 31.  See also On Memory and Reminiscence 2, 453a 10-b7, where Aristotle
states that recollection is a form of discursive reasoning (syllogismos) and involves searching for an
image in a material substratum.
76 A variety of passages support this claim.  Some of the most important passages of relevance are to
be found in Physics VII.3 and DA I.4.  For instance, “it is by the soul’s calming down out of its native
disorder that it becomes something understanding (gignetai) and knowing (epistêmon).  For this reason
too, children are able neither to learn nor to judge from sense perceptions in the same way as their
elders for their disorder and motion [in their bodies] is great.  The soul is calmed and brought to rest
for some by nature itself, for others by other people, but in both kinds by the being altered of
something in the body, just as in the case of the use and being-at-work, when one has become sober or
has been awakened.” (Phys. VII.3, 247b 17 – 248a 6, my emphasis)  In the Oxford translation, Hardie
and Gaye have “…children are inferior to adults owing to the great amount of restlessness and motion
in their souls.”  However, the motion and restlessness in question is certainly in the body (as the
italicized portion of the above quotation indicates), and there is nothing in the Greek text
corresponding to the words “in the soul” in their English translation.  (There are a variety of places
where Aristotle refers to turbulent motion within the bodies of children and its psychological effects.
We will encounter some of these below.)
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to recall a forgotten face  – all of these are performed or experienced by the person as
a psychosomatic whole.
Indeed, in De Anima I.4, Aristotle states that it is better to speak of the person,
rather than the body or the soul, as acting, thinking, and experiencing.  For example,
when a man opens a door or decides to take a walk, we do not say that his hand
opened the door or that his soul decided to take a walk.   Thus, “… to say that the soul
gets angry is as if someone were to say the soul weaves cloth or builds a house.  For it
is better, perhaps, not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks things through
(dianoeisthai), but that the human being does these things by means of the soul…”
(DA I.4, 408b 12) The source of the action is neither the body nor the soul but the
human being as a psychosomatic whole.77  Therefore, to explain action and self-
motion, one must identify the psychosomatic sources from which they come forth.
In conclusion, the psychosomatic unity of the living thing has the consequence
that the soul and the living body can be talked about in isolation, but they cannot exist
apart from one another.  They are distinguishable, but not separable (like a curved
line’s concavity and its convexity, and like a road going from Athens to Thebes and
the same road going from Thebes to Athens).  However, although it is possible to talk
about them in separate discourses, according to Aristotle, it is “absurd” (atopon) to do
so.78  Aristotle tells us that the motion of animals is caused by desire on account of the
fact that “the instrument by which desire causes motion is already a part of the body
                                                 
77 Also see EE II.6, 1222b 28 where it is the human being (anthrôpos) who is said to be the source of
action and motion.
78 DA I.3, 407b 14-24 (quoted above).  It is interesting to contrast this view with Descartes’
methodology as stated in his work Treatise on Man: “I must describe for you first the body on its own;
and then the soul, again on its own; and finally I must show you how these two natures would have to
be joined and united so as to constitute men resembling us.”  (Descartes, The World and Other
Writings trans. and ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 99.)
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[and] for this reason one must study what concerns animal motion among the acts
performed by the body and the soul in common.”79  It is in this way that we will study
Aristotle’s views on action, perception, and their psychosomatic sources in the
chapters that follow.
                                                 
79 DA III.10, 433b 19.
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Chapter 2
Appearance, Perception, and Voluntary Action
2.1 Animals, Automata, and Voluntary Action
The previous chapter culminated in Aristotle’s view that a human being thinks
discursively, acts, perceives, and experiences emotions as a psychosomatic whole –
that is, these actions and events take place at every level of the human being’s
composition simultaneously.  Accordingly, the dynamism of the living body is
integral to virtually every aspect of the individual human being’s action and
experience.80  In the present chapter we are turning from a static picture of the living
thing’s stratified constitution, to a moving picture of the living thing in action.  In
particular, we will focus upon the physiological functions that are instrumental in the
explanation and origination of voluntary action.
On Aristotle’s view, a voluntary action is “one of which the source is in
oneself, when one knows the particular circumstances in which the action takes
place.” (NE III.1, 1111a 22)  Alternatively, “All, then, that a man does – it being in
his power to abstain from doing it – not in ignorance and owing to himself must needs
be voluntary; this is what voluntariness is.” (EE II.9, 1225b 8)  Thus, an agent acts
                                                 
80 We must note, once again, that Aristotle recognizes the possibility of a contemplative activity that
transcends one’s human individuality and involves (temporary) union with the immortal contemplative
activity of the Divine Mind.  On this see DA III.5, NE X.7, and Metaph. XII.7, among other places.
Here we are concerned with the actions, desires, emotions, and discursive thinking of individual
embodied human beings.  For Aristotle divine contemplation is the highest activity in which it is
possible for human beings to partake, but this is impossible without the proper organization of the total
human psyche and an ethical way of life.  This is implicit in Aristotle’s view that the intellectual
virtues (particularly, phronêsis) and the virtues of character are mutually dependent.  (See NE VI.12,
1143a 34 and VI.13, 1144b 30.)
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voluntarily when (1) he is the source (archê) of his motion, in the sense that it is up to
the agent to either do or not do the things that he does voluntarily, and (2) he is aware
of the particular circumstances of the action.81  In what follows we will see that the
latter is critical to the former: one’s ability to refrain from acting is based in one’s
ability to re-frame one’s interpretation of the circumstances of action.  Furthermore,
the act of re-framing or “mastering the appearances” is based in physiological
processes, making functions in the living body directly relevant to our power to act
voluntarily, and thus to our bearing responsibility for our actions, and thus to moral
psychology.82
Now, in this chapter we are emphasizing one subclass of voluntary actions.
Aristotle divides voluntary actions into those that are chosen and those that are not.
All action involving choice is voluntary, but not all action that is voluntary involves
choice.83  For example, actions performed on the spur of the moment, actions
performed out of rage, and the actions of the incontinent or weak-willed person are
voluntary but not chosen.  Additionally, according to Aristotle, children and non-
                                                 
81 Also see NE III.1, 1111a 17-22; NE III.5 1113b 4; and EE II.6, 1233a 4.  An additional passage of
relevance to condition (1) above is Phys. VIII.4, 255a 6-12, where Aristotle explains that although the
natural elements (earth, air, fire, and water) posses natures – that is, internal principles and sources
(archai) of change and rest – they are not voluntary self-movers because they do not have the power to
stop themselves from moving toward their natural places in the cosmos.
82 The process of mastering the appearances is essentially the same as what Stoics such as Epictetus
referred to as “questioning the appearances.”  Contemporary psychologists sometimes call this “re-
framing” and “overcoming stimulus control.”  For instance, see Jonathan Haidt’s The Happiness
Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 16.  Haidt
states that over the course of evolution the use of language partially freed human beings from stimulus
control.  Below in §2.3.1, we will encounter the importance of attaching “the right name” to the objects
of perception.
83 NE III.2, 1111b 6.  See also NE V.8, 1135b 8.
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human animals do things voluntarily but they do not choose to do what they do, since
choice involves deliberation and the active exercise of reason.84
Chosen and unchosen voluntary actions originate from different forms of
“imagination” (phantasia), namely one that is sensory (aisthetikê) and another that is
rational or calculative (logistikê).  All animals possess sensory imagination, but only
mature human beings possess rational imagination. (DA III.10, 433b 30)
Nevertheless, on Aristotle’s view, most human beings, most of the time, are like
children and non-human animals in that their actions are governed by the appearances
or images of sensory imagination.85  In this condition of intellectual passivity, the
somatic imminence of sensory imagination leads to the mechanical construction of
the agent’s interpretation of the circumstances of action, framing them under one
description rather than another.  Furthermore, the same somatic processes that
underlie the perception also actuate the agent’s motion, and thus govern the actions
undertaken in those circumstances.  Thus, the source of such voluntary but unchosen
actions are psychosomatic processes within the agent himself (making the action
voluntary), but do not involve the active exercise of reason (making the action
unchosen).86
                                                 
84 NE III.2, 1111b 8; VII.4, 1148a 8; VII.8, 1151a 8.
85 See DA III.3, 429a 4; III.10, 433a 11; NE VII.7, 1150b 28.  As noted in Chapter 1, the relevant term
here for “appearances” or “images” is phanatasmata, which is also translated “presentations,”
“impressions,” or “phantasms.”  Particularly because the standard translation is “images,” it should be
recalled throughout that there is no restriction to visual images.  Any sensible form – sights, sounds,
smells, tastes, and feels – is referred to as an image or appearance or presentation of the likeness of
something.  Notable examples of non-visual phantasmata are the sensuously felt bodily changes that
partly constitute emotional experiences (such as sensations of heating or chilling in the body, and
tension or relaxation of the muscles).  See §1.4 above.
86 For Aristotle, as I interpret him, ethical philosophy is aimed at transforming this passive condition in
which our animal nature dominates our humanity, into an active condition in which all elements of the
human being function in accordance with their proper virtues, most particularly the highest and most
divine element – Nous.  Such activity in accordance with the highest virtue is happiness (eudaimonia),
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It will be useful to begin by recalling Aristotle’s comparison between the
processes of reproduction and the movement of automatic puppets.  As discussed in
Chapter 1, the developing organism’s formative growth and the automaton’s
locomotion are alike in three respects: (1) in one sense the source of motion is
external to the embryo or automaton, (2) in another sense the source of motion is
internal to the embryo or automaton, and (3) the given process of motion evolves
immediately, by necessity, and in a manner determined by the active and passive
dispositional propensities of the material undergoing change.
In On the Motion of Animals, Aristotle applies the same automaton analogy to
the voluntary self-motions of animals (including human beings).  There he parallels
the bones and sinews of animals with the iron bars and cables of the automata. (MA 7,
701bff)  Alongside the three points of comparison between self-movers and automata
as mentioned above, he introduces two points of contrast that differentiate voluntary
self-motions from the motions of automata: (i) the plasticity of organic matter and (ii)
the role of intelligible content in actuating self-motions.  (I quote the relevant passage
at length, inserting markers in pointed brackets for later reference.)
“<A> The movement of animals is like that of automatic puppets, which are
set moving when a small motion occurs: the cables are released and the pegs
strike against one another; and like that of the little cart (for the child riding in
it pushes it straight forward, and yet it moves in a circle because it has wheels
of unequal sizes: for the smaller acts like a center, as happens in the case of
the cylinders [that are smaller at one end, i.e. cones]).  For they have
functioning parts that are of the same kind: the sinews and bones.  The latter
are like the pegs and the iron in our example, the sinews like the cables.
When these are released and slackened the creature moves.  <B> Now in the
puppets and carts no alteration (alloiôsis) takes place, since if the inner wheels
                                                                                                                                            
which is the goal of ethical philosophy and human life.  (Recall the discussion of the aims of ethical
philosophy in §0.2.)
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were to become smaller and again larger, the movement would be circular.
But in the animal the same part has the capacity to become both larger and
smaller and to change its shape, as the parts expand because of heat and
contract again because of cold, and alter.  <C> Alteration is caused by
phantasiai and sense-perceptions and ideas (ennoiai).  For sense-perceptions
are at once a kind of alteration and phantasia and thinking have the power of
the actual things.  For it turns out that the form conceived of the… pleasant or
fearful is like the actual thing itself.  That is why we shudder and are
frightened just thinking of something.  All these are affections (pathê) and
alterations (alloiôseis); and when bodily parts are altered some become larger,
some smaller.  <D> It is not difficult to see that a small change occurring in an
origin sets up great and numerous differences at a distance – just as, if the
rudder shifts a hair’s breadth, the shift in the prow is considerable.  Further,
when, under the influence of heat or cold or some other similar affection, an
alteration is produced in the region of the heart, even if it is only in an
imperceptibly small part of it, it produces a considerable difference in the
body, causing blushing and pallor, as well as shuddering, trembling, and their
opposites.” (MA 7, 701b 1-32)
Let us briefly examine each segment of this marvelous passage.  In segment
<A> Aristotle parallels the parts of the automata and those of the animal body in
terms of their functional roles in the genesis of the automaton’s and the animal’s
motions.  An interesting and important detail is elucidated with the example of the toy
cart possessing wheels of unequal sizes.  The explanation of the fact that the cart is
moving and the explanation of the way in which it is moving are not the same.  It is
moving because the child pushed it, but it is moving in a curve on account of the
unequal sizes of its wheels.  Illustrating parallels (1) and (2) mentioned above, in one
sense the source of the cart’s motion is external and in another sense it is internal.
Recalling Chapter 1, the relative sizes of the cart’s wheels constitute the “symmetry”
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(rhuthmon) of the cart’s constituent parts, which establishes its passive dispositional
propensity to move in a curve when pushed.87
Now, even though the cart’s motion is partially accounted for by the cart
itself, the cart surely does not set itself in motion, or even move itself in a curve,
voluntarily (just as the reproductive formation of the body is partly based upon the
symmetry of powers within the developing offspring but is not a voluntary self-
motion of the offspring or its parents).  However, if the toy cart could alter the sizes
and shapes of its parts as it moved, so as to steer and stop itself, it would be on its
way to becoming responsible for the direction of its movements.  This is just the
feature that Aristotle attributes to animal bodies in the next segment of the passage
above.
Segment <B> presents the first crucial difference between animals and
automata: the notion of alteration (alloiôsis) and what later philosophers such as
William James refer to as the “plasticity” of organic material.  The plasticity or
malleability of organic matter is a function of its balance of receptivity and resistance
to change.  James defines plasticity as “the possession of a structure weak [i.e.,
receptive] enough to yield to an influence, but strong [i.e., resistant] enough not to
                                                 
87 Physics VIII.2 is an important chapter concerning the relevance of external causes to the self-motion
of living things.  There Aristotle states: “having been at rest beforehand, afterwards the ensouled thing
walks, having been moved by nothing outside it, as it seems.  But this is false.  For we always see
something moved in the animal, of the parts congenital to it; but the cause of the motion of this is not
the animal itself, but perhaps the surroundings.  We say it moves itself not in the case of every one of
its motions, but in the case of those in respect to place.  So nothing prevents, but it is perhaps rather a
necessity, that many motions come to be present in the body by means of the surroundings, while some
of these set in motion thinking (dianoian) or desire, and that presents sets in motion the whole animal,
such as happens with those that are asleep; for even though no motion of perceiving is present, because
some motion is nevertheless present [in the body], the animals wake up again.”  (253a 10 – 22)
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yield all at once.”88  Recall from Chapter 1 that Aristotle designates the hot and cold
as active (poêtika), and the moist and dry as passive (pathêtika).  A material’s
plasticity is determined by the passive modes of being affected associated with the
moist and the dry, the former being characterized by receptivity and the latter by
resistance to change.  Here in segment <B> above, Aristotle notes that the presence of
these active powers, coupled with the symmetry of the passive qualities, causes the
inward parts of the animal body to expand and contract, to change size and shape.  At
MA 8, 702a 7 he also includes amongst the changes so produced changes of the inner
parts from liquid to solid (and vice versa), and from hard to soft (and vice versa).
Segment <D> notes that these comparatively minor changes of size, shape,
and so on, in the inner parts of the body, most of all in the heart, cascade their way
through the body and manifest themselves outwardly in significant changes such as
blushing, pallor, and so forth.  Clearly we must also count the locomotion of the body
as a whole among these outward consequences of subtle changes in the heart.  Thus,
the plasticity and symmetry (or plastic symmetry?) of its inward parts prepare the
body to react in specific ways to the presence of the active powers of hot and cold.  In
this sense, self-movers do not defy nature, they exploit nature.
Segment <C> presents the second critical factor distinguishing animals from
automata: the active powers of hot and cold that catalyze these changes in the animal
body are the heatings and chillings that partially constitute the passions and
necessarily accompany our thoughts, imaginings, and perceptions.  This means that
the physiological processes underlying and partially constituting our psychological
                                                 
88 Principles of Psychology, Ch. IV, p. 68.
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lives are also the sources of our physical motions, and this is how, say, desiring to
walk can cause one’s legs to move.  This makes it possible to control one’s motions
and actions by changing what one is thinking or imagining.  This is virtually what
makes one morally responsible for one’s actions.  (Later in this chapter we will
consider our capacity to control our thoughts and emotions, and to “master the
appearances,” which is finally the key to autonomous moral responsibility.)
Now let us re-connect this discussion to the three parallels that Aristotle draws
between automata and the processes of reproduction and voluntary self-motion with a
simple example.  Suppose someone insults me and out of anger I strike him.  (1) In
one sense the man or his insult is the source of my action – I struck him because he
insulted me; (2) in another sense I myself am the source of my action – I struck him
because I became angry and followed the resulting impulse to strike the man; and (3)
the process of change proceeds necessarily or without interruption – (a) the
perception of the insult as such, (b) the swelling up of anger, (c) the impulse to strike,
and (d) the striking motion of my arm all seamlessly flow from one to the next, each
one growing directly out of its predecessor.  For Aristotle each segment of this
process is rooted in the living body, and the process as a whole is unified and
conditioned according to this fact.  The perception of the insult as such, the swelling
up of anger, and the impulse to strike are no less integrated with physiological
functions than the observable striking motion of the arm.89
                                                 
89 As pointed out in Chapter 1, this is not to say that the relevant psychological processes are “reduced”
to being nothing but physiological processes, any more than vengefully striking a person is merely a
motion of the arm.
61
We must stress here that, although Aristotle states that the object of anger or
fear or desire is a source of the animal’s motion, the responsibility for action lies in
the agent and not in the object of anger or fear or desire.  This is because it is not the
external thing as such that causes my action, but the external thing perceived as
painful or fearful or desireable.90  It is this fact that finally makes our self-motions
unlike the movements of the automata since the sources of self-motions are internal to
the self-movers in a stronger sense than this is so in the case of the automata: the
voluntary self-mover, recall, has the power to do or not to do the things that it does
voluntarily.  For example, the toy cart neither has the power to either move or not
move, nor does it have the power to either move in a curve or not move in a curve.
Thus, the source of the self-mover’s motion is not simply in the self-mover; it
is the self-mover.  For (a) the motivating or moving power of the object of desire is
bestowed upon that object by the animal or human being who perceives it as
desirable, whereas the motivating or moving power of the child’s push on the toy cart
is not similarly bestowed upon the child by the cart; and (b) the self-mover is
responsible for its mode of perceiving things as desirable or undesirable.91  Contrary
to the famous example of Baron d’Holbach, then, there is a great difference between a
man who voluntarily jumps from a window and one who is thrown from the window
                                                 
90 This point is presented nicely in David Furley’s article “Self Movers” (1978), reprinted in Self-
Motion: From Aristotle to Newton, edited by Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox (Princeton
University Press, 1994).
91 For example, see NE III.5, 1114a33ff and III.1, 1110b9-18.  More on this below.
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by the force of another person.92  The question is not whether or not the fall was
necessitated, but by what and in what conditions it was necessitated.93
Now, our modes of perception are deeply influenced by, and have a
significant impact upon, our experience of passions (pathê).94  As previously stated,
on Aristotle’s view the passions or affections of soul possess intelligible content but
they are also sensuously felt bodily experiences: they move through the blood and
through the tissues of our inner organs; they flow in waves of hot and cold through
this fleshy medium in which we sense the presence of ourselves as human beings;
they increase, decrease, rarify, condense, soften, harden, liquefy, and solidify the
uniform constituents of the body; and they clench and release the muscles, moving
and directing the non-uniform parts of the body.  Thus, they originate in the central
region of the heart and show themselves on our surfaces as grimaces of disgust, the
blush of embarrassment, the pale visage of fear, the wide-eyed expression of
amazement, and are displayed by all those bodily motions through which we pursue
the objects of desire and flee from those of fear.  This union of the intelligible and
somatic dimensions of our experience can be described both as the somatic
                                                 
92 Baron d’Holbach, System of Nature vol. 1, 137.
93 The idea here is reminiscent of the compatiblist view of A. J. Ayer: “But if all that is meant [by
determinism] is that it is possible, in principle, to deduce [the future course of events] from a set of
particular facts about the past, together with the appropriate general laws, then, even if this is true, it
does not in the least entail that I am the helpless prisoner of fate.  It does not even entail that my
actions make no difference to the future: for they are causes as well as effects; so that if they were
different their consequences would be different also.”  (“Freedom and Necessity,” 23)  As poet
Kathleen Raine nicely expressed this point, “We are the agents, not the victims of fate.” (Kathleen
Raine, “Blake: The Poet As Prophet,” 74)  This is intimated in the story of Oedipus, for instance, in the
sense that he met his fate directly on account of his own actions.
94 The term pathê is variously translated as “feelings,” “affections,” and “passions.”  It derives from the
verb paschein meaning to passively undergo change due to the action of another thing.  Thus, passion
is to action as passive is to active: in spite of their occasional intensity, the pathê are passivities; they
are not things that we do but things that happen to us.  Insofar as our behavior is governed by passions
alone, we do not do anything but are the subjects of a multitude of happenings – including the
happenings of our inner life such as emotions and thought-like imagination.
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imminence of the soul and as the animate and sentient life of the body.  We will now
take a closer look at the nature of this somatic imminence and its profound impact on
the explanation of voluntary action and moral responsibility.
2.2 The Particular Circumstances of Voluntary Action
In this section I will present a basic outline of Aristotle’s view of voluntary
action as described in NE III.1.  This will help to set the stage for displaying the
centrality of our modes of perception to the actions we undertake and the
voluntariness of those actions.  Subsequent to that we will see that physiology is a
decisive factor – sometimes virtually the sole factor – in determining our mode of
perception.
Aristotle introduces the subject of voluntary action by noting that virtue is
concerned with feelings and actions, and that agents are only praised, blamed,
punished, or honored for their voluntary actions, while they are sometimes forgiven
and pitied for their involuntary actions.  But exactly how do voluntary actions differ
from involuntary actions?  In short, Aristotle’s view is that involuntary actions are
those that happen through force or ignorance (1101a 1), while voluntary actions
originate in oneself and one’s awareness of the circumstances of action (1111a 21).95
We will briefly examine each of these in turn: the force and ignorance underlying
involuntary actions, and the agency and awareness underlying voluntary actions.
                                                 
95 Strictly speaking, Aristotle calls an action involuntary if and only if it is done through force or on
account of ignorance, and is also accompanied by regret.  When the condition of regret is not met the
action is “non-voluntary.” (NE III.1, 1110b 24)  I will generally ignore this point.
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According to Aristotle, an action happens by force when its source is external
to the one who is forced.  The source is said to be external when the one who is
forced “contributes nothing,” e.g. when a wind or group of people carries one away.
(NE III.1, 1110a 2)  It is essential to recall that external objects that move one to act
because they are desired cannot be said to compel or force ones action.  In these
instances, it is not the external object as such that is the source of ones motion; what
moves the agent to act is the external object as perceived and desired by the agent.  In
perceiving the object as desirable, the agent is contributing the very stuff that gives
the object of desire motivational power.  The source of his or her motion is not the
external object strictly speaking but the intentional object of his or her own desire.
The reasons for the object’s being desired or perceived as desirable are to be found
primarily within the agent.  (As we will see, the explanation of the agent’s mode of
perception is grounded in the conditions of the living body.)  For this reason one
cannot blame the objects of desire but must blame oneself “for being easily caught by
such things.” (NE III.1, 1110b 15)96
An action happens through ignorance when it occurs because the agent fails to
adequately grasp the particular circumstances in which the action takes place.  For
example, Aeschylus revealed secrets pertaining to the Mysteries of Demeter in his
tragedies involuntarily, so he said, because he did not know that it was forbidden to
speak of such things.  (NE III.1, 1111a 10)  He may have identified his action as
                                                 
96 See NE III.1, 1110b9-18. Also see III.5, 1114a33ff where Aristotle argues that we are in control of
the appearances, and bear the responsibility for what appears to us as good.  Additionally, at III.1,
1111a23-b5 Aristotle states that actions performed on account of desire or spiritedness are not
unwilling actions (implying that these actions originate in oneself and not in the relevant external
objects), and that “irrational feelings” are just as much a part of human nature as reason.
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“writing a tragedy” or as “writing dialogue about the Mysteries,” but he could not
have identified what he was doing as “exposing secrets about the Mysteries” since he
did not know they were secrets.  Oedipus killed his father involuntarily because he
did not know that the man in the road was his father.  He may have identified the man
under the description “man blocking my way,” but not “my biological father.”97
These actions were both involuntary actions because they were performed on account
of ignorance of the nature of the action and the patient of the action, respectively.
However, Aristotle notes that acting on account of ignorance must be
distinguished from simply acting while being ignorant.  (NE III.1, 1110b 25)  For
example, suppose a person does something that he would not otherwise do because he
is enraged or drunk.  He may be acting while ignorant but he is not acting on account
of ignorance since the primary explanation of his uncharacteristic behavior is his rage
or drunkenness, not his ignorance.  (NE III.1, 1110b 25-29)  Like Aeschylus and
Oedipus, the drunken agent would not have done what he did if he had known or been
actively attending to the particular circumstances of his action.  However, unlike
Aeschylus and Oedipus, the drunkard brings about his ignorance knowingly; that is,
he puts himself into this condition of ignorance knowingly through his own willing
actions of drinking alcohol.
In all of these cases, if the agent had known the circumstances of his action,
he would not have performed the action.  But if the agent himself is responsible for
the ignorance that lead to his uncharacteristic action, then this action does not come
about on account of his ignorance but on account of the actions that knowingly
                                                 
97 See Poetics 1153b 31 – 1154a 10 for discussion of the impact of knowledge and ignorance on
tragedy.  (Referenced in Sachs’ Nicomachean Ethics, p. 39, n. 49.)
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brought about his ignorance (e.g., drinking the alcohol with full knowledge of its
stupefying powers), or the negligent failure to act that is responsible for his ignorance
(e.g., demolishing a building without checking to see if anyone was inside first).  In
NE III.5 Aristotle mentions responsibility for ignorance and the blame that it
warrants:
“In fact people apply punishment for ignorance itself if the one who is
ignorant seems to be responsible for it, as when the penalties are doubled for
people who are drunk, for the source [of the ignorance that goes along with
drunkenness] is in oneself, since one has the power not to get drunk, which is
the cause of the ignorance.  And they also punish those who are ignorant of
anything in the laws which one ought to know and which is not difficult to
know, and similarly in other cases in which people seem to be ignorant
through carelessness, on the grounds that it is up to people themselves not to
be ignorant, since they are in control of how much care they take.”  (NE III.5,
1113b 29 – 1114a 3)
Since involuntary actions come about through force or ignorance, voluntary
actions seem to be those that come about in the opposite conditions: when the source
or starting-point (archê) of the action is in oneself and when one is aware of the
particular circumstances of the action. (NE III.1, 1111a 22)  The crucial feature of
actions that originate in oneself, according to Aristotle, is that it is up to oneself to
perform them or not to perform them.  (NE III.1, 1110a 17)  This is repeated in NE
III.5: “[I]n those cases in which acting is up to us, not acting is also up to us, and
where it is up to us to say no, it is also up to us to say yes…”  (1113b 4)
It will be worth pausing a moment to consider this power – our power to do or
not to do the things that we do voluntarily.  Neither the uniform nor the non-uniform
parts of the body have this power.  For example, neither the blood nor the arms have
the power to move themselves voluntarily.  Similarly, the natural elements do not
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have the power to move themselves.  Thus, in the Physics Aristotle argues that the
natural elements are moved away from their natural places by force and toward their
natural places by nature, but that even in the latter case they cannot be said to move
themselves. (Physics VIII.4, 255a 4ff)  For if they had the power to move themselves,
he says, they would also have the power to stop themselves; and if they had the power
to move themselves toward their natural places, they would also have the power to
move themselves away from their nature places. (VIII.4, 255a 6-12)
If neither the human being’s parts nor the constituents of its parts have the
power to act voluntarily, then how does the human being as a whole have this power?
We will find that the key to this power is incidental perception and our capacity to
“master the appearances” through what William James calls “voluntary attention.”
For now recall from Chapter 1 the following passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics
(quoted here at greater length), juxtaposing what Aristotle calls “rational potencies”
(dunameis meta logon) and “non-rational potencies” (dunameis alogoi).
… some things can produce change according to a rational formula
and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are non-
rational and their potencies are non-rational, and the former potencies
must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the living and
in the lifeless; as regards potencies of the latter kind, when the agent
and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question,
the one must act and the other be acted on, but with the former kind of
potency this is not necessary.  For the non-rational potencies are all
productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects,
so that if they produced their effects necessarily they would produce
contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible.  There must,
then, be something else that decides [on a given occasion whether to
exercise a rational power, and, if so, in what way]; I mean by this,
desire (orexis) or [choice] (proairesis). For whichever of two things
the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and meets
the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency in question.
Therefore everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that
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for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the
potency, must do this.98
Thus, the dispositional propensities of the natural elements are non-rational
potencies that are discharged automatically and necessarily, while functional
capacities to act voluntarily are actualized by desire and by deliberate desire (i.e.,
choice).  Below we will see in greater detail how incidental perception, sensory
imagination, and rational imagination, and their grounding in the processes of the
living body, conspire to endow the human being with the power to act voluntarily.
Now, recall that for Aristotle, voluntary actions differ from involuntary and
non-voluntary actions in that whatever an agent does voluntarily he does (1) while
retaining the power to refrain from doing what he is doing and (2) while knowing,
perceiving, or being aware of the particular circumstances of what he is doing.  These
are importantly related because our responsibility for our modes of perception is
essential to our moral responsibility for our actions.99  Our moral responsibility
depends upon the fact that we have the power to question the appearances, to
reconsider our judgments, and to re-evaluate our impulses, each of which will alter
our perception of the circumstances of our action and thus re-direct our courses of
action.100
                                                 
98 Metaph. IX.5, 1047b 35 – 1048a 15 (trans. Ross). Regarding rational potencies, recall DA III.9, 433a
3-6, quoted in Chapter 1, on the doctor who does not automatically heal because he knows the medical
art.  Regarding non-rational potencies, recall the passage from On the Generation of Animals: “When a
pair of factors, the one active and the other passive, come into contact in the way in which one is active
and the other passive… then immediately both are brought into play, the one acting, the other being
acted upon.”  (GA II.4, 740b 22-25)
99 See NE III.5, 1114a 32 – b 6.
100 Virtue critically involves holding on to the right way of perceiving or naming or putting together an
interpretation of the circumstances.
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What, then, is the nature of the knowledge or perception integral to voluntary
action?  Two kinds of knowledge (and corresponding forms of ignorance) play a role
in the production of action: knowledge of general principles pertaining to actions in
the abstract and knowledge of the particular circumstances in which action takes
place.101  The general principles that are relevant here pertain to a good, pleasant, or
advantageous end that is attainable through action.  The particular circumstances are
six in number and discussed below.  Here we are concerned with the psychological
processes through which we become (or fail to become) aware of the particular
circumstances under certain descriptions as opposed to others.102
While knowledge of the general principles is clearly of immense importance,
according to Aristotle it does not play an essential role in accounting for whether an
action is voluntary or involuntary; it is knowledge or ignorance of the particulars that
has this function.  Ignorance of the general principles concerning good and bad
actions makes one unjust or morally depraved, whereas ignorance of the
circumstances of some particular action makes the action involuntary or non-
voluntary.103  For example, if I take another person’s property because I am ignorant
of the fact that doing so is morally impermissible then I am morally depraved and a
thief.  But if I have mistaken their property for mine my action is not a sign of moral
depravity; rather I have taken another’s property involuntary.
                                                 
101 These different knowledge factors are represented in the practical syllogism as the major and minor
premises (respectively); more on this in Chapter 3.
102 Daniel Wegner refers to essentially the same psychological process of perceiving the action under a
certain description as “action identification.”  See The Illusion of Conscious Will, p. 159ff.
103 See NE III.1, 1110b 28 – 1111a 2.
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Now, the particular circumstances that comprise the structure and content of
an action are the following (presented at NE III.1, 1111a 3-6):
(1) the agent – who is performing the action?104
                                                 
104 In the passage cited above, Aristotle suggests that only an insane person could fail to identify the
agent when the agent is himself.  However, according to the reports of Daniel Wegner, psychological
studies confirm the phenomenon of “action projection,” in which, in some sense, the agent
misperceives his own actions as actions of another. (See The Illusion of Conscious Will, Chapter 6.)
This is made possible, Wegner argues, because (a) we are not intrinsically informed about the causes
of our actions, and (b) we have an inclination to attribute a perceived action to whoever or whatever
appears to us to be its most plausible source. (p. 198)  The apparent agent and the actual agent may
typically coincide, but cases of action projection are by no means confined to the insane.  Nevertheless,
even when they do coincide, it is always only on the basis of “apparent mental causation,” Wegner
argues, and not on the basis of any direct perception of the causal sources of one’s actions, that one has
the experience of consciously willing one’s actions.  This experience is associated with an “authorship
emotion,” a visceral sense of oneself as the source of one’s actions.  Wegner characterizes this unique
emotion as a “somatic marker” (a phrase he borrows from Antonio Damasio), a “body-based
signature” that anchors our sense of ourselves as agents in our bodies. (p. 325-327)  But grasping the
agent or “who?” of the action is not simply a matter of saying “I” or “me.”  Rather, it raises the
perennial injunction to Know Thyself! by setting in motion one’s personal self-perception and one’s
general notion of human nature.  These contents of one’s incidental perception of oneself influence the
actions one performs and the manner in which one performs them (the “manner” being the sixth factor
of the action, e.g., vigorously, confidently, hesitantly, etc.).  Thus, concerning ourselves as individuals,
we say things like “I can’t see myself doing that,” or, when someone behaves inappropriately we may
rebuke him by rhetorically asking “Who do you think you are?!?”  Furthermore, we identify the means
to our ends through deliberation, and the object of deliberation is an action that is within one’s own
power to perform.  Therefore, confusion about what is within one’s own power will undermine one’s
ability to recognize the means to one’s ends, and, so, to realize those ends.  One’s conception of human
nature generally is no less critical here, which underscores the importance of Aristotle’s function
argument (NE I.7).  Through this argument Aristotle seeks to articulate the nature of the human being
as such in order to pinpoint what ultimate undertaking, or way of life, is the natural end or goal (telos)
representing human fulfillment or happiness.  In line with these observations, some of Aristotle’s
formulations of the practical syllogism make special reference to the nature of the agent.  Paula
Gottlieb brings this out insightfully in her general schema for the practical syllogism: Major Premise –
“Such and such a human being ought to do such and such a thing”; Minor Premise – “I am such and
such a human being, and this is such and such a thing.”  Since this is a practical syllogism, the
conclusion that follows is not a judgment but my performance of the action.  (“The Practical
Syllogism” in Blackwell Companion to NE, p. 224; also see Jonathan Lear Aristotle: The Desire to
Understand, p. 148-9, and William James PBC, p. 47 on different actions being appropriate to different
selves or kinds of persons).  Striking in Gottlieb’s schema is “I am such and such a human being.”  For
insofar as the major premise represents the agent’s aims or the good sought for through action (e.g.,
MA 7, 701a 24), the minor premise of such syllogisms will have the agent explicitly asserting to
himself “I am a virtuous human being,” “I am a courageous human being,” “I am a healthy human
being.”  In this way, the agent defines himself – in both word and deed – by deliberately and actively
taking on the role of the person he desires to become.  What I have in mind here are not self-inflating
or self-deceiving delusions, but ways in which the agent authentically sets forth for himself or herself a
role and “[acquires] a taste for the real thing from imitating it… [for] imitations, if they are practiced
much past youth, get established in the habits and nature of the body, tones of voice, and mind.”
(Republic III, 359C-D)  On playing a “role” or “character” (prosôpon: literally face or countenance;
more generally, characteristic way of making oneself manifest), and “those who have forgotten their
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(2) the action – what basic action is being performed?
(3) the patient – who or what is being acted upon?
(4) the instrument – with what is the action being performed?
(5) the purpose – for the sake of what is the action being performed?
(6) the manner – in what way is the action being performed?105
Of these particular circumstances, the most important are the action and the
purpose: above all, the agent must know what he is doing and why he is doing it.106
The manner of the basic action is also noteworthy: if the basic act is, say, telling
someone that he or she has great potential, then to do so sincerely, or sarcastically, or
condescendingly, constitutes a very different action overall – e.g., encouraging,
discouraging, or insulting the patient.
                                                                                                                                            
own proper character (idiou prosôpou),” see the ever-brilliant Epictetus, Discourses I.2.  We will
return to some of these issues in Chapter 3.
105 We can compare Aristotle’s framework for conceptualizing action with a parallel analysis from the
Tibetan Buddhist tradition concerning action and karma.  (Note: the base meaning of “karma” is
“action,” and also includes the notion of an action together with its repercussions, and thus expands the
notion of action into that of the law of cause and effect.  The details of this concept are comparable to
Aristotle’s view of the development character.)  In the Tibetan Buddhist framework, the elements of
the action are divided into (i) the basis, (ii) the state of mind, (iii) the execution of the act, and (iv) the
culmination of the action.  For example, one of the non-virtuous actions is stealing, which is
characterized in this framework as follows (see Jinpa’s translation of Mind Training: The Great
Collection, p. 456ff):
Action: Taking what is not given
(i) Basis: An object owned by someone other than oneself
(ii) State of mind (twofold)
(a) Recognition
(u) Specific: particular basis of theft perceived as such
(v) Non-specific: as when basis is flock of sheep
(b) Intention
(w) Taking what is not given through attachment
(x) Taking what is not given through anger
(z) Taking what is not given through delusion
(iii) Execution: theft by force, deception, refusal to return item, etc.
(iv) Culmination: when object is removed or thought of its attainment occurs in the
mind
106 See NE III.1, 1111a 18, referred to in a footnote in §0.2 above.
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Now, knowledge of the particular circumstances of action is a sort of
perceptual recognition rather than an abstract demonstrative knowledge (epistêmê).107
The perception of these particular circumstances of the action involves what Aristotle
calls “incidental perception.”  This sort of perception concerns not what things look
like, sound like, taste like, and so forth, but what we judge things to be (e.g., a table, a
book, a generous action, a contemptuous remark, etc.).  Incidental perception thus
concerns how your perception or interpretation of a situation and its significance are
put together in your experience with certain intelligible contents built in.  This can be
as simple as perceiving a black cylindrical shape as a cup (which may serve as a basis
for your act of picking it up for the purpose of drinking), or as complicated as
perceiving, all in an instant, that the subtle but concerned facial expression of your
friend indicates that something has gone wrong which cannot be discussed in the
present company and thus an opportunity to leave the room must be created and
seized upon (which may serve as a basis for your act of fabricating some excuse to
leave the room).  So in the following section we will examine incidental perception,
keeping in mind that the voluntariness and course of one’s actions depends upon
one’s incidental perception of (1) oneself as the agent, (2) what one is doing, (3) to
whom, (4) with what, (5) for what reason, and (6) in what way.108
                                                 
107 For example, see NE VI.8, 1142a 13-31.
108 Before advancing beyond our brief discussion of Aristotle on voluntary action in NE III.1, it is
worth noting that, in addition to voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions, Aristotle identifies
a class of “mixed actions.”  Some actions are involuntary in the abstract, but voluntary in the particular
circumstances in which they are performed.  In more contemporary terms, these are involuntary action
types that are realized, sometimes, by voluntary action tokens.  Aristotle gives the example of throwing
goods overboard in a storm, or performing some base action at the command of a tyrant who has one’s
parents held captive.  In abstraction from contextual factors one would not voluntarily throw goods
overboard, or perform the commanded base action, but in these particular circumstances, for the sake
of safeguarding oneself and others on the ship, or saving the lives of one’s parents, one performs the
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2.3 Appearance and Perception
In this section I will show that alterations in the living body are critical to the
process of “putting together” (suntithemenôn) one’s perception of the circumstances
of action (which, in turn, is essential to which actions one voluntarily performs).  First
I will describe Aristotle’s notion of “incidental perception” and its relation to
phantasia.  Secondly, I will present Aristotle’s view of how the appearances of
incidental perception are altered by the passions (pathê).  Thirdly, I will show that the
alteration of appearances and judgment by the passions is based on the embodiment
of the pathê.
2.3.1 Incidental Perception and Perception Management
In De Anima II.6 Aristotle distinguishes between the proper objects of
perception, the common objects of perception, and the incidental objects of
perception.109  The proper objects of perception are the special objects unique to each
                                                                                                                                            
given action tokens voluntarily.  Thus mixed actions are involuntary in the abstract since no one would
choose them for their own sake (NE III.1, 1111a 18), but they are voluntary at the time when they are
performed since they are chosen and “the end for which an action takes place is in accordance with its
occasion.” (NE III.1, 1110a 14)  Thus, the fact that “actions are in the particulars” (NE III.1, 1110b 8)
leads to the consequence that tokens of mixed actions are more properly categorized as voluntary
actions because they originate from an agent who knows what he or she is doing and has the power to
refrain from doing it.  However, there are certain circumstances that “strain human nature too far, and
no one could endure them.” (1110a 25)  In these cases, the actions are no longer mixed-but-in-these-
conditions-voluntary but are involuntary because one no longer retains the power to refrain from
performing them.  “For what rests with himself,” Aristotle tells us, “and it wholly turns on this,” he
says, is “what his nature is able to bear” (EE II.8, 1225a 25).
109 I will generally stick to the Aristotelian terminology of “incidental perception.”  The sense of this
term here is that color, sound, and the other proper perceptibles are perceived in their own right, while
a book or a tree is perceived incidentally (kata sumbebêkos) or not in its own right but along with the
perception of the relevant colors and shapes.  However, where the context is clear, I will simply use
“perception” or other terms for what I take to be the same thing: “perceiving as,” “seeing as,”
“perceptual recognition,” or “propositional perception” (see Barnouw’s Propositional Perception).
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sense: colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and tactile impressions.  These are the
presentations of what things look like, sound like, smell like, taste like, and feel like
(in short, what later philosophers might call “qualia” or “sense data”), which includes
sensations within one’s own body.  The common objects of perception are those that
are shared by more than one sense modality.  For instance, we can both see and feel
motion.  Incidental perception refers to those observations that go beyond what a
given thing looks like, sounds like, and so forth, and involve a judgment about or
recognition of what the thing is.
Although in a different context, the distinction between proper and incidental
perception is illustrated nicely by both Berkeley and Descartes.  In Berkeley’s Three
Dialogues, Philonous states, “For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the
streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I have had
that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach.  It is
nevertheless evident, that in truth and strictly speaking, nothing can be heard but
sound: and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from
experience.”110  Additionally, Descartes provides a well-known example relevant to
Aristotle’s distinction between proper and incidental perception:
“We say that we see the wax [candle] itself, if it is there before us, not that we
judge it to be there from its colour and shape; and this might lead me to
conclude without more ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the
eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone.  But then if I look out of
the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I
                                                                                                                                            
William James refers to this as “apperception” (e.g. Talks to Teachers on Psychology, Ch. XIV),
although I will generally avoid this term since it is also used, for instance by Kant, more specifically
for the mind’s awareness of its own states as such.
110 George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues (Oxford World Classics,
1999), 144.
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normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax.
Yet do I see any more than hats and coats [or more strictly, colors and shapes]
which could conceal automatons?  I judge that they are men.  And so
something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely
by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.”111
From Aristotle’s perceptive, Descartes goes too far in claiming that sensible
particulars are known “by the mind alone” and grasped “solely by the faculty of
judgment in [the] mind.”  The significance of this will emerge shortly.  For the
present, having illustrated the distinction between proper and incidental perception, I
want to stress that, ordinarily, the intelligible contents of incidental perception (e.g.,
“coach,” “wax,” “hat,” “coat,” “man”) are not consciously inferred from the sensible
qualities of proper perception (sounds, colors, shapes, etc.); rather, these intelligible
contents are presented immediately in perceptual experiences that are structured
outside of conscious awareness.  Thus, in ordinary circumstances I do not consciously
infer that I am seeing a tree from an antecedent recognition of green- and brown-
colored shapes.  Instead, the perception is put together as “tree” or “that’s a tree” in
the first instance.112  As will become evident shortly, apart from its metaphysical and
epistemological consequences, this fact about the construction of the content of
incidental perception also has extremely important practical and ethical ramifications
since the content of incidental perception is central to voluntary action.
                                                 
111 Second Meditation, Meditations on First Philosophy edited and translated by John Cottingham
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21.  Additional material of relevance is found in the Sixth
Meditation.
112 It is very important that “nothing is acted upon by the incidentally perceived thing as such.” (DA
II.6, 418a 24)  This means that the responsibility for the appearance of “tree,” or “person in distress,”
or “harmful insult” – and any action initiated in relation to these perceptions – primarily lies in the
perceiver and not in an external cause of the perception.  This is even more poignant when applied to
our perceptions of life conditions as good or bad, cause for joy or sorrow, and so on: the characteristics
of being bad and a cause for sorrow are largely a function of our mode of perception and not the
conditions themselves.
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So, incidental perception involves the coincidence or fusion of intelligible and
sensory content.113  I would like to clarify the nature of this fusion of intelligible and
sensory content by briefly analyzing Aristotle’s statement that “the thinking potency
grasps in thought the forms that are present in things imagined” or, as another
translation renders this statement, “the faculty of thinking, then, thinks the forms in
the images.”114  Aristotle gives the following example: “perceiving that a signal light
is fire, and observing by what is common to the senses that it is moving, one
recognizes that it is an enemy.”  This example combines a special object of
perception (light), a common object of perception (motion), and an incidental object
of perception (a sign of an enemy, although perceiving the light as fire is also already
an instance of incidental perception).  So, the thought “enemy” or “sign of the
enemy” and the image of moving light arise together as a single experiential content.
Now, we can distinguish two ways of interpreting the phrase “thinking the
forms in the images”: (a) thinking a form in an image, as opposed to being presented
with the image but not thinking a given form along with it, and (b) thinking a form in
an image, as opposed to thinking the form itself alone and without an image.  For
                                                 
113 I will suggest here that, ordinarily, our experience consists of a fairly confused apprehension on
both sides: we do not think the intelligible forms in an explicit, clearly articulated way, nor do we
attend perceptively to the sensory qualia.  On the one hand, ordinarily, we observe “tree” or “that’s a
tree” but cannot, or simply do not, articulate to ourselves what a tree essentially and ultimately is; and,
on the other hand, we rarely savor the sensory perception, the many shades of green and brown, and
the intricate shapeliness of the leaves and branches, the sound of the leaves blowing in the wind, and
the other qualities that are presented to us perceptually.  The point is of even greater moment when
applied to our often inchoate awareness of what we are doing (e.g., destroying the environment,
wasting precious time, developing destructive habits, violating our own professed values, etc.)  To the
extent that this is so, one fears that Heraclitus was referring to people such as ourselves when he said,
“though present they are absent.” (DK 22B 34, trans. Richard McKirahan in Philosophy Before
Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1994), 118)
114 DA III.7, 431b 3: the first translation is by Joe Sachs, the second is by J. A. Smith (from the Oxford
translation edited by Ross).
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instance, on the one hand, (a) someone not informed about the significance of the
moving fire would fail to perceive the fire as a sign of the enemy – would fail to think
“enemy” or “sign of the enemy” at the sight of the fire.  Were he expecting, say, a
religious procession to take place in the relevant vicinity, he might instead perceive
the moving light as a religious procession.  Here he fails to think a certain form
(enemy) with the image and thinks some other form (procession) instead.115
On the other hand, (b) a person might not be looking out for enemies or signs
of enemies at the moment but may be thinking abstractly about what an enemy or a
sign is.  Even in this case, however, Aristotle insists that, in all human thinking, an
image must be employed in the service of facilitating the contemplative act – whether
a sensory image presently perceived or one drawn from memory (or one formed from
images drawn from memory).  For Aristotle, the only contemplative activity that is
wholly independent of sensory experience and sensory imagery, and thus independent
of the body, is the contemplative activity of the Divine Mind or God.116
Like Aristotle, Plato was also deeply concerned with the problem of
disengaging one’s attention from the special objects of sensory perception in order to
directly grasp the intelligible forms reflected in the perceived particulars – the
emphasis of reading (b) of Aristotle’s statement above.  In Republic VII such
                                                 
115 At the end of Republic V (479B) Socrates analogizes the ambiguity or multiple interpretability
sensible particulars with a riddle: “A man who is not a man saw and did not see a bird that was not a
bird in a tree (xulon) that was not a tree; he hit (ballein) and did not hit it with a stone that was not a
stone.”  C. D. C. Reeve explains as follows: “The answer is that a eunuch with bad eyesight saw a bat
on a rafter, threw a pumice stone at it, and missed.  For ‘he saw a bird’ is ambiguous between ‘he saw
what was actually a bird’ and ‘he saw what he took to be a bird,’ xulon means both ‘tree’ and ‘rafter’
or ‘roof tree,’ and ballein means both ‘to throw’ and ‘to hit.’”  (C. D. C. Reeve, Plato: Republic, p.
174, n. 51)
116 For example, see Metaph. XII.7, 1072b 18 (quoted below): “the thinking that is just thinking by
itself is a thinking of what is best [i.e., God] just as itself.”
78
disengagement is represented allegorically as a “turning around” and ascension from
the infamous cave.  The following passage from Republic V will also help elucidate
this distinction between attending to the reflections of intelligible forms in sensible
particulars versus directly attending to the intelligible forms themselves:
“The lovers of listening and seeing are passionately devoted to beautiful
sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of such things.  [That is,
for them the thought “beauty” takes place in a confused form amidst their
attention to the special objects of sense such as colors, shapes, etc.]  But their
thought is unable to see the nature of the beautiful itself or to be passionately
devoted to it… On the one hand, won’t those who are able to approach the
beautiful itself, and see it by itself, be rare?  [That is, few are able to
contemplate the form of beauty directly, without the mediation of sensory
instances of beauty, and through a purely intelligible and articulate grasp of
what beauty is in itself]…What about someone who believes in beautiful
things but does not believe in the beautiful itself, and would not be able to
follow anyone who tried to lead him to the knowledge of it?  Do you think he
is living in a dream, or is he awake?  Just consider.  Isn’t it dreaming to think
– whether asleep or awake – that a likeness is not a likeness, but rather the
thing itself that it is like?  …But what about someone who, to take the
opposite case, does believe in the beautiful itself, is able to observe both it and
the things that participate in it, and does not think that the participants are it,
or that it is the participants – do you think he is living in a dream or is
awake?”  [Glaucon replies…] “He is very much awake.”  (Republic V, 476B-
D)117
Our ability to free our thinking from the images or appearances is of critical
importance.  This freedom might be an absolute aloneness of the intellect collected
                                                 
117 Also see Republic VII, 534B, where Socrates states that anyone who cannot give an account of the
form of the good is “dreaming and asleep throughout his present life [and] before he wakes up here, he
will arrive in Hades and go to sleep forever.”  See also Republic VI, 484C and VII, 523A.  The
allegory of the charioteer from Plato’s Phaedrus also provides relevant material, particularly where
Socrates argues that it is through using present sensory impressions to “remind” oneself of the
intelligible forms that one “undergoes a continual initiation into the perfect mystic vision” and “can
become perfect [or complete] in the true sense of the word.” (Phaedrus 249C, trans. Hamilton)
Similarly, Plotinus argues that people who cannot contemplate the forms directly seek to contemplate
in a roundabout way by beholding themselves performing beautiful actions (Enneads III.8.6, quoted
below in §3.3).  This is comparable to NE VII.13, 1153b 29 where Aristotle states that in all our
actions we pursue the pleasure of contemplation without knowing that this is what we are pursuing.
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into itself and wholly withdrawn from sensible experience and its influence (e.g., as
described by Plotinus, which corresponds, for Aristotle, to the activity of the Divine
Mind), or it might be a relative freedom to conceptualize and understand the
appearances in accordance with right reason and a virtuous mode of perception
(which is the line of thought in Aristotle that we are working on here, that pertains to
the human individual).  More specifically, though, the two senses of Aristotle’s claim
that we think the forms in the images – senses (a) and (b) above – are relevant to our
purposes here because, we will see, they indicate the relevance of functions in the
living body to incidental perception and practical reasoning, and the relevance of
incidental perception and practical reasoning to voluntary action and moral
responsibility.
Regarding sense (a), seeing some sensible particular as exemplifying a certain
intelligible content can make all the difference to the actions one undertakes and the
responsibility one bears for those actions.  For instance, seeing the moving fire as a
sign that the enemy approaches may give rise to fear that forms the basis of my
sounding the alarm, rushing to procure weapons and soldiers, etc.  Failing to see the
moving fire as a sign of the enemy but, rather, as the procession of a religious
festival, I may ponder how wonderful the festivals are this time of year and calmly
proceed in that direction (to a very unexpected fate).
Furthermore, as indicated above, we ourselves are responsible for how things
appear, for ultimately we have the capacity to control how we conceptualize or
interpret the circumstances in which we act.  Although a great deal of spiritual
struggle may be required to develop this capacity and to shape our modes of
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perception in accordance with virtue, nevertheless we are responsible for which forms
serve as the intelligible contents that structure our perception of the images.118  The
intelligible forms that constitute the content of our perceptual experience are a
function of conditions within ourselves as much as, or to an even greater extent than,
they are a function of the external objects that cause our perceptions.119  Our
responsibility for our modes of perception is integral to – perhaps the very most
important element that accounts for – our capacity to act voluntarily, our bearing
responsibility for our actions, and our attaining or failing to attain happiness.
Moreover, in regard to sense (b), both the contemplation and the perceptual
presentation of intelligible forms depend upon sensory images.  According to
                                                 
118 I should emphasize that we have a capacity to control our thoughts and our modes of perception.
Aristotle often distinguishes amongst (1) a capacity (dunamis), (2) an ability or active state of
readiness (hexis) to perform a given activity, and (3) actively being-at-work (energeia).  These three
levels of potentiality and actuality are sometimes labeled, respectively, P1, P2/A1, and A2 (where P =
potency or potentiality, and A = activity or actuality).  (For an excellent discussion, see Aryeh
Kosman’s “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion,” Phronesis 14 (1969), 40-62.)  For example, Aristotle
states that “there are varying degrees in which [a thing] may be potentially that which it is capable of
being – it may be nearer to it or further removed from it (just as a sleeping geometer is at a further
remove than one who is awake, and a waking one than one who is busy at his studies).”  (GA II.1, 735a
9)  Even further removed from geometrical contemplation is the child who has not yet studied
geometry.  The child is “far removed” from the activity of geometrical contemplation in that he is not
presently able to perform this activity.  However, he does possess a capacity for developing an ability
to perform this activity in a way that a tree does not.  (We will return to the notion of being nearer or
further removed from an activity – particularly, the human good – in Chapter 3 with a nice passage
from Aristotle’s De Caelo.)  Applying this distinction to our capacity to control our thoughts and our
modes of perception, until one develops this capacity into an ability that one actually puts to use, one is
responsible for one’s modes of perceptions and actions only in a derivative sense, like the pilot who is
responsible for the shipwreck because of his absence from the helm.  (See Physics II.3, 195a 14 for
assigning responsibility for the shipwreck to the absent pilot.)  This responsibility-in-absence can be
contrasted with autonomous moral responsibility in which one has mastered oneself.  We will briefly
return to this in the Epilogue of this dissertation.
119 This is certainly true of the intelligible content presented in perception, and it is also true of the
purely sensory qualities or proper perceptibles.  Indeed, we are aware of the world through our
awareness of the changes and conditions within our own bodies.  George Stratton makes this related
comment: “[In the process of perception,] the passive factor, the recipient of the action [i.e., the sense
organ], has a part in the total process and demands our attention, quite as much as does the agent in
perception [i.e., the stimulus].  The very fact that the same stimulus can have a variable effect
according to the condition in which it finds our organs, convinces one that the scientist’s attention must
be directed beyond the stimulus, the ‘object,’ the active feature in perception.”  (Theophrastus and the
Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle, p. 20)
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Aristotle, because these images are bodily, the inseparability of human thinking from
images implies that conditions in the living body are integral to the processes of our
contemplative and discursive reasoning, and to the presentation of intelligible
contents in incidental perception.120  These images undergo changes that take place
within the body and are ultimately governed by the dispositional propensities of the
body’s lowest-level constituents.121  Thus, the “proper symmetry” of the inward
constituents of the body is not only integral to the functions of nutrition and
reproduction (as described in Chapter 1), and voluntary self-motions (as described
earlier in this chapter), but it is also critical to perception, imagination, and reason.
Since these soul-powers are among the sources of moral responsibility, their somatic
imminence has a direct bearing on moral psychology.
Let us illustrate this with respect to incidental perception.  As mentioned
above, the proper and incidental objects of perception are functions of ourselves as
much as, or to an even greater extent than, they are functions of the supposed external
stimuli that act upon our sense organs.  This is a critical aspect of our moral
responsibility for several reasons.  The one I would like to dwell upon here is that this
fact about perception gives us the capacity to alter our assessments and “master the
appearances.”  In the process of gaining this mastery and altering one’s mode of
perception, one must strain to attend to certain intelligible contents as opposed to
others.
                                                 
120 Recall, once again, the following references: DA I.1, 403a 9; DA III.7, 431a 16; DA III.8, 432a 7;
On Memory and Reminiscence, 1, 449b 31.  See also On Memory and Reminiscence 2, 453a 15.
121 Among other places, see On Memory and Reminiscence 2, 451b 10ff.  We will return to this below.
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As William James states, “Our moral effort, properly so called, terminates in
our holding fast to the appropriate idea.”  The preferred intelligible content of
incidental perception is referred to here as the “appropriate idea,” which James also
refers to as “the proper conception,” “the true head of classification,” and “the right
name.”  He writes, “the essential preliminary to every decision is the finding of the
right names under which to class the proposed alternatives of conduct.” Moreover,
“The effort by which [one] succeeds in keeping the right name unwaveringly present
to his mind proves to be [one’s] saving moral act[!]”  He refers to these acts of
straining to hold the right idea as instances of “voluntary attention,” and calls them
“the fundamental act of will.” 122  James writes, “In action as in reasoning, then, the
great thing is the quest of the right conception.  The concrete dilemmas do not come
to us with labels gummed upon their backs.  We may name them by many names.
The wise man is he who succeeds in finding the name which suits the needs of the
particular occasion best.”123
For example, in resisting temptation one might imagine and strain to attend to
the health consequences of the proverbial cake as opposed to its delicious taste, or to
the deleterious effects of the alcohol or one’s past drunken stupidity as opposed to the
pleasures of intoxication.  In an effort to drive away folly and laziness, one might
focus intently on the fleeting nature of the opportune moment and the preciousness of
                                                 
122 See Talks to Teachers on Psychology, pp. 81, 90-91, and PBC, p. 391-321 (all emphasis in
original). I will continue to use “voluntary attention” in the above sense.  Consider the following
Aristotelian parallel: “Now the braggart seems to be someone who takes upon himself a reputation for
things that do not belong to him, or exaggerated over those that belong to him, while the ironic person,
on the contrary, seems to disown things that do belong to him or understate them, but the person at the
mean, being someone who calls each thing by its right name, is apt to be truthful in his life as well as
in speech, acknowledging the things that belong to him, and nothing greater or less, as his own.” (NE
IV.7, 1127a 23, emphasis added)
123 PBC, p. 297-8 (emphasis in original).
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the time and resources one is squandering.124  Practicing ethical virtue in accordance
with the Socratic discourses of Plato’s dialogues, one might divert the impulse to take
revenge by attending to the vengeful act one is inclined to perform as being more
harmful to oneself than the unjust action done unto you, and to the perpetrator of this
unjust act as having harmed himself more than he has harmed you.  Such mindfulness
is integral to the practice of transforming adversity into the opportunity to practice
virtue.  A sage such as Socrates or Buddha or Jesus – or any ordinary person with the
relevant temperament – will no longer need to strain in this way; rather the perception
will be “put together” with the appropriate content in the first instance.125 As Aristotle
states,
                                                 
124 I borrow part of the above sentence from Heirocles (a Neoplatonic philosopher who, along with
Syrianus, was a student of Plutarch of Athens), who states that “Pythagoras begins by the precepts of
active virtue.  Before all things, we ought to dissipate and drive away folly and the laziness that are in
us and then apply ourselves to divine things.”  (Commentary on the Golden Verses, in The Golden
Chain: An Anthology of Pythagorean and Platonic Philosophy, ed. Algis Uzdavinys, p. 178.)  The
sentiment here could be expressed in Aristotelian terms by saying that the virtues of character are a
necessary condition for the intellectual virtues.  (See NE VI.13.)  Plato also depicts this beautifully in
his allegory of the cave; “here is what our present account shows about this power to learn that is
present in everyone’s soul, and the instrument with which each of us learns: just as an eye cannot be
turned around from darkness to light except by turning the whole body, so this instrument [the rational
part of the soul] must be turned around from what-comes-to-be together with the whole soul [the
appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of soul], until it is able to bear to look at what is and at the
brightest thing that is – the one we call the good.”  (Republic VII, 518C)
125 One can compare such masters of moral and intellectual virtue with chess masters.  As Douglas
Hofstadter explains, “[The chess master] thinks on a different level from the novice; his set of concepts
is different.  Nearly everyone is surprised to find out that in actual play, a master rarely looks ahead
any further than a novice does – and moreover, a master usually examines only a handful of moves!
The trick is that his mode of perceiving the board is like a filter: he literally does not see bad moves
when he looks at a chess situation – no more than chess amateurs see illegal moves when they look at a
chess situation.”  (Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Vintage Books, 1980),
286, emphasis in original.)  Just as the chess master does not even see bad chess moves, so the
developed sage does not even fathom ethically corrupt actions or the predications that motivate them.
We should note that in spite of this fact, it is impossible to mechanically transplant the wisdom of a
sage into another’s heart or mind by providing him or her with instructions or a sterile set of true
propositions concerning how one should behave, for there can be no such set of instructions that is
effective in all possible circumstances.  This observation lays behind Plato’s many statements to the
effect that wisdom cannot be transmitted through the written word, partly because the words of a
written text remain the same whoever reads that text, whereas the true soul-guide must perceive the
individual person before him and choose his words according to the characteristics of that particular
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“Then to a person of serious moral stature, what is wished for would be what
is truly good, but to a flighty sort of person it would be any random thing, just
as, in the case of bodies, for the ones that are in good condition those things
are healthy that truly are so, while for the ones that are sickly different things
might be healthy, and similarly in the case of what is bitter or sweet or hot or
heavy or of any other sort.  For the person of serious moral stature discerns
each thing correctly, and in each kind of thing, the true instance shows itself
to such a person.  For in accordance with each sort of active condition [or
state of character (hexis)] there are special things that are beautiful and
pleasant, and the person of serious moral stature is distinguished most of all,
perhaps for seeing what is truly so in each kind, since such a person is like a
rule and measure of what is beautiful and pleasant.”126
In the process of developing such enlightened modes of perception, however,
practice and straining to voluntarily attend to certain features will be necessary.  Now,
what I want to point out about such examples of “mastering the appearances” is this:
for Aristotle, the somatic imminence of the images through which intelligible
contents are made manifest in our experience has the consequence that this straining
of attention – so important to moral responsibility, and thus to moral psychology –
involves physical “countermotions” (antikinousin) within the living body that enable
                                                                                                                                            
person’s soul.  (For example, see Phaedrus 271A-278D and .)  The Sufi philosopher Al-Ghazali
presented this point nicely when he wrote: “Were a physician to treat all of his patients with a single
medicine he would kill most of them; and so it is with the Shaykh [that is, the “physician of the soul”],
who, were he to charge all his aspirants with one kind of [spiritual] exercise, would destroy them and
kill their hearts.”  (From “An Exposition Detailing the Method Used in Refining the Character,” being
§22.5 of On Disciplining the Soul, Refining the Character, and Curing the Sickness of the Heart,
translated by T. J. Winter, p. 41)  Recall the footnote in §0.2 about the lack of precision of ethical
discourse, as opposed to the ultimate precision of virtue.  We will return to this in Chapter 3.
126 NE III.4, 1113a 25ff, emphasis added.  The above passage concerns the virtuous person’s
perception of particular circumstances.  A corresponding point holds with respect to the abstract
principles about what is best: “But that ‘eye’ of the soul [namely, practical wisdom (phronêsis)] does
not develop its active condition without virtue… For demonstrative reasoning about things to be done
has a starting point, ‘since such-and-such is the end and the best thing,’… and this does not show itself
except to a good person; for vice warps someone and makes one be wrong about the sources that
govern action.  So it is clear that it is impossible to be possessed of practical judgment (phronêsis)
without being good.” (NE VI.12, 1144a 30-35, emphasis added)
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one to “gainsay” or “contradict” (antiphêsi) the appearances.127   These
countermotions free one’s faculty of judgment or opinion from forces that blindly or
irrationally construct the appearance.
As evidence that the faculty of appearance and that of judgment are distinct,
Aristotle cites the fact that the image or appearance of the sun in our perceptual
experience is only a foot in diameter, but judgment or opinion contradicts or says
something contrary to (antiphêsi) this appearance.128  In this instance, the faculty of
judgment resists and holds its own ground in the face of the presentation, maintaining
the judgment that the sun itself is large although its appearance is small.   This is a
case in which “there is a false appearance of things about which, at the same time,
there is a true conception (hupolêpsin alêthê).” (DA III.3, 428b 3)  The well-known
Müller-Lyer Illusion (below) also illustrates this point: even after one measures the
two horizontal lines in this image, and forms a true conception that they are the same
length, the appearance that the bottom line is longer than the upper line typically
persists nevertheless.  Thus, one feels oneself exerting an effort to contradict and re-
shape the appearance into conformity one’s judgment so that one sees them as being
the same length (and does not only judge this to be the case).
                                                 
127 See On Memory and Reminiscence, 2, 453a 27; On Dreams 2, 460b 16-20; On Dreams 3, 461b; DA
III.3, 428b 3-10; and De Sensu 7, 448b 12.
128 On Dreams 2, 460b 16-20; DA III.3, 428b 3-10; Sense and Sensibilia 7, 448b 12. For a description
of a calculative process relating to this, see On Memory and Recollection 2, 452b 7ff.
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This example is closely tied to visual qualia, which are objects of proper
perception, but the same point applies to more conceptually complex and richly
textured appearances of incidental perception and their corresponding judgments or
conceptions.  A chilling case in point is presented in Sartre’s Situations, where French
resistance against the German occupation is described in terms of an inner struggle to
maintain a “true conception” in the face of Nazi propaganda and the appearances it
was projecting:
“All around us on the walls, in the newspapers, on the screen, we met that foul
and insipid image that our oppressors wanted us to accept as ourselves…
 Since the Nazi poison was seeping into our thinking, each accurate thought
was a victory… alone and naked before torturers who were clean-shaven,
well-fed, well-dressed, who regarded this wretched flesh with contempt –
torturers whose smug consciences and enormous social power gave every
appearance of their being right.”129
Exerting the countermotions within one’s soul and body, sustaining the
voluntary attention necessary to successfully contradict this appearance and to
maintain the true conception of one’s own human dignity in opposition to the
politically weighted Nazi poison, was the most essential victory upon which all other
                                                 
129 From Situations III, 11-13, quoted in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, edited with introduction
by Robert Denoon Cumming, pp. 233-234 (my emphasis).
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forms of outward victory depended.130  The difficulty of holding onto a given mode of
perception under the pressure of some alternative interpretation that is weighted by
political power or widespread public approval is depicted nicely in Republic VI.
There Socrates states that it is not private individual sophists but public multitudes of
people who corrupt the youth (particularly, those youths with natures suited for true
philosophy)…
“…[w]hen many of them sit together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army
camps, or any other gathering of a majority in public and, with a loud uproar,
object excessively to some of the things that are said or done, then approve
excessively of others, shouting and clapping; and when, in addition to these
people themselves, the rocks and the surrounding space itself echo and
redouble the uproar of their praise or blame.  In a situation like that, how do
you think – as the saying goes – a young man’s heart is affected?  How will
whatever sort of private education he received hold up for him, and not get
swept away by such praise and blame, and go be carried off by the flood
wherever it goes, so that he will call the same things beautiful and ugly as
these people, practice what they practice, and become like them?” (Republic
VI, 492A-C)
Now, the visual appearance of the sun as smaller than the earth has little or no
power over our judgment as to the relative sizes of these planetary bodies: although
presented with a false appearance, we easily maintain a true conception.  The
appearance that the upper arrow of the Müller-Lyer Illusion is shorter than the lower
one weighs upon one’s judgment even after measurement has led one to form the true
belief that they are equal in length.  To the systematically marginalized victim of
prolonged torture, the appearance that the well-dressed, smug, and socially powerful
and publicly supported torturer is somehow in the right may be very overpowering
indeed (although this false appearance loses all its power when the situation is viewed
                                                 
130 Also see Victor E. Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning (New York: Pocket Books, 1984).
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from a clearer perspective).  In these examples, though, the agent maintains a true
conception in the face of false appearances.
However, much of the time, particularly when strong emotions are involved,
the appearances dominate the faculty of judgment.  Like the dreamer who takes the
dream presentation for waking experience, in these cases we are “mere followers of
the phantasms.”  As Ross renders this idea, “sometimes [opinion or judgment] is
inhibited and gives its allegiance to the image [that is, the appearance].”131  To
hearken back to Socrates’ profound words, in these cases of noetic passivity “the
power of appearance makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing
our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choices…”132  The
active exercise of reason, calculation, or rational imagination saves us from being
dragged around in this way by the power of appearance against the will of our true
selves.  In a related passage, Socrates notes that when people first began to exercise in
the nude it appeared ridiculous to many, but “the laughter in the eyes faded away
because of what the arguments had proved to be best.”  (Republic V, 452D)  Through
the exercise of reason, then, certain intelligible contents fade away, and other contents
become salient or vivid (enargon) in our incidental perception.
 We should note that calculation or discursive reasoning is surely not the only
method for influencing one’s mode of incidental perception, and may be ineffective
without a host of other means for effecting this transformation and serving as aides to
voluntary attention.  Indeed, in the Platonic scheme of education presented in the
                                                 
131 See On Dreams 1, 459a 8, and Ross’s paraphrase in Aristotle: Parva Naturalia, A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary, p. 267.  Recall that “phantasms,” “images,” and “appearances” are all
translations of the same word in Greek: phantasmata.
132 Protagoras 356d, quoted above.
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Republic, dialectic and mathematics are last in the program and are preceded by
education in music, gymnastics, and poetry.  Thus, the enlightened use of these arts is
absolutely essential in the education of character and shaping one’s mode of
perception.133
Here we can note aphorisms such as those employed in the Pythagorean
schools, referred to as “symbols” (symbola) or “sayings” (akousmata).  In his
Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy Iamblichus presents thirty-nine of these
symbolic sayings, which we can interpret as aids to voluntary attention and beneficial
mechanisms of “perception management.”  For instance, one such saying is “One
should not stir a fire with a knife.”  As Johan C. Thom notes, this is generally
interpreted to mean “Do not increase someone’s anger by arguing with him.”134
Iamblichus elaborates on this saying as follows:
“This exhorts us to wisdom.  For it excites in us an appropriate conception
with respect to the propriety of not opposing sharp words to a man full of fire
and wrath, nor contending with him.  For frequently by words you will agitate
and disturb an ignorant man, and will yourself experience things dreadful and
unpleasant… [M]any by gratifying anger have changed the condition of their
soul, and made death preferable to life.”135
                                                 
133 See Republic III.  In the paragraphs that follow we will consider symbolic sayings of the
Pythagorean school and their usefulness in the education of emotions and modes of perception.  Our
observations in this regard are also applicable to poetry and parables and so forth.  Relevantly, in The
Happiness Hypothesis Jonathan Haidt makes very perceptive remarks about “how the West was lost”
when moral education became almost exclusively a matter of rational proofs and logical argumentation
and ceased to make sufficient use of maxims and role models in its pedagogy. (pp. 158-166)  Brief
comments on the wordless transformational power of music will arise at the end of Chapter 3.
134 Johan C. Thom, “The Passions in Neopythagorean Writings,” in Passions and Moral Progress in
Greco-Roman Thought, edited by John T. Fitzgerald (New York: Routledge, 2008), 71.
135 Iamblichus: The Exhortation to Philosophy, translated by Thomas Moore Johnson (Grand Rapids,
MI: Phanes Press, 1988), 100.  As further rendering of the Greek terminology here: this symbol
exhorts us to wisdom (phronêsis: practical wisdom), and it excites (egeirei: awakens, arouses, stirs up,
raises from the dead) an appropriate conception (tên ennoian tên prosêkousan: fitting thoughts,
reflections, ideas, intentions) in our incidental perception of the situation of action. (Cf. James on the
“appropriate idea,” “the proper conception,” “the true head of classification,” and “the right name.”)
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The symbolic saying establishes an analogical association between the
metaphorical image (e.g., stirring a fire with a knife) and a perceived situation or
possible action (e.g., using sharp words in response to another’s anger).  In doing so,
it serves as a filter through which one re-conceptualizes the perceived situation or
possible action; it superimposes features of the metaphor’s content onto one’s
perception of the corresponding action or situation, and transfers a predication from
the one to the other.  In particular, by stirring a fire with a knife one will harm oneself
(presumably the idea is that one’s hand will get burned by getting too close to the fire
or the fire will heat the knife as one grips it); similarly, by responding to another’s
anger with sharp words one will increase the other person’s anger and harm oneself
by gratifying and indulging one’s own tendency toward anger, thereby disfiguring
and altering the condition of one’s own soul (for the worse).136
In this instance, the presence of the symbolic association transfers the
predication that this is not good to do from the symbol to one’s incidental perception
or imagination of the possible action.  It thus helps one to judge the situation correctly
and, thereby, to hold back from the action.137  As an aid to right action, the symbolic
image functions as a sort of psychological switching device, redirecting the impulse
to action through an alternative pathway of discharge.  As an aid to right judgment, it
                                                 
136 For further illustration, two additional Pythagorean akousmata or symbola are “Do not eat the
heart,” meaning “Do not wear yourself out by worrying”; and  “Wipe out the marks of a pot in the
ashes,” meaning “One should not allow any trace of anger to remain after it is spent, but all
remembrance of evil must be erased from the mind.”  (Thom, “The Passions in Neopythagorean
Writings,” ibid.)
137 One additional feature of note that may be transferred from the symbol to one’s perception of the
action in question is the judgment that I have the power to do this.  I feel myself to be entirely capable
of holding back a knife from a fire, and the association of this content with the situation at hand may
increase my sense that I can and will successfully resist the impulse to lash out in anger – and this
sense will increase the likelihood that I do succeed in redirecting the impulse.  Recall the importance of
one’s incidental perception of oneself as agent from the footnote in §2.2.
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works like a psychological splint implanted into one’s “imagination” (that is, the
faculty for presenting appearances) when – as is often the case – calculation or
reasoning has not been able to straighten out the measuring standard by which one
judges what is good to do and what is bad, what is beautiful and what ugly.
“Reinforcements” of this kind are necessary when the measuring standard that
informs one’s judgments is being warped under the pressure of, say, poisonous
political propaganda, popular opinion and the clamorous re-doubled praise or blame
of the unenlightened masses, a manipulative and controlling relationship partner,
advertisements carefully designed to lead you to want things that are not good for
you, or one’s own excessive desire for pleasure or other errant dispositions.  In
administering these correctives to itself, the soul is like a doctor doctoring himself.138
Now, in order to fully work this psychological medicine into one’s soul, to
push it beneath one’s crowded thoughts and have it grow into one’s character
(echoing the fragment from Empedocles quoted in the introduction above), one must
do more than meditate upon symbolic images and reason about what is best to do.
One must also act and set oneself in motion to the intelligible music in these images
and reasoned judgments about the good.  Among other reasons, this physical
movement gives the relevant intelligible content leverage in the functional structure
of the psyche by altering the conditions in the inward parts of the body, for it is in
                                                 
138 Aristotle compares nature with someone practicing medicine on himself at Phys. II.8, 199b 26.
Compare the discussion above with Epictetus on “reinforcements” used against faulty habits of
perception (Discourses I.27), Plato on “antidotes” for counter-acting psychologically poisonous
appearances (e.g., Republic X, 595B), and the following reference to “aids” for maintaining proper
judgment from Marcus Aurelius: “To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:-
Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see
distinctly what king of thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself
its proper name…” (Meditations, III.11, my emphasis)
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these conditions that one’s mode of perception is based.  As William James observes,
“It is not in the moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing motor
effects, that resolves and aspirations communicate a new ‘set’ to the brain [and
thereby to one’s habits and character].”139  On Aristotle’s view, in struggling against
false appearances one is involved in a psychosomatic struggle.
2.3.2 Dreams, Recollection, and Putting Together Perceptions
To get a clearer sense of the somatic dimension of this struggle to bring the
appearances into harmony with truth and right reason, let us return to the trivial but
helpfully simple example of one’s perception of the tempting cake.  Due to the
somatic imminence of the images through which one perceives the cake as something
good to eat, to contradict this appearance, and stabilize a perception of the cake as
unhealthful (and therefore not to be eaten), one’s effort of attention involves the
production of countermotions in the blood that alter and re-arrange the somatic
images residing there.  A brief look at Aristotle’s explanations of dreaming and
recollection will help to clarify the nature of these somatic countermotions and the
manner in which they can alter the appearances by making one intelligible content
more vivid than another in one’s incidental perception.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, for Aristotle, stimulation to the sense organs
creates an impression that flows through the blood and into the heart, where
awareness is centered in the living body.  As Aristotle states, the heart has “supreme
                                                 
139 Talks to Teachers, p. 35.  James later notes that “When a resolve or a fine glow of feeling is allowed
to evaporate without bearing practical fruit, it is worse than a chance lost: it works positively to hinder
future resolutions and emotions from taking the normal path of discharge.” (p. 36)  This is the road to
akrasia.
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control” since it is “the source both of the sensitive and nutritive soul,” and “the soul
is, as it were, set aglow with fire in this part.”140  Images or sense impressions linger
in the blood, although we are typically unaware of them during waking consciousness
because they are too faint in comparison to present impressions (just as the stars,
although they are still present, are invisible during the sunlit hours of the day).  As
Aristotle states, “the movements which occur in the daytime [within the body] are,
unless very great and violent, lost sight of in contrast with the waking movements,
which are more impressive.  In sleep the opposite takes place, for the even trifling
movements seem considerable.”  (On Prophesying by Dreams, 1, 463a 7; brackets by
Beare)
According to Aristotle’s explanation of dreaming, upon falling asleep the
sense organs become inactive and these faint residual impressions come to be noticed.
As they flood into the heart the dreamer mistakes them for actual perceptions.
Aristotle states, “when one is asleep, in proportion as most of the blood sinks inwards
to its fountain [the heart], the internal [sensory] movements… accompany it
inwards.”  (On Dreams, 3, 461b 11; brackets by Beare.)  Furthermore, the relative
disorder of the presentations in dreams is explained, from this perspective, on the
grounds that the residual impressions get distorted and re-arranged in comparatively
random combinations as the blood moves toward the heart.  Consider this passage,
which I quote at length since similar principles account for our perceptual experience
while we are awake:
                                                 
140 On Youth and Old Age 3, 469a 4; and 4, 469b 16.
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“From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory
impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects or from
causes within the body, present themselves not only when persons are awake,
but also then, when [asleep], with even greater impressiveness.  For by day,
while the senses and the intellect (dianoias) are working together, they (i.e.,
such movements) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as a
smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures,
though, as soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge
into notice.  But by night [i.e. in sleep] owing to the inaction of the particular
senses, and their powerlessness to realize themselves, which arises from the
reflux of the hot from the exterior parts to the interior, they [i.e., the above
‘movements’] are borne in to the head quarters of sense-perception, and there
display themselves as the disturbance (of waking life) subsides.  We must
suppose that, like the little eddies which are being ever formed in rivers, so the
sensory movements are each a continuous process, often remaining like what
they were when first started, but often, too, broken into other forms by
collisions with obstacles.  This [last mentioned point], moreover, gives the
reason why no dreams occur in sleep immediately after meals, or to sleepers
who are extremely young, e.g. to infants.  The internal movement in such
cases is excessive, owing to the heat generated from the food.  Hence, just as
in a liquid, if one vehemently disturbs it, sometimes no reflected image
appears, while at other times one appears, indeed, but utterly distorted, so as
to seem quite unlike the original; while, when once the motion has ceased, the
reflected images are plain and clear; in the same manner during sleep the
phantasms, or residuary movements, which are based upon the sensory
impressions, become sometimes quite obliterated by the above described
motion when too violent; while at other times the sights are indeed seen, but
confused and weird, and the dreams [which then appear] are unhealthy, like
those of persons who are atrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine.
For all such affections, being spirituous, cause much commotion and
disturbance.  In sanguineous animals, in proportion as the blood becomes
calm, and as its purer are separated from its less pure elements, the fact that
the movement, based on impressions derived from each of the organs of sense,
is preserved in its integrity, renders the dreams healthy, causes a [clear] image
to present itself, and makes the dreamer think, owing to the effects borne in
from the organ of sight, that he actually sees, and owing to those which come
from the organ of hearing, that he really hears; and so on with those also
which proceed from the other sensory organs.” (On Dreams 3, 460b 27 – 461a
31; brackets by Beare)
Like many other passages in Aristotle’s biologically based works, this passage
is packed with important elements, including clues to Aristotle’s explanation of
voluntary attention, akrasia or weakness of will, incidental perception, practical
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reasoning, the relationship between the activity of the Divine Mind and that of the
individual human mind, and more.  We will return to some of these features later.
For now I want to elucidate the somatic aspects of incidental perception and the
efforts of attention through which one voluntarily masters and structures the
appearances.  It is through efforts such as these that one takes possession of oneself
and becomes an autonomously responsible being.
Recall that the “proper symmetry” (rhuthmon) of the body’s constitution
provides for the natural growth and unfolding development of the “fetation,” and for
the developed animal’s voluntary self-motions.  Likewise, the symmetry of active and
passive powers in the organism’s sense organs, blood, and heart provides for (a) the
absorption of the stimulus in the form of a sense impression, (b) the propagation of
the impression through the blood and into the heart, and (c) the association of the
present impression with the residual impressions of past experiences lingering in the
blood.  In this way, the stimulus triggers a process through which the image that
manifests the intelligible content of incidental perception comes to be present in the
heart and apprehended in the soul.
Taking on the impression depends upon both the stimulus itself and the
condition of the sense organ that receives it.  The propagation of the impression
through the blood re-awakens and accumulates the faint associated residual
impressions of past experience.  The explicit or subliminal presence of these faint
impressions alters how one is likely to apprehend the presently perceived particular,
and thus alters the content of incidental perception.  For example, past experiences of
eating pastries leave residual impressions of their pleasurable taste.  Upon seeing a
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pastry, if these residual images of the taste of pastries are re-awakened, the pastry
appears to me as pleasurable to eat.
Now typically one does not consider these residual images of the pastry’s taste
as likenesses of past pastry-eating experiences – that is, there is not an explicit
episode of remembering how some particular pastry tasted.  Rather, the subliminal re-
presentation of the residual images of what pastries taste like, combined with the
present perception of what the pastry looks like, establishes an expectation that
structures the incidental perception of the pastry one is about to eat.  Thus, I perceive
the pastry as a tasty treat and am disposed to eat it.  On other hand, if the blood is
more fully saturated with associated residual images of the sight of myself
overweight, and the unpleasant bloated feeling and toothaches that accompany
stuffing oneself with sweets, or if images of this kind are not as faint as the pleasant
associations, I will perceive the pastry as fattening and will be disposed to avoid it.
When I am straining to attend to the fact that the pastry is fattening, and to fight
against the desire for its pleasurable taste, I am straining to produce countermotions
that re-awaken residual images that will associate the pastry with things I want to
avoid.  I am trying to alter the symmetry of powers within the body (like the toy cart
steering itself by altering the sizes of its wheels: recall §2.1 above).
The ways in which these associations influence the content of incidental
perception will be considered later (e.g., §2.3.4).  For now I want to emphasize that
the propagation of the present sense impression through the blood, and the process of
“putting together” the image in which I think the form that is the content of the
incidental perception, both take place mechanically, in accordance with the
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“symmetry” of the active and passive powers in the body.  Our capacity to alter and
shape our habitual mode of perception – to exploit the mechanical powers of the body
with rational intelligence – is based in the plasticity of our organic material, the
malleability of the symmetry of active and passive powers.
Aristotle’s account of recollection provides helpful clues here.141  In On
Memory and Reminiscence 2, Aristotle describes the way that nature (physis) and
habit (ethos) combine in the processes through which associated psychosomatic
movements trigger one another in a sequence that leads from a mnemonic token to a
sought-for memory: “Recollections result because this or that motion naturally comes
about after this or that other one; if this is by necessity, it is clear that whenever one is
set in motion in that way, one will be set in motion also in this way, but if it is not by
necessity but from habit, one will be set in motion this way for the most part.” (On
Memory and Reminiscence 2, 451b 10; trans. Sachs)142  In some instances we recollect
without effort and without intentionally searching.  As Beare notes, “The train of
ideas is part of the mechanism of nature, which the will avails itself of, but which
may lead to recollection without an effort of will.”143
Additionally, we should note, the mechanisms of nature may operate against
the will and compel the prolongation of irrational passions or discursive reasoning
that the agent cannot discontinue.  The following passage is critical:
                                                 
141 I should note that the subliminal association I have been referring to above is not the same process
as recollection.  The latter is an explicit and intentional “searching” (zetêsis) for a residual image in the
body that is the likeness of some past experience that one cannot presently remember.  Here I am
comparing the principles that govern the somatic elements of this intentional process and those that
govern the spontaneous processes that structure incidental perception in ordinary circumstances.
142 Also see Topics VIII.14, 163b 24ff.
143 Note in Beare’s Oxford translation at 451b 24.  See Ross (ed.) Student’s Oxford Aristotle Vol. III.
98
“That the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a searching for an
‘image’ in a corporeal substrate, is proved by the fact that in some persons,
when, despite the most strenuous application of thought (dianoian), they have
been unable to recollect, it [that is, the effort at recollection] excites a feeling
of discomfort, which, even though they abandon the effort at recollection,
persists in them none the less; and especially in persons of melancholic
temperament.  For these are most powerfully moved by presentations.  The
reason why the effort of recollection is not under the control of their will is
that, as those who throw a stone cannot stop it at their will when thrown, so he
who tried to recollect and ‘hunts’ [after an idea] sets up a process in a material
part, [that] in which resides the affection.  Those who have moisture around
that part which is the center of sense-perception suffer most discomfort of this
kind.  For when once the moisture has been set in motion it is not easily
brought to rest, until the idea which is sought for has again presented itself,
and thus the movement has found a straight course.  For a similar reason
bursts of anger or fits of terror, when once they have excited such motions, are
not at once allayed, even though the angry or terrified persons [by efforts of
will] set up counter motions, but the passions continue to move them on, in
the same direction as at first, in opposition to such counter motions.  The
affection resembles also that in the case of words, tunes, or sayings, whenever
one of them has become inveterate on the lips.  People give them up and
resolve to avoid them; yet again and again they find themselves humming the
forbidden air, or using the prohibited word.”144
Just as a sequence of images may form an explicitly entertained “train of
ideas,” so the accumulation of images may subliminally come together and structure
and accentuate certain aspects of the immediate apprehension of some perceived
object.  Thus, on the one hand, the original impression conveys the proper objects of
perception: what something looks like, smells like, sounds like, feels like, or tastes
                                                 
144 On Memory and Reminiscence 2, 453a 15 – 453b 11 (brackets by Beare).  It is noteworthy that
Aristotle uses the very same metaphor concerning the stone in connection with the formation of
character: “[An unjust person can not] stop being unjust and become just merely by wishing to do so;
any more than a sick man can get well by wishing, although it may be the case that his illness is
voluntary, in the sense of being due to intemperate living and neglect of the doctors’ advice.  At the
outset then, it is true, he might have avoided the illness, but once he has let himself go he can do so no
longer. When you have thrown a stone, you cannot afterwards bring it back again, but nevertheless you
are responsible for having taken up the stone and flung it, for the origin of the act was within you.
Similarly the unjust and profligate might at the outset have avoided becoming so, and therefore they
are so voluntarily, although having become unjust and profligate it is no longer open to them not to be
so.” (NE III.5, 1114a 14-24)  See also Eudemian Ethics II.8 1224a 17 for a relevant mention of the
motion of a stone.
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like.  On the other hand, particularly when judgment passively follows appearance,
the perception’s intelligible content is put together mechanically as the impression
flows inward toward the heart.  The appearance of the proper perceptibles is
determined by the stimulus and by the relevant sensory organs.  However, in this
passive state, the additional question of what the perceived object is is also all-but-
answered by the symmetry of powers in one’s body and the blind mechanical forces
of non-rational potency.
Dorothea Frede presents a similar view of phantasia as “synthesizing” present
and residual impressions, thereby being the faculty responsible for the overall gestalt
of one’s perception and bridging the gap between our awareness of proper
perceptibles and our capacity for abstract thinking (which has its nascent starting
point in incidental perception).  However, her account seems to overlook the
importance of the somatic imminence of the images (phantasiai) through which this
synthesizing function is performed.  She writes, “Since there is no control, no special
faculty in the soul, that ‘keeps [phantasiai; images, presentations, appearances] in
order’, phantasiai can become mere appearances that drift in and out of
consciousness, reappear in dreams, or delude us in a state of fever.”145  It is my
contention that (a) we re-arrange and set the images in order when we exercise
voluntary attention and discursive reasoning (logismos, syllogismos, dianoia), and (b)
                                                 
145 “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Nussbaum and
Rorty), 285-286.  Also compare her statement that “Free-floating items that come to my mind when I
contemplate, say, sunsets in general are mere images, while memories are images that are likenesses of
something retained from the past with the association of the time-lapse.” (p. 285)  Whether the images
in question are vehicles of contemplation, memory, daydreaming, or practical reasoning, as we have
seen, they do not float freely in some frictionless immaterial space but move and “float” in the material
medium of the body (specifically, the blood), like eddies in a river (see On Dreams 3, quoted above).
Therefore, their motion is governed according to the symmetry of non-rational active and passive
powers in the body.
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whether or not we are intentionally concentrating our attention in these ways, the
powers that keep the images in order are bodily powers (ultimately, the hot, cold,
moist, and dry).
We will consider (a) discursive reasoning (more specifically, practical
reasoning) in the next chapter.  To get a glimpse of (b) the role of the body in
structuring the content of our perception independently of reason, recall Aristotle’s
use of the automata metaphor and the three parallels between their functioning and
ours: (1) in one sense the source of motion is external, (2) in another sense the source
of motion is internal, (3) the motion is a necessary sequence of events.  Here too
Aristotle provides a similar example: the residual sense impressions and the active
impressions of present sensory experience “are so related [in general] that if anything
move the blood, some one sensory movement will emerge from it, while if this
perishes another will take its place; while to one another also they are related in the
same way as the artificial frogs in water which severally rise [in fixed succession] to
the surface in the order in which the salt [which keeps them down] become
dissolved.” (On Dreams 3, 461b 12; brackets by Beare)  Thus, images drift in and out
of consciousness, reappear in dreams, or become deranged through fever on account
of their somatic imminence.  And their instrumental role in synthesizing the contents
of incidental perception is grounded in the same bodily causes.
Now, let us re-connect this discussion to the six particular circumstances of
the action mentioned in the previous section of this chapter: the agent, the action, the
patient, the instrument, the purpose, and the manner.  For an action to be voluntary,
Aristotle says, the agent must have each of these factors in view as he acts (and have
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the power to refrain from the action).  We have been speaking thus far of the
incidental perception of trees and pastries and so on.  But one’s recognition of the six
features of action is also an instance of incidental perception.  The way in which one
conceives of oneself, the action, the patient, and so on, are also put together in
accordance with the same principles as have been described above.  This is true of our
perception of the circumstances of our own actions and of the actions of other people.
Recall from above that individuals who have established the mode of
perception integral to virtue generally have the incidental perception of the situation
put together in a way which accords with virtue right from the moment of
apprehending the situation.  The rest of us must establish countermotions to alter our
perception so that it harmonizes with the right set of considerations.  Others do
nothing to counteract or re-assess the appearances and simply follow them
unthinkingly.  In this sense, the problem with those who are morally corrupt, weak-
willed, or practically inept is that their perceptions are absorbed into a network of all
the wrong predicates, and / or they do nothing to counteract this condition.  The
reason this takes place is that the bodily medium through which sense data are
transmitted to the center of awareness has been habituated to automatically associate,
say, pastry with tasty things, alcohol with good times, etc.  The required
countermotion is a willful act of voluntarily searching out, re-vivifying, and re-
arranging the faint residual sense impressions.  Acts of voluntary attention, like
processes of “searching” (zetêsis) such as recollection and deliberation, are
intentional acts as opposed to the usual passive submission to the happenings that
mechanically construct one’s perception.
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In this section we have seen that, for Aristotle, the somatic imminence of the
“images” through which we apprehend intelligible contents is instrumental in
determining our modes of incidental perception.  This is important for several
reasons, among them being the fact that our incidental perception of the six factors of
action is essential to the voluntariness of what we do, and to the actions we tend to
take.  In the next section we will further investigate the nature of phantasia
(“imagination”) and the ways in which sheer presentation and incidental perception or
interpretation are related.
2.3.3 Phantasia and Incidental Perception
Phantasia has an important role in Aristotle’s explanation of the voluntary
actions of human beings and non-human animals, the experience of emotions,
perception, and a variety of cognitive activities involving rational thought –
deliberation, contemplation, and recollection to name a few.  However, Aristotle’s
account of phantasia also gives rise to many questions.  Typically translated as
“imagination,” phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which “images” or “appearances”
or “presentations” (phantasmata) occur to us.  (DA III.3, 428a 1)  These “images” are
instrumental in discerning and deciding upon a course of action, initiating and
guiding action, enabling us to remember and to recollect the past, and in facilitating
contemplative thought.
Here we are concerned with how phantasia is related to incidental perception.
How does the sheer presentation of a thing relate to our perception or recognition of
what it is?  Is the “what it is” to be included as an element of the “presentation” or
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“appearance”?  Furthermore, exactly what content is involved in incidental
perception?  Does incidental perception involve explicit predication (or only implicit
recognition)?  These questions are important because they concern the mechanics of
how our perceptions are put together.  As was stated above, if we do not see things
correctly, if we do not recognize the true significance of the circumstances of our
actions, we may fail to act intelligently and instead act in complete opposition to our
deepest values in the pursuit of ends that are entirely idiotic.
Recall from Chapter 1 the two senses of being, employed in singling out this
thing here and identifying what it is – e.g., “This thing here is a horse” or “Socrates is
a man.”  These are the elements of acts of predication or categorization (katêgorien).
As Porphyry notes at the opening of his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, this
Greek term originally referred to the accusation phase of a trial (as opposed to the
apologia – the defense speech).146  Heidegger makes an interesting connection
between predication (katêgoria) and the public market place (agora).  He writes,
“We translate katêgoria as a ‘statement about something’… but even then we
do not at all capture the full Greek meaning.  Kata-agoreuein means to accuse
someone to his face in the agora, the open court, of being ‘the very one
who…’  From that comes the broader meaning: to speak about something as
this or that, so that in and through our speaking the thing we speak about is
put forth into the public view, into the open, as manifest.  Katêgoria is the
naming of what something is: house, tree, sky, sea, hard, red, healthy.  The
philosophical ‘term’ ‘category,’ on the other hand, means a special kind of
speaking-about.  We are able to speak about a present thing as a house or a
tree only insofar as we have already beforehand wordlessly addressed what
                                                 
146 On Aristotle’s Categories, 55, 3, translated by Steven K. Strange (New York: Cornell University
Press, 1992), 29. See also Jeffrey Barnouw’s Propositional Perception: Phantasia, Predication, and
Sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 2002), 119.
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we encounter – i.e., have brought it into our open field of ‘vision’ – as
something standing-on-its-own, a thing.”147
Heidegger’s “wordless addressing of what we encounter as something
standing-on-its-own” corresponds to singling out this thing here, while speaking
about it – saying something about what it is – corresponds to identifying what it is.  It
may be necessary to identify something as a thing in order for it to be presented as a
thing of a certain kind.  Nevertheless, in ordinary experience these do not happen in
succession but occur as one event of “being appeared to.”  I do not first perceive
“thing,” then “blue rectangular thing,” then “book.”  I perceive a book immediately,
and only next notice its being blue, if I take any special notice of its color at all.  To
perceive a thing directly, purely, and simply as “thing” or “being” (in the primary
sense), to apprehend the intelligible content “being” or “thinghood” apart from any
further characterization of this particular being  – this is the object of metaphysics, the
science of being qua being.148  Here we are concerned with the perceptual predication
                                                 
147 “On the Being and Conception of FYSIS in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1” (Man and World, 9, No. 3,
1976), 232.
148 There are different modes of apprehending being qua being.  Aristotle’s is one of an intelligible
contemplation that is not an analysis that distinguishes concepts, or a synthesis that combines concepts
into propositions, but a contemplative act of “touching” in which the mind realizes its identity with
what it knows.  For instance, note the following: “And the thinking that is just thinking by itself is a
thinking of what is best just as itself, and especially so with what is so most of all.  But by partaking in
what it thinks, the intellect thinks itself, for it becomes what it thinks by touching and contemplating it,
so that the intellect and what it thinks are the same thing.” (Metaph. XII.7, 1072b 18; see also Metaph.
IX.10, 1051b 17ff; DA III.5, 430a 23ff; DA III.6, NE VI.8, 1142a 25).  In this view, pure being is
exemplified by the thought of the Divine Mind.  Although discursive reason may be necessary to
approach this illumination, the thinking Aristotle is here referring to is non-discursive.  A different
mode of apprehending being qua being is more phenomenological.  Here one is reminded of Sartre’s
description of the direct perception of being in Nausea, which begins as follows: “So I was in the park
just now.  The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground just under my bench.  I couldn’t
remember it was a root any more.  The words had vanished and with them the significance of things,
their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface.  I was
sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which
frightened me.  Then I had this vision…” (Nausea, p. 126-127)  While Sartre sees pure being as a
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of things as things of certain kinds, or perceiving them – in the first instance – under
certain descriptions.
Now one problem that arises is whether or not the content of incidental
perception is a function of imagination (i.e., appearance, presentation, phantasia).
Does the presentation of the appearance involve only the proper objects of perception
or does it include the incidental objects of perception as well?  Let us enter into a
brief, but perhaps obligatory, eristic digression to dispute this point.  Throughout this
chapter I have spoken as if the content of incidental perception is linked with the
appearances or presentations.  This is particularly true when the faculty of judgment
“merely follows” or “gives its allegiance” to the images or appearances.  But even
when one fights against the appearances, one does not fight against, say, the
appearance that the pastry is brown (an object of proper perception).  Rather, one
fights against the appearance that the pastry would be pleasurable to eat or that eating
it would be a good thing to do, and these are not matters of proper perception but of
incidental perception.
Another way to put the interpretation here is to say that imagination or
appearance (phantasia) presents proper objects of perception combined with
predications involving incidental objects of perception.  Richard Sorabji concurs with
this view.  He writes that an animal’s perception of a scent that it has learned to
follow “already involves predication;” perception of the common sensibles (motion,
rest, etc.) “already involves perceiving a proposition, in other words that something is
the case;” “a perceptual appearance is typically an appearance that something is the
                                                                                                                                            
“monstrous” and “obscene nakedness,” Aristotle sees it as the immortal and undifferentiated noetic
luminosity of the Divine Mind.
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case, or, as we would sometimes prefer to say, an appearance as of something’s being
the case.”  Additionally, “There is not merely an appearance of whiteness, but of
whiteness as belonging to something [e.g., a loaf of bread] or as being located
somewhere.”149  Also in harmony with this view, Joe Sachs writes “the things that we
perceive are already organized in accordance with something intelligible, and one of
the things the intellect thinks is the perceptible thing in its wholeness.”150
However, the position I have taken here has been argued against.  For
instance, John F. Heil Jr. contends that phantasia encompasses only the proper object
of perception and not the incidental object of perception.  In connection with DA
III.3, 428a 24, Heil writes “Thus, for this bread to appear white is for me to perceive
the bread and believe the bread is white… So, beliefs I hold about an incidental object
(Kate’s bread) are not beliefs at work in the appearance of the perceptual object (the
loaf of bread in front of me).”151  Heil’s analysis here is flawed because, like “Kate’s
bread,” “the loaf of bread in front of me” is an incidental object of perception, not
“the perceptual object” (i.e., the object of proper perception).  The proper perceptual
object is “white” or “the white patch.”  So the first sentence of Heil’s in the quotation
above should be re-written as: for this white patch to appear to be bread is for me to
perceive the white patch and believe it is bread (or to conceive of it as being bread).
In the passage under discussion here, Aristotle is considering the view that
phantasia is a combination of perception and belief, and he is asking whether
                                                 
149 “Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception,” in Nussbaum
and Rorty (ed.s), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 195-225.  (The
above quotations are from pp. 196-198.)
150 Aristotle’s On The Soul and On Memory and Recollection (Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2001), 141
n. 13.
151 “Aristotle’s Objection to Plato’s ‘Appearance’: De anima 428a24-b9” in Ancient Philosophy vol.
23, 2003, p. 326.
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phantasia involves perception and belief about the proper objects of perception: the
appearance of white and the belief “that looks white” or “there is something white.”
Aristotle answers this question in the negative: when I perceive the white patch I
typically do not also form an explicit belief “There’s white” or “I see white.”  Rather,
I perceive the white patch, but the belief content of my perception is, e.g., “Bread” or
“That’s bread.”  Note how Heil translates the relevant passage from Aristotle’s De
Anima III.3, 428a 28: “I mean, [on the view I am criticizing] appearance will be the
combination of the belief about, and perception of, something white.”  Heil illustrates
this with the example of a loaf of bread: I perceive white bread and form a belief
about it, namely that it was baked by Kate.
Again, the example and the translation are confused.  On the view Aristotle is
criticizing, phantasia is the combination of a perception of a proper object of
perception and a belief about that proper object of perception, e.g., a perception of
white, or this white patch, and a belief about its being white.  “Something white” in
Heil’s translation invites, and is taken in his example, as something to which
whiteness belongs – the bread – which distorts the meaning.  Note Sachs’s translation,
with the next few lines of text: “I mean that [on the opposing view] imagination
would be an intertwining of the opinion and the perception that something is white,
but not of the opinion that it is good with the perception that it is white.  In that case
the imagining would be the having an opinion of the very thing one perceives [e.g.,
this white patch], and not one incidentally related to it [e.g., bread or good].”  The
inclusion of “white” in the “that clause” describing the content of both the perception
and the belief ties them both, as it should, to the proper object of sense perception.
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This is the view Aristotle is describing and denying.  Hamlyn’s translation also
supports this reading: “I mean [on the view being criticized] that it will be the blend
of the belief in white and the perception of white that will be imagination…”
So, in the passages in question, Aristotle is not denying that appearance can
include predications involving the objects of incidental perception.  He is denying
that the belief component of appearance concerns the proper objects of perception.
Again, typically the intelligible content of my perception is not “white thing” or some
other observation about the qualia.  Rather, in the first instance, prior to any
conscious scrutiny over what the presented object is, the content of my perception
includes the predicative, interpretive, intelligible content of incidental perception.
The intelligible content of incidental perception may include an implicit conception
of what the perceived object is, or the appearance that this object has some other
characteristic that goes beyond the relevant qualia.  Unlike qualia such as “red” or
“warm,” which are proper objects of perception, contents such as “good” or “to be
pursued” are contents of incidental perception: you do not see that something is good
in the same sense that you see that something is red.  The present point is that, while
these intelligible contents may be thought or contemplated in their own right through
the power of intellect (nous), they are also be rendered implicitly, in an unarticulated
form, through the power of appearance (phantasia) – hence, e.g., Aristotle’s use of
the term “the apparent good.” (phainomenou agathou, e.g. at NE III.4, 1113a 20)
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2.3.4 Memory, Association, and Incidental Perception
I have argued for the connection of appearance and incidental perception, but
we must ask how the intelligible content of incidental perception can show forth and
grow in the presentation of raw sense-data or proper perceptibles.  Above I
characterized the content of incidental perception as being “put together” as the sense
impressions seep through the blood and into the heart.  In this process, the present
object of proper perception is associated with residual sensory impressions of past
experience that linger in the blood.  These associations accentuate certain modes of
conceptualizing the present particular.  To borrow the phrase from William James
(quoted in §2.3.1 above), these associations determine the “head of classification”
under which the present particular is perceived.
If you want to show this sports car as a source of happiness, you do not show
it stuck in a traffic jam, nor do you show the owner writing out the exorbitant
payment check (the likely future of most would-be owners); rather, you show this car
driving down a winding, curvy road through an exotic mountain landscape (where, as
a matter of fact, the tempted potential owner will never go).  The context in which the
car is presented alters what it is presented as being – e.g., something that will not, or
something that will, make me substantially happier.  If you want to portray Socrates
as a sage, you do as Plato did; if you want to display him as a sophist, you do as
Aristophanes did.  Contextual cues, playing off of ingrained associations, change how
the thing in question comes to be regarded – e.g., as a boon to the city-state or a
pestilence.  If you want to control the voting public’s perceptions, just show yourself
in a hardhat on a sunny day at the plant shaking hands with all-American steel
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workers, and tell the world you are best friends with Joe the plumber; next, combine
darkly tinted images of your opponent with scenes of violent, stormy seas, sounds of
ominous music, and threatening messages spoken in tremulous tones of warning (the
latter being an actual add by John McCain’s campaign against Barack Obama).
With such examples of corrosive “perception management” we see how the
passivity of the faculty of judgment in submission and mechanical allegiance to
carefully manufactured appearances can be deadly (although, as it turned out, in the
last case the good prevailed). On the other hand, we can also see how uncovering
these tactics of perception management, and contradicting the appearances they
project, empowers the viewer against their noxious influences.  Such political smear
campaigns, particularly when they become too transparent, tend to backfire and are
perceived as shameful attempts to manipulate public opinion for the sake of political
power.152
Now, there are surely differences between examples such as those just
presented and more basic judgments / appearances such as “that is a table.”  But,
fundamentally, I am suggesting, the principles through which the appearances
manifest intelligible content are similar, with the contextual cues – in both the basic
and more complex cases – finally being provided by habitually ingrained associations
amongst residual sensory impressions in the body.
Of course, these residual impressions also serve as the basis for memory, and
memory, as we should expect, and as Aristotle argues, is central to incidental
                                                 
152 As mentioned above, I will take up this theme in later work, and will consider philosophical
methods of perception management that serve as “antidotes” to corrupted modes of perception.  (Plato
has insightful things to say here e.g. at Republic X, 595B, among other places.)
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perception (not to mention to other higher cognitive abilities).  We must note that the
simple persistence of a sense impression is not identical with remembering.  To
remember is to behold or consider a residual image as a likeness of some past
experience.  Actively searching for a residual image that one cannot recall is the
process of recollection.  Nevertheless, for Aristotle, memory and recollection are
crucial bridges from pure sense experience to intelligible thinking.
In Posterior Analytics II.19 and Metaphysics I.1, Aristotle describes how
sensory activity provides us with a capacity for intelligible thinking.  In both of these
accounts, Aristotle describes a progression from sensation, through memory, to
experience and the formation of universal concepts.  In short, sense-data is stored in
the body and as this mass of stored data is ordered and arranged into coherent
categories, universal concepts are grasped.  Experience ensues as the perception of
particular entities is accompanied by the recognition that the particular at hand
belongs to a certain category.  In other words, the particular is “perceived as” a thing
of a certain kind.  As Aristotle puts it, “although it is the particular that we perceive,
the act of perception involves the universal; e.g., ‘man,’ not ‘a man, Callias’.” (Post.
An. II.19, 100a 16)  This feature of the act of perceiving particulars is critical to our
overall concern – moral responsibility and moral psychology – in that choice and
action involve one’s incidental perception of the particulars, and those universals
which are salient in one’s perception of particulars essentially controls the manner in
which one acts in those circumstances.
Aristotle presents the following analogy regarding the cognitive starting-
points that enable us to reason:
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“[such starting-points] arise from sense perception, just as, when a retreat has
occurred in battle, if one man halts so does another, and then another, until the
original position is restored.  The soul is so constituted that it is capable of the
same sort of process.” (Post. An. II.19, 100a 10)
I interpret this analogy as follows.  A military unit such as a troop of soldiers
or a squadron counts as a unit – that is, a single entity, a unified whole, one thing (as
opposed to a mere multitude of many things) – to the extent that each member plays a
particular functional role in relation to the others, e.g., general, scout, front-line
fighter, etc.  When a retreat occurs, each member gives up his role as a soldier and
retreats for his own personal safety.  When the functional roles that unify the
squadron and make it a whole have been abandoned, there is no longer a military unit
– one squadron – but a mere collection of individuals.153  However, when a retreating
individual “halts” and reclaims his position and role as general or scout or front-line
fighter, we might say that he is no longer “merely himself,” but is a general or a scout
or a front-line fighter.  One by one, then, such successive “haltings” restore the
original fighting force and the mere collection of individuals once again becomes a
unified whole, one thing – a squadron.
Similarly, successive perceptions of particular objects supply one with a
collection of sensory impressions stored in the body.  These impressions are sorted
out into coherent sub-collections of data that constitute wholes rather than mere heaps
of individual memories.  Such a sub-collection of data is an interconnected network
of associations that represents one’s conception of a certain category or universal
                                                 
153 In various places Aristotle makes much of the distinction between a “unified whole” and a “mere
heap” e.g. a house versus a mere pile of wood, a living organism versus a mere collection of organ-like
parts, and so on.
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concept. When such a unified network of residual sense impressions has crystallized,
a universal concept has “made a stand.”  As Aristotle says, “memories, though
numerically many, constitute a single experience.  And experience, that is the
universal when established as a whole in the soul – the One that corresponds to the
Many, the unity that is identically present in them all – provides the starting-point of
art (technê) and science (epistêmê).” (Post. An. II.19, 100a 6)
When this has occurred, a perceived individual is not “merely itself,” e.g. this
furry thing here, but is recognizable as representative of a whole category, e.g. it is
recognizable as a cat.  As the halting of the soldiers restores the unified whole which
was present before the retreat, so when many sense impressions halt or come to rest in
a single category as members of a kind, the soul has “restored” or “recreated” within
itself the intelligible form (universal) present in each of the sensible particulars of the
kind.  Mind is then able to “think the forms in the images” – that is, to apprehend
universals through particular sense-images stored in memory or perceived at the
moment.
2.3.5 Passions, Appearances, and Judgments
In various places Aristotle points to the fact that passions influence the
appearances of things and, consequently, our judgments about them.  For instance,
“[W]e are easily deceived respecting the operations of sense-perception when
we are excited by emotions, and different persons according to their different
emotions; for example, the coward when excited by fear, the amorous person
by amorous desire; so that, with but little resemblance to go upon, the former
thinks he sees his foes approaching, the latter, that he sees the subject of his
desire; and the more deeply one is under the influence of the emotion, the less
similarity is required to give rise to these illusory impressions.  Thus too, both
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in fits of anger, and also in all states of appetite, all men become easily
deceived, and more so the more their emotions are excited.  This is the reason
too why persons in the delirium of fever sometimes think they see animals on
their chamber walls, an illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals
of the markings thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes
corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a way that, if
the latter be not very ill, they know well enough that it is an illusion; but if the
illness is more severe they actually move according to the appearances.”  (On
Dreams 2, 460b 3-15)154
Also relevant is the following passage where Socrates says to Glaucon:
“A passionate man should not forget that all boys in the bloom of youth
somehow manage to sting and arouse a passionate lover of boys, and seem to
merit his attention and passionate devotion.  Isn’t that the way you people
behave to beautiful boys?  One, because he is snub-nosed, you will praise as
‘cute;’ another who is hook-nosed you will say is ‘regal;’ while the one in the
middle you say is ‘well proportioned.’  Dark ones look ‘manly,’ and pale ones
are ‘children of the gods.’  As for the ‘honey-colored,’ do you think that this
very term is anything but the euphemistic coinage of a lover who found it easy
to tolerate a sallow complexion, provided it was accompanied by the bloom of
youth?  In a word, you people find any excuse, and use any expression, to
avoid rejecting anyone whose flower is in full bloom.” (Republic V, 474D)
Stephen R. Leighton has perceptively commented on Aristotle’s view of the
influence of the passions on incidental perception in his paper “Aristotle and the
Emotions.”  To borrow an example from Leighton, at the sound of a distant
backfiring car, the coward hears the loud sound (the proper object of perception) as
being gunfire (the object of his incidental perception), whereas another person may
interpret the same sound correctly as a backfiring car.155  Leighton states that Aristotle
nowhere explicitly reports what explains such changes of judgment involving
                                                 
154 Aristotle also describes the distortion of judgment that is sometimes produced by extreme emotions
in the Rhetoric, where he compares the arousal of the jurors’ emotions and its distortion on their
judgment to the warping of a measuring stick.  See Rhetoric I.1, 1354a 25ff and I.2, 1356a 16.
155 Stephen R. Leighton, “Aristotle and the Emotions,” (1982), reprinted in Essay’s on Aristotle’s
Rhetoric (Rorty, 1994), 214.
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emotion.156  However, this is not the case since there are a variety of passages in
which the somatic imminence of both the passions and the appearances is given this
explanatory role: passions influence appearances, and consequently judgments,
because both passions and appearances are embodied in the same physiological
medium.  As Aristotle states, “And because imaginings remain within [the body] and
are similar to perceptions, many animals act in accord with them, some, the beasts,
because of not having intelligence, but others, humans, because their intelligence is
sometimes clouded by passion, disease, or sleep.” (DA III.3, 429a 5)
For example, the coward’s disposition to be afraid has him expecting danger
because he is already in a physiological condition similar to the one that corresponds
to being afraid (namely, an excessive chill in the blood), and the residual images of
past fearful experiences are either exceptionally numerous or vivid (or both) in his
body.  Thus, the backfiring sound will be received into a system of perceptual organs
already saturated with images of sights, sounds, and bodily “feels” of frightful
experiences, and this sound will thus be associated with danger.157  The subject’s
awareness of chilling and tightening sensations in the body will contribute to the
automatic classification of the perceived sound among things to be feared.  Aristotle
says as much in the following important passage:
“But all the attributes of the soul seem also to be with a body – spiritedness,
gentleness, fear, pity, boldness, and also joy, as well as loving and hating – for
                                                 
156 Ibid., 207.
157 As a further indication that Aristotle takes such bodily conditions to underlie states of character and
the corresponding modes of perception, note the following: “[Older people] are cowardly and afraid of
everything before it happens, since their [bodily] constitution is the opposite of that of the young: they
are chilled while the latter are heated, so that the old age paves the way to cowardice because fear is
also a kind if chill.” (Rhetoric II.13, 1389 29; trans. Sachs)
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together with these the body undergoes something (paschei).  This is revealed
when strong and obvious experiences (ischurôn kai enargôn pathêmatôn)158 do
not lead to the soul’s being provoked or frightened, while sometimes it is
moved by small and obscure ones, when the body is in an excited state and
bears itself in the way it does when it is angry.  [That’s the key line.]  And this
makes it still more clear: for when nothing frightening is happening there arise
among the feelings of the soul those of one who is frightened.  But if this is
so, it is evident that the attributes of the soul have materiality in the very
statements of them, so that their definitions would be of this sort: being angry
is a certain motion of such-and-such a body or part or faculty, moved by this
for the sake of that.” (DA I.1, 403a 18-27, emphasis in original)
When one’s faculty of judgment merely follows the irrational cues of an
uneducated, physiologically grounded habit of perception, what ought to be one’s
ruling faculty has been “melted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move
                                                 
158 Hicks (1907) translates ischurôn kai enargôn pathêmatôn as “violent and palpable incentives.”
(Also compare the use of ischura hupolêpsis – “strong conception” – at NE VII.2, 1145b 36.)
According to Liddell and Scott (Greek-English Lexicon, p. 556), the abstract noun enargeia refers to
clearness, distinctness, vividness; clear and distinct perception; or a vivid description. The adjective
enargês thus means visible, palpable, manifest in bodily shape (the last sense, as Liddell and Scott
note, especially pertains to the gods when they appear in their own forms, undisguised).  The basic
notion is thus one of a quality or attribute making a vivid appearance in one’s perception (proper or
incidental). We will return to this in Chapter 3 in connection with the constitutive means to the good
being either vividly manifest as such in one’s perception of the concrete conditions of action or
disguised by a veil of apparently “squalid particulars” (borrowing a phrase from William James).  It is
worth stressing that vividness of presentation is not only to be taken in terms of proper perceptibles (as
displayed, for instance, by keen visual perception or representations in the visual arts); enargeia is also
attainable in words and had a central position in ancient Greek literary criticism.  As Ian Kidd notes,
while historical judgment and handling of evidence are surprisingly ignored by Plutarch, “The prime
virtue which Plutarch singles out for the great Athenian historian Thucydides is vivid presentation
(enargeia).” (Ian Kidd in Robin Waterfield’s Plutarch: Essays, 149.)  Regarding Plutarch’s style and
his use of vivid presentation, Kidd elaborates that “It is a style of illustration rather than of argument,
modeled to create mental images fixed by human examples, by anecdote and simile.” (153)  As
intimated above in connection with the Pythagorean symbolic sayings, the use of narrative in addition
to argument – mythos in addition to logos - is particularly relevant for presenting vivid impressions that
alter one’s mode of perception and are serviceable in the process of moral development.  As Werner
Jaeger writes, “The myth is a natural corrective influence, even when examples and parallels are not
deliberately chosen from it.  It acts as a pattern for life… [and] a collection of authoritative instances.”
(Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 1, pp. 40-41)   Throughout this work Jaeger stresses the
educational power of the parageigma, the example for imitation: “The chief characteristic of every
variety of didactic speech is the introduction of an instructive example.” (p. 27) For instance, in
advising Telemachus to grow up and to take on the manly role of the home in his father’s absence,
Athena employs the example of Orestes, who had recently won glory for avenging the death of his
father, Agammemnon.  Jaeger comments, “Lacking the example or Orestes, Athena’s advice would
have no standard to give it weight and conviction.” (p. 33)
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together with it.”159  We will need to say more about exactly how the bodily
conditions pave the way for one’s being susceptible or not susceptible to the
experience of terror and the other passions.  However, we should emphasize the
explanatory leverage of the physiological conditions by noting that these conditions
are not only essential to explaining how the passions arise but are also essential to
explaining how they fade away.  Thus, bursts of anger or fits of terror are difficult to
dissolve because the moisture around the heart has been set in motion in accordance
with these passions and cannot easily be stopped in spite of one’s countermotions
against them.  For this reason, people with excessive moisture around the heart will
have greater difficulty ridding themselves of these emotions.  (On Memory and
Reminiscence 2, 453a 15-32)
2.4 Conclusion
So, in this chapter we have seen that (a) incidental perception of the
circumstances of action is essential to the voluntariness of action, and to the courses
of action one is likely to take in those circumstances; and (b) incidental perception,
and our efforts to shape our modes of incidental perception, is crucially influenced by
                                                 
159 This powerful image is presented by Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations X.24.  Additional insights
relevant to the issues here are presented throughout the Discourses of Epictetus, who frequently refers
to our “power to make correct use of external impressions” (essentially being what I have called
“mastering the appearances”).  Note the following relevant passage: “As was fitting, therefore, the
gods have put under our control only the must excellent faculty of all and that which dominates the
rest, namely, the power to make correct use of external impressions, but all the others they have not put
under our control.  Was it indeed because they would not [put these others faculties under our control]?
I for one think that had they been able they would have entrusted us with the others also; but they were
quite unable to do that.  For since we are upon earth and trammeled by an earthy body and by earthy
associates, how was it possible that, in respect of them, we should not be hampered by external
things?”  (Disourses, I.1, emphasis added)
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conditions in the living body; therefore, (c) conditions in the living body are central to
moral responsibility and moral psychology.160
                                                 




Practical Reasoning and the Physiological Causes of Akrasia
3.1 Introduction: Turning Reasons Into Causes
Ultimately, we do all that we do for the sake of one thing – happiness
(eudaimonia) or the human good.  However, this end is as elusive as it is desired.
Therefore, we ought to attend very carefully to what it is and how to attain it.  When
we do this we are engaged in the process of practical reasoning, the process of
figuring out what to do – what to do with one’s life on the whole, and what to do with
oneself here and now.  In this chapter we will study Aristotle’s understanding of
practical reasoning and the ways in which it sometimes succeeds, and sometimes
fails, to turn our reasons to act into causes that move us in action.
In outline, Aristotle’s view on this matter has four main parts: (1) deliberation
turns wish into choice (that is, deliberation turns one’s desire for some end into a
desire to do things that promote the end); (2) deliberation brings about this
transference of desire by altering or “marking” the appearances of incidental
perception for pursuit or avoidance (see DA III.7, 431b 2); (3) this perceptual and
affective alteration takes place along with, and partly on account of, specific
physiological processes in the living body; and (4) these bodily processes physically
necessitate the voluntary self-motions that set us off in the pursuit of our envisioned
ends.  In this way, reasons to act become the causes of action.
However, there are occasions when our reasoning about what to do does not
move us to act, and, instead, we are moved against our better judgment by errant
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desires.  This condition, weakness of will or lack of self-restraint (akrasia), is often
described as a clash between reason and desire.  However, it is always desire that
moves us: “the intellect alone obviously does not cause motion without desire.” (DA
III.10, 433a 24)  Thinking alone never causes motion, only thinking that is “for the
sake of something” and is thus charged with desire for that something. (NE VI.2,
1139a 35)  Thinking that is for the sake of something – namely, deliberation –
originates from rational wish, and transfers desire from the object of wish to the
object of choice.  Choice is thus “deliberate desire” – a fusion of intellect and desire –
and is the source of action (praxis).  We will see that, on Aristotle’s view, when
deliberate desire is overpowered by irrational desires, the one desire overpowers the
other physically.  In many ways, the following passage from William James
encapsulates this entire chapter:
“A tendency to act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to
the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, and the
brain ‘grows’ to their use.  When a resolve or fine glow of feeling is allowed
to evaporate without bearing practical fruit it is worse than a chance lost; it
works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking
the normal path of discharge.  There is no more contemptible type of human
character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends
his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a
manly concrete deed…  But every one of us in his measure, whenever, after
glowing for an abstractly formulated Good, he practically ignores some actual
case, among the squalid ‘other particulars’ of which that same Good lurks
disguised, treads straight on [the path of that most contemptible character].
All Goods are disguised by the vulgarity of their concomitants in this work-a-
day world; but woe to him who can only recognize them when he thinks them
in their pure and abstract form!”161
                                                 
161 William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course, p. 14-15.  On the “nerveless sentimentalist and
dreamer” we can compare Socrates’ description of “those lazy people who make a banquet for
themselves of their own thoughts when they are walking alone.  People like that, as you know, do not
bother to find out how any of their appetites might actually be fulfilled, so as to avoid the trouble of
deliberating about what is possible and what is not.  They assume that what they want is available, and
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3.2 Eudaimonia – The Overarching Aim and Its Realization
“[The true good, as opposed to the merely apparent good,] is what every soul
pursues, and for its sake does everything.  The soul has a hunch that the good
is something, but it is puzzled and cannot adequately grasp just what it is or
acquire the sort of stable belief about it that it has about other things, and so it
misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give.”  (Republic
VI, 505D-E)
Eudaimonia – happiness, wellbeing, human flourishing – is the ultimate target
or focal point (skopon) of all our endeavors.  As C. D. C. Reeve points out, the
prescriptive force of every choice originates in our wish for this end.162  We can
understand this more clearly by looking at the kind of end or goal that Aristotle takes
eudaimonia to be.  In the second sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states
that some ends are products or works (erga) resulting from activities, while other
ends are simply certain activities or ways of being at work (energeiai) undertaken for
                                                                                                                                            
then proceed to arrange all the rest, taking pleasure in going through everything they will do when they
get it – thus making their already lazy souls even lazier.” (Republic V, 458A)  These are the people
who are attracted by the “idea” of a certain action or endeavor, but quickly become disenchanted when
facing the apparently “squalid particulars” attendant to actually realizing the end.  As for the effects of
failing to identify the nature of happiness and its relevant particulars, note also the following profound
stanzas from the Buddhist sage Shantideva: “[B]eings long to free themselves from misery, but misery
itself they follow and pursue.  They long for joy, but in their ignorance destroy it, as they would their
foe… If things could be according to their wish, no suffering would ever come to anyone of all
embodied beings, for none of them wants pain of any kind.  Yet carelessly, all unaware, they tear
themselves on thorns; And ardent in pursuit of wives and goods, they starve themselves of
nourishment.” (The Way of the Bodhisattva, 1.28; 6.34-35).  And in Homer’s Odyssey, Zeus proclaims:
“Well now, how indeed mortal men do blame the gods!  They say it is from us [gods] evils come, yet
they themselves, by their own recklessness have pains beyond their lot.”  (Od. 1.32-4, quoted and
discussed in Jeffrey Barnouw’s Odysseus: Hero of Practical Intelligence, p. 37)  The so-called
“Golden Verses of Pythagoras” also insightfully touch upon this theme: “Men shall you find whose
sorrows they themselves have created, wretches who see not the Good that is too near, they hear
nothing; Few know how to help themselves in misfortune.  That is the Fate that blinds humanity; in
circles, hither and yon they run in endless sorrows; For they are followed by a grim companion,
disunion within themselves…” (quoted in The Golden Chain: An Anthology of Pythagorean and
Platonic Philosophy ed. Algis Uzdavinys, p. 37)
162 “Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
(2006), p. 203. Also see Sarah Broadie’s Ethics With Aristotle, p. 182.
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their own sake.  (NE I.1, 1094a 1)  For example, one generally performs activities
such as building a ship or shopping for groceries for the sake of the ship or
acquisition of groceries that will result from these activities.  On the other hand, more
often than not we engage in activities such as philosophical contemplation or, say,
swimming for their own sake, without any goal beyond the performance of these
activities.
Of course, one might simultaneously go swimming for the sake of its health
benefits as well for its own sake, so that some ends are pursued both for their own
sake and for their consequences.  According to Aristotle, happiness is a way of being
at work that is pursued for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, with the
additional feature that, ultimately, all other actions are undertaken for the sake of it.
In this sense, eudaimonia is the all-encompassing endeavor that unifies the whole of
life into a single action.  As Aristotle states, “it is equally a mistake to place inactivity
(apraktein) above action (prattein), for happiness is action (praxis), and the actions of
the just and the wise are the realization of much that is beautiful (kalôn).”163
But in what sense is eudaimonia an action?  In order to answer this we need a
clear sense for how a multitude of comparatively basic actions can be unified into a
single overarching action.  Consider a simple example such as going to the post
office.  In performing this action I stand up, walk to my car, turn the key, turn left,
turn right, and so forth.  And yet, throughout this sequence of many distinct basic
actions, I am also performing one action the entire time – going to the post office.
                                                 
163 Politics VII.3, 1325a 30.  As we will see below, the ending of this passage has an important
relationship to Aristotle’s view of what eudaimonia finally consists in (namely, contemplation), and
has implications that undercut and dissolve the dispute between “inclusivists” and “exclusivists” as to
the role of contemplation in the good life.
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When I am walking to my car, I am going to the post office; when I am turning left on
Route 1, I am going to the post office, etc.  My basic actions change, but my
overarching action remains the same.
In an analogous way, from Aristotle’s point of view, happiness is an action
(praxis) and way of being at work (energeia) that encompasses all of our
undertakings over the course of life and unifies them into a whole.  We are always
trying to “live well” – this is the one thing we try to be doing in all that we do.  We
can gain insight into this aspect of action by looking at the methods of imitation
(mimêsis) through which the poet represents actions.  In his Poetics, Aristotle states
that a tragedy is an imitation of a single action that is complete and of serious
magnitude.  (Poetics 7, 1450b 23)  The action of a tragedy is represented by the story
or plot (mythos), which consists of a combination or arrangement of incidents
(sunthesin tôn pragmatôn).  (Poetics 6, 1450a 3)  The distinction between an
overarching action and its basic constituents is presented here in terms of the single
action (praxis) represented by the tragedy’s plot, and the many incidents (pragmatôn)
that the plot arranges into a unity.
For example, in Chapter 17 Aristotle notes that although epic poetry involves
more incidents or episodes (epeisodia) than are presented in a tragedy, even the
overarching action of an epic can be stated briefly.  Thus, although the Odyssey
includes many incidents or episodes, its plot is not long and can be stated as follows:
“A certain man is absent from home for many years; he is jealously watched
by Poseidon, and left desolate.  Meanwhile his home is in a wretched plight -
suitors are wasting his substance and plotting against his son.  At length,
tempest-tossed, he himself arrives; he makes certain persons acquainted with
him; he attacks the suitors with his own hand, and is himself preserved while
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he destroys them.  This is the essence of the plot; the rest is episode.” (Poetics
17, 1455b 17-23)
In formulating the Odyssey as a single action we might prefer to say that the
action that this epic represents or imitates is “the homecoming (nostos) of Odysseus.”
Nevertheless, the passage above illustrates the distinction between the Odyssey’s plot
and the particular incidents of which the poet sings.  The poet does not say a certain
man has been absent from home for many years; he says that Odysseus, whose home
is in Ithaca, has been held captive on Calypso’s island for seven years, and so forth.
He sings of particular incidents through which he tells a certain story.  As in art, so in
life: the agent performs his overarching action (praxis) by performing a variety of
basic actions (pragmata).  Through the performance of these basic actions, the
overarching action is realized.  The realization of the overarching action is
unchanging and complete throughout the changing and incomplete course of basic
actions.  I am unvaryingly “going to the post office” over a span of time throughout
which I am performing a variety of basic actions.
Now, an overarching action and its basic constituents are related as form and
material (respectively).  Recalling our discussion from Chapter 1, material is not to be
equated with the corporeal per se, but with raw material that is arranged so as to
become something (other than merely the material that it is).  Thus, the material
causes of an action are not simply its physical causes; rather, its material causes are
the incidents that are combined and arranged into its realization.  The material causes
of going to the post office are the more basic actions that constitute its realization on a
given occasion: getting into the car, turning left on some particular street, turning
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right on another, and so on – this is the stuff of which the act of going to the post
office is made.  The central question of practical reasoning is: what is the stuff of
which my happiness or flourishing is to be made?
There are at least two important features of the hylomorphic relationship
between an overarching action and its basic constituents: multiple realizability and
the relativity of material and form.  Just as two objects can be composed of different
material and yet have the same form, and two plays may concern different people,
present different incidents, and yet have essentially the same plot (e.g. Romeo and
Juliet and Westside Story), so overarching actions can be realized in various ways.
Thus, I may go to the post office by turning left, then right, whereas someone coming
from the opposite direction will do the same thing by doing opposite things – will go
to the post office by turning right, then left.  As we will see below, when this same
principle of multiple realizibility is applied to eudaimonia and living well it is of great
consequence.
Secondly, the relativity of form and material is pertinent here as well.
Walking to my car is a basic action relative to my trip to the post office, but is an
overarching action relative to moving my left leg forward, then the right, and so on.
Ordinarily it is not necessary to attend to such basic actions as the motion of the legs
(unless, of course, one stumbles, has an injury, or has not yet learned to walk).  The
competent driver who knows her way generally does not pay careful attention to
turning left here, turning right there on her way to the post office.  Once one has
mastered a certain basic action, it is possible to look straight to a more overarching
action without concerning oneself with the “material” constituents through which the
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overarching action is realized.  While the novice must attend carefully to each
successive motion over the keyboard (“play an A, now a C”), throughout his entire
performance the virtuoso can simply attend to “playing Beethoven’s ‘Tempest.’”164
Likewise, the person who exercises ethical and intellectual virtue is a virtuoso at
living as a human being, and can keep his eye on the realization of his overarching
aim and can see this good through the particular actions and conditions that constitute
his life.165
Now, going to the post office is not an action of “serious magnitude.”  In
stating that tragedies imitate actions that are of serious magnitude, Aristotle links the
overarching action of a tragedy with the happiness or wretchedness of the lives of the
agents in the tragedy.  Actions of serious magnitude pertain to the whole of one’s life,
                                                 
164 A similar observation is made by Amélie Rorty in her excellent paper “The Place of Contemplation
in Aristotle’s NE.” (p. 381)
165 The issues raised here are related to the notion of “action identification” as described by Daniel
Wegner.  He writes, “The central idea of [the theory of action identification] is that whereas people
may think about any action in many ways, they typically think about an action in just one way.
Although the person could be said to know the action through all its various descriptions, the theory
proposes that the person’s effective knowledge of the action at any one moment is limited to one
identity – usually the identity that the person has in consciousness or has most recently held in
consciousness.  The person’s conscious identification of the action can range, then, along a dimension
from low-level identifications that indicate how the action is done (“I’m waving my hand”) to higher-
level, more encompassing identifications that indicate why or with what effect the action is done (“I am
signaling the waiting to bring on the cheese dip”).  This flexibility in the naming of actions suggests
that they might be undertaken under one identity and later recognized under others.”  (The Illusion of
Conscious Will, p. 159, emphasis added)  Vallacher and Wegner (1987) describe experimental results
that support three theoretical principles of their theory of action identification: (1) action is maintained
with respect to its prepotent identity, (2) when both a lower and a higher level act identity are
available, there is a tendency for the higher level identity to become prepotent, and (3) when an action
cannot be maintained in terms of its prepotent identity, there is a tendency for a lower level identity to
become prepotent. (pp. 4-5)  Aristotle makes a similar observation when he states that sometimes one
does not need to consider the minor premise of the practical syllogism since experience and the ability
to immediately recognize how to accomplish the task at hand make this additional consideration (the
minor premise) unnecessary.  (For example, see MA 7, 701a 26.)  As we will see later in this chapter,
the notion of one’s prepotent identification of an action is also related to akrasia.  For example, the
akratic knows that the cake fattening and thus unhealthy to eat, and he knows that it is sweet and thus
pleasant to eat.  It is the latter identification that constitutes his prepotent identifcation or, in Aristotle’s
terms, effective knowledge.  He identifies his action as “eating something sweet” and not “eating
something unhealthy.”
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and one’s life as a whole is itself the one action of greatest and most serious
magnitude.  Happiness is performing that action – i.e., living one’s life – well.  As
Aristotle states, “eudaimonia is a kind of action (praxis), namely doing well
(eupraxia).” (Physics II.6, 197b 5)  Additionally, “Tragedy is essentially an imitation
not of persons but of action and life (praxeôn kai biou), of happiness and misery.  All
human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a
certain kind of action (praxis), not a quality.  Character gives us qualities, but it is in
our actions – what we do – that we are happy or the reverse.”166
The multiple realizability of overarching actions and the relativity of the
overarching / basic action distinction have important consequences here.  First, in the
“function argument” (NE I.7), Aristotle argues that the nature of human happiness is
determined by human nature and the human ergon.  Happiness is therefore one and
the same thing for all human beings.  We do not simply use the same word for a
multiplicity of aims, but fundamentally we all want exactly the same thing – activity
of the soul in accordance with the highest and most perfect virtue over the course of a
complete life.  As Aristotle states,
                                                 
166 Poetics 6, 1450a 16-20.  Note the following from the commentary of Gerald Else: “Why must the
characters [in a tragedy] reach the stage of happiness or unhappiness at all; why must they ‘succeed or
fail’?  Because… tragedy is an imitation of an action, and ‘action’ means ‘complete action,’ action
carried through to a natural goal in happiness or unhappiness.” (Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 241)  Else also notes that praxis has the
connotation of completeness, and prattein (“to do,” the infinitive verb from which praxis derives)
originally has the sense “’to get through, complete’ (a journey, an intended result).” (p. 241, n. 73)
Similarly, Sarah Broadie comments: “’Praxis’, often a weightier word than our ‘action’, indicates a
doing in light of which a person’s life is seen as going well or not.”  (Broadie and Rowe, Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 261)  Thus, praxis involves embarking
upon an overarching action and carrying it all the way through to the end.  Compare also NE I.7, 1198a
19, where, after defining eudaimonia as a being-at-work (energeia) of the soul in accordance with
virtue, Aristotle adds that “this must be in a complete life, for one swallow does not make a Spring, nor
one day, and in the same way one day or a short time does not make a person blessed and happy.”
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“But since [animals and human beings] do not all have the same nature or the
same best active condition (hexis), nor even seem to, they do not all pursue the
same pleasure either, though they all pursue pleasure.  But perhaps it is even
the case that people [all of whom do have the same nature] pursue not what
they think they do or would say they do, but [we all pursue] the same
pleasure, since all things have in their nature something divine [and this is
what they pursue].”  (NE VII.13, 1153b 29)
Because we all have the same nature, ultimately we all pursue the same thing
– namely, the fulfillment of the divine part of our nature in its complete being-at-
work (energeia) in accordance with virtue or excellence (aretê).  This fulfillment
encompasses possessing, and putting ourselves to work in accordance with,
intellectual virtue (which also presupposes physical health and ethical virtue).  Now,
the uniform and objective nature of happiness makes it possible for people to fail to
understand what happiness truly is and to pursue it through the wrong means.
However, it does not imply that there is some one prescribed life-course that must be
followed in order for a person to flourish or be happy.
To understand this, imagine a classroom of students who each begin an exam
by writing their names.  In one sense they all do the same thing – each one writes
down his or her own name – but in another sense they all do something unique – each
one writes down a unique name.  Likewise, our nature moves us all to do the same
thing – to live well by exercising our souls in accordance with virtue – but we each
have to do something unique to realize that overarching aim.167  Spelling a word is not
something one deliberates about, because it is always done in a fixed way. (NE III.3,
                                                 
167 Compare the following from Shunryu Suzuki’s Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind: “There is no way set
up for us.  Moment after moment we have to find our own way.  Some idea of perfection, or some
perfect way which is set up by someone else, is not the true way for us.  Each one of us must make his
own true way, and when we do, that way will express the universal way.  This is the mystery.” (p.136)
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1112b 2)  However, there can be no set prescription for spelling out eudaimonia in
the actions that one takes in life since the circumstances in which these actions must
take place are particular and vary intractably.
In its turn, this consequence of multiple realizibility underlies the features of
virtue as Aristotle defines it: “an active condition (hexis) of the soul that makes one
apt at choosing, consisting in a mean condition in relation to us, which is determined
by a proportion and by the means by which a person with practical judgment would
determine it.”  (NE II.6, 1106b 35)  In particular, multiple realizability plays a critical
part in the fact that virtue is an active condition of the agent and is not an attribute of
the action per se.  This is because, even if we generally consider a certain action type
to represent virtuous actions, it is not the case that every possible token of that action
type is virtuous.  For example, telling the truth and paying your debts are generally
just actions, but they are not just actions if you are dealing with a madman who asks
you to return his weapon and to tell him the location of his next victim.168
And so, a basic action that is just when done unto one person is not
necessarily just when done unto another.  What was courageous yesterday may be
rash today because the tides of battle have turned.  In saying that courage is a mean
between the extremes of cowardice and rashness, Aristotle is not saying that the
recipe for courage is equal parts confidence and fear.  There can be no pre-established
recipe since what is courageous depends on the circumstances.  The mean is
determined with reference to the circumstances at hand and the agent acting.  One can
consider staying on target and choosing the mean as analogous to maintaining a set
                                                 
168 See Republic I, 331B for this example, where it is used to show that “telling the truth and paying
your debts” is not an adequate definition of the Form of justice.
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speed while riding a bicycle on uneven terrain.  As the road changes from flat, to
uphill, to downhill, and so forth, one must sometimes pedal more or less vigorously,
sometimes coast, and sometimes apply the brakes all in order to maintain a constant
speed.  Likewise, holding onto the mean in regard to one’s actions and affections will
involve a fluctuating degree of intensity along the spectrum of confidence and fear.
As Aristotle states, in regard to the active conditions of the soul, “there is some target
to which the one who has a rational understanding looks off as he tightens or loosens
his grip, and there is some boundary marking the mean conditions which we claim are
between excess and deficiency, a boundary in accord with right reason.”  (NE VI.1,
1138b 23-6)
It is therefore necessary to develop an active condition (hexis) of the soul that
is both stable and versatile.  Often translated as “state of character,” the term hexis
derives from the verb echein meaning to take possession of a thing, to make
something one’s own.  A hexis in the soul is not a passive, inert, static “state,” but a
dynamic and attentive condition that one makes one’s own through an “effortful
holding on.”169  In this context, one is holding on to a certain mode of perception,
thought, and attentiveness in which one is prepared to bear oneself well in relation to
feelings and actions.  As an active condition, virtue involves willfully “bearing
ourselves well or badly” in relation to passions (pathê), which we passively
experience and undergo.  (NE II.5, 1105b 27)
                                                 
169 This phrase, and the translation of hexis as “active condition,” are drawn from the phenomenal work
of Joe Sachs.  See his Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
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Poignant here is the connection between hexis and the stance of a wrestler,
which is adopted in preparation for the impact of the opponent.170  Analogously, we
take on a certain state of character by willfully adopting an inner stance, making
ourselves attentive and ready for either the impact of an excessively intense passion
or a deficit of some passion when a greater intensity is fitting.  This is the
psychological “tightening and loosening” through which we keep our eyes fixed on
the moving target of the mean.  Just as the defensive football player aims to tackle the
ball carrier, and not Walter Payton or O. J. Simpson per se, so the virtuous person
aims to hit the mean, not to muster the confidence to fight in battle or the strength to
resist a possible pleasure (since in some circumstances these are not courageous or
temperate actions).  Because the mean is a moving target, it only through such
dynamic, versatile stability that one can take hold of it.  As Marcus Aurelius fittingly
remarks, “The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's, in respect of
this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are sudden and
unexpected.”171
The foregoing considerations suggest that we have to engage in practical
reasoning in order to attain our aim – the human good – largely because that aim must
be realized by a multiplicity of actions performed amidst unpredictably changing and
varying conditions.  These matters (and more) are very beautifully encapsulated in the
following critical passage from Aristotle’s De Caelo (On the Heavens).  Because of
                                                 
170 See Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2004).
171 Marcus Aurelius Meditations VII.61; see also the opening of NE III.8.  One can recall the
comparison of masters of ethical and intellectual virtue to chess masters presented in the previous
chapter.  They are each poised to take in the presented circumstances in such a way that their hearts
and minds spring back and interpret the situation in terms of the right set of considerations.
132
its importance to these issues, as well as the fact that I have not encountered this
passage in any of the literature on practical reasoning, I quote it at length:
“For it is natural that the best-conditioned of all things should have its good
without action, that that which is nearest to it should achieve it by little and
simple action, and that which is farthest removed by a complexity of actions,
just as with men’s bodies one is in good condition without exercise at all,
another after a short walk, while another requires running and wrestling and
hard training, and there are yet others who however hard they worked
themselves could never secure this good, but only some substitute for it.  To
succeed often or in many things is difficult…  In action, again, when A has to
be done to get B, B to get C, and C to get D, one step or two present little
difficulty, but as the series extends the difficulty grows…  [O]n our earth it is
man that has the greatest variety of actions – for there are many goods that
man can secure; hence his actions are various and [sometimes] directed to
ends beyond them – while the perfectly conditioned has no need of action,
since it is itself the end, and action always requires two terms, end and means.
The lower animals have less variety of action than man; plants perhaps have
little action and of one kind only [i.e., self-nourishment / reproduction].  For
either they have but one attainable good (as indeed man has), or, if several,
each contributes directly to their ultimate good.  One thing then has and
enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few
steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it
but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from consummation.  Thus,
taking health as an end, there will be one thing that always possesses health,
others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by running and thus
reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable himself to run, thus further
increasing the number of movements, while another cannot attain health itself,
but only running or reduction of flesh, so that one or other of these is for such
a being the end.  For while it is clear best for any being to attain the real end,
yet, if that cannot be, the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state.”
(DC II.12, 292a 23 – b 20)172
In spite of the fact that we aim to sustain one overarching action throughout
the whole of life (namely, living well), a complex variety of basic acts are demanded
                                                 
172Also note: “We may take it as agreed, then, that each person has just as much happiness as he has
virtue, practical wisdom, and the action that expresses them.  We may use God as evidence of this.  For
he is blessedly happy, not because of any external goods but because of himself and a certain quality of
his nature.” (Politics, VII.1; 1323b20.  Also see 1325b25, NE VII.14, 1154b 27, and Metaphysics
XII.7, 1072b 26.)
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of us if this aim is to be realized.  To decipher which particular sequence of basic
actions I myself must perform to sustain the overarching aim is the job of practical
reasoning, to which we turn next.
3.3 Practical Reasoning – Its Origin, Its Object, and Its Efficacy
The distinction between our overarching aim and the basic actions that
constitute its realization gives rise to the need for practical reasoning: the process of
achieving a clear conception of our target (skopon) – namely, happiness (eudaimonia)
– and identifying the basic actions to be performed here and now in the realization of
that aim.  These dual faces of practical intelligence may have roots in the Homeric
sense of noos, which Kurt von Fritz describes as entailing “a clearly conceived aim
and a vision of a way to its attainment.”173  As Aristotle states, “And intellect is
directed at what is ultimate on both sides, since it is intellect (nous) and not reason
(logos) that is directed at both the first terms and the ultimate particulars, on the one
side at the changeless first terms in demonstrations, and on the other side, in thinking
about action, at the other sort of premise, the variable ultimate particular…” (NE
VI.11, 1143a 35)
Even though our aim is one overarching action, we must enact a vast
multiplicity of particular basic actions to realize this aim – an unpredictable maze of
pathways and possibilities for action going every which way.  We need a still and
unshakable remembrance of our aim, combined with the versatility of the “many
                                                 
173 Kurt von Fritz, “Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems,” Classical Philology, 38 (1943), 82.
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turning” (polutropos) mind of Odysseus – “hero of practical intelligence.”174  One
may enter a labyrinth knowing that the exit is northward without knowing where to
turn left and where to turn right within the labyrinth so as to emerge at the northern
exit.  Knowing the general direction in which your destination is located, and
knowing how to get there are two different things.  Likewise, I may know what I want
to do (e.g., to uninsultingly explain to you why I am rejecting your proposal), without
knowing how I am going to do it (e.g., without knowing exactly what I am going to
                                                 
174 I borrow this phrase from Jeffrey Barnouw’s Odysseus: Hero of Practical Intelligence (University
of America Press, 2004).  On the remembrance of one’s overarching aim, Jean-Pierre Vernant recounts
an ancient legendary practice:  “[B]efore writing was available, the institution of the mnênôn (the
figure who is responsible for the remembering of the past for the sake of legal decisions) was based on
trust in the individual memory of a living ‘recorder.’  Only later did the term come to refer to the
magistrates responsible for the preservation of written records.  But the role of the mnênôn was not
restricted to the legal context.  Gernet points out that it derived from a religious practice.  According to
legend, the mnênôn acts as a servant to a hero.  His function is to remind his master constantly of a
divine task, the forgetting of which would lead to death (Plutarch, Greek Questions, 28).”  (Myth and
Thought Among the Greeks, p. 427, n. 3)  On the versatility of the many-turning mind and its capacity
to identify “the way” amidst the intractable variations of particular circumstances, we can note the
famous opening of Lao Tzu’s Tao Tê Ching, which Arthur Waley translates: “The Way that can be told
of is not an Unvarying Way.”  Waley’s accompanying note reads: “The Realists demand… an
‘unvarying way’ of government, in which every act inimical and every act beneficial to the State is
codified and ‘mated’ to its appropriate punishment or reward.  The Taoist replies that though there
does exist… ‘an unvarying Way’, it cannot be grasped by the ordinary senses nor described in words…
The whole doctrine of Realism was founded on the conviction that just as things which issue from the
same mould are mechanically identical, ‘cannot help being as they are’, so by complete codification, a
series of molds (fa), can be constructed, which will mechanically decide what ‘name’ (and
consequently what reward or punishment) should be assigned to any given deed.” (The Way and Its
Power, p. 141-142)  The Zen Master Zhaozhou (Joshu) is said to have presented a relevant metaphor:
“A clay Buddha cannot cross water; a bronze Buddha cannot get through a furnace; a wooden Buddha
cannot get through fire.” (Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, p. 75)  Whatever set teaching
or pre-established prescription for action you possess, in some circumstances it will not work.  This is
essentially Aristotle’s point that there is limited precision to be attained in ethical discourse since
action is concerned with particulars and the particulars are variable.  Socrates makes a related point at
Republic IV, 426E ff where he compares the futility of creating individual laws for every situation to
cutting off the Hydra’s heads: as soon as one situation is covered by law, some exception or variation
requiring a new law will sprout up (the only ultimate and set laws that must be given, he says, being
those that come from Apollo concerning sacred matters).  As mentioned above, this is why virtue is
something inhering in the agent and not the action.  Thus, after presenting Joshu’s metaphor, Suzuki
later adds “Joshu's statement about the different Buddhas concerns those who direct their practice
towards some particular Buddha [that is, some particular image and formulation of Buddhist teaching].
One kind of Buddha will not serve your purpose completely.  You will have to throw it away
sometime, or at least ignore it.  But if you understand the secret of our practice, wherever you go, you
yourself are ‘boss.’  No matter what the situation, you cannot neglect Buddha, because you yourself
are Buddha.  Only this Buddha will help you completely.” (p. 84)
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say).175  More generally, we may intend to live a good and happy life, and may even
formulate some abstract conception of what such a life would consist in, but,
submerged in the particularities in relation to which we must act, we may still lack the
perceptual insight required for wisely choosing what to do.  As Aristotle states in a
related context, “such things are in the particulars, and the judgment is in the
perceiving.”  (NE II.9, 1109b 25)  Practical reasoning – more specifically,
deliberation – is the intellectual process of searching for the way to move through that
maze of possible actions so that one lives a good and happy life.
Now, Aristotle characterizes the object of deliberation more narrowly and
specifically.  As Aristotle describes in NE III.3, one does not deliberate about eternal
things (e.g., the organization of the cosmos or the incommensurability of the diagonal
and the side of the square), or about things that always happen in the same way (e.g.,
solstices and the rising of the stars), or about irregular occurrences that sometimes
happen in one way and sometimes in another (e.g., draughts and rain), or about things
                                                 
175 This problem of knowing what you want to do but not knowing how to do it raises profound issues
when applied to the case of articulating one’s own thoughts.  Through his characteristic method of
examination (elenchos), Socrates continually shows his interlocutors that they have mistaken their
sense of what they want to say for clear knowledge of how to actually say it.  Hence, after numerous
frustrated attempts to articulate a definition of holiness, Euthyphro finally tells Socrates “I have no way
of telling you what I have in mind.” (Euthyphro, 11B)  Because Socrates awakens his interlocutors by
bringing them into this strange condition – simultaneously being aware of (a) what you mean to say
and (b) your inability to say it – Meno compares Socrates to a stingray that numbs its victim, and,
amidst his own floundering attempts to define virtue, says “My mind and my lips are literally numb,
and I have nothing to reply to you.” (Meno 80A)  Meno intensifies our appreciation of this predicament
by asking “But how will you look for something [e.g., a statement that captures the essence of virtue]
when you don’t in the least know what it is?  How on earth are you going to set up something you
don’t know as the object of your search?  To put it another way, even if you come right up against it,
how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn’t know?”  Socrates elaborates: “Do
you realize that what you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either
what he knows or what he does not know?  He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it
there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what
he is to look for.” (80D-E)  Socrates addresses this so-called “trick argument” by introducing the
Platonic doctrine that learning is recollection of innate knowledge, so that we do already possess what
we are looking for in one sense but not in another.
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that come about by chance (e.g., finding treasure), or about actions performed by
another (e.g., a Spartan would not deliberate about the governing of the Scythians), or
about things that one does oneself but are always done in the same way (e.g., the
spelling of a word), or about particulars (e.g., whether a particular item is a loaf of
bread or whether it has been sufficiently baked, things of this kind falling under sense
perception).  Instead, Aristotle assigns three characteristics to the objects of
deliberation: they are actions that (i) promote our ends, (ii) are within our power, and
(iii) are not always undertaken in the same way. (NE III.3, 1112a 22ff)  It is these
actions that are chosen.176
Here we are concerned with the distinction between the source of deliberation
and that in which deliberation terminates, namely wish and choice (respectively).
With regard to this distinction Aristotle states,
“[W]ishing is rather for an end, while choice is of things that are related to the
end; for example, we wish to be healthy, but we choose those things by means
of which we will become healthy, and we wish to be happy and say so, while
it would not fit the meaning to say we choose to be happy, since, universally,
choice seems to be concerned with things that are up to us [that is, basic
actions that we have the ability to perform “straightaway”].”  (NE III.2, 1111b
28)177
                                                 
176 The above three features of the object of deliberation are related to a vast array of issues that I
cannot go into here.  In short, the first involves to the distinction between constitutive and productive
means to an end; the second is related to Aristotle’s distinction between degrees of power (dunamis)
(referred to in Chapter 2 with Aristotle’s example of the sleeping, inactive, and active geometers); and
the third is connected to Aristotle’s view that ethical philosophy is necessarily limited in its precision
(referred to in the introduction above, and touched upon briefly above in connection with Lao Tzu, et
al.).
177 Confusion over this distinction leads people to yearn for the fulfillment of their wishes without
directing themselves toward the relevant basic actions that are within their power, the seemingly
“vulgar concomitants” and “squalid particulars” that are the very means to their ends (borrowing
James’ terms from the opening of this chapter).  As mentioned in the “Golden Verses of Pythagoras,”
they fail to see “the Good that is too near.”  As the Confucian philosopher Mengzi (Mencius) notes,
“The Way lies in what is near, but people seek it in what is distant; one’s task lies in what is easy, but
people seek it in what is difficult.  If everyone would treat their parents as parents and their elders as
elders, the world would be at peace.” (4A11.1, Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional
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So wishing is a desire for some apparent good, while choice is a desire for
doing what is related to that apparent good as productive or constitutive means to its
realization.  It is through deliberation that we identify those basic actions, and our
desire for the end is transferred to those actions as means.  The latter desire –
deliberative desire – is choice.
But what sort of process is deliberation?  How does deliberation enable us to
identify the means to our ends, and to transfer our desire from the former to the latter,
resulting in choice, which, according to Aristotle, is the moving cause of action?
Like recollection, deliberation is a process of “searching” (zetêsis) that involves
images.178  Whereas recollection involves moving through a mnemonic sequence of
images, or a “train of thought,” that terminates in a sought-for memory, deliberation
                                                                                                                                            
Commentaries (Hackett, 2008), Bryan W. Van Norden, p. 95; see also 6B21ff).  World peace is the
higher-level description of what is wished for, which is constitutively understood here as filial piety
among human beings.  Instead of exhibiting filial piety in their relations to individual persons by
treating parents as parents and elders as elders, people seek to establish world peace through other,
more difficult means that are not specified in terms of relevant basic actions (e.g., re-organizing
society).  In effect, they “think globally” but do not know how to “act locally.”  They are all wish and
no choice.  In this way we become the nerveless sentimentalists and dreamers, the lazy people who
make a banquet for themselves when thinking about their wishes, but do not deliberate about and
perform the “manly concrete deeds” that must be done to realize those wishes (as mentioned in the
quotations at the opening of this chapter).  Such a failure to identify the appropriate concrete bases for
action is intimated in the following passage from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: “A worker in 1830
is capable of revolting if his salary is lowered, for he easily conceives of a situation in which his
wretched standard of living would be not as low as the one which is about to be imposed on him.
[That is, his present experience gives him knowledge that is referenced to concrete particulars that
constitute a higher standard of living than the one about to be imposed upon him (although even now
he could surely abstractly formulate the thought “I could be in even better conditions than I am in at
present”).]  But he does not represent his [present] sufferings to himself as unbearable; he adapts
himself to them not through resignation but because he lacks the education and reflection [and
experience] necessary for him to conceive of a social state [in terms of concrete particulars] in which
these sufferings would not exist [although he can surely abstractly formulate the concept “perfect city-
state”].  Consequently he does not act.  Having gained control of Lyon after a riot, the workers at
Croix-Rousse do not know what to do with their victory; they return home bewildered, and the regular
army has no trouble overcoming them.”  (p. 435, emphasis in original)
178 See NE III.3, 1112b 15-24; NE VI.9, 1142a 32; On Memory and Recollection, 2, 453a 14.
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involves a rationally governed sequence of images that terminates in a sought-for
means to one’s end.  Deliberation amounts to the construction of an implementation
hierarchy, a sequence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of the
aim.
Aristotle compares deliberation with the use of a geometrical diagram, where
“what comes last in an analysis is what comes first in the synthesis.” (NE III.3, 1112b
23)179  Likewise, the last step of deliberation coincides with the first step of action,
and the series of necessary conditions is recapitulated in the reverse order by a series
of actions or necessary consequences of action.  For example, Aristotle outlines the
deliberative process through which a physician brings about health as follows:
“The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of
thought:- since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be
present, e.g. a uniform state of the body, and if this is to be present, there must
be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to
a final something which he himself can produce. Then the process from this
point onward, i.e. the process towards health, is called a ‘making.’… The heat
in the movement [of the physician’s hands rubbing the patient’s flesh] caused
heat in the body, and this is either health, or a part of health, or is followed by
a part of health, or by health itself.  And so it is said to cause health, because it
causes that to which health attaches as a consequence.” (Metaph. VII.7, 1032b
5-28; trns. Ross)
Recall from Chapter 2 that, for Aristotle, our discursive thinking is necessarily
facilitated by the use of images.  When the deliberator has hit upon something that is
within his power to do (and to do without further preparations or investigation into
how it is to be done), his deliberation has resulted in the “deliberative image.”  In this
                                                 
179 Cf. DA III.10, 433a 16.  In natural contexts, as well as in cases of conscious deliberation, Aristotle
states that “what is last in the order of time is first in the order of being.”  Among other places, see PA
II.1, 646a 25ff, GA II.5, 741b 17-24, and DA III.5, 430a 21.  This will return in the Epilogue below.
139
way, his deliberation “marks” what is perceived or imagined for pursuit or avoidance.
(DA III.7, 431b 2)  The deliberative image shows the particular in the aspect or under
the description that makes it serviceable as a means to one’s end.
For example, I may frequent a park in which I ordinarily perceive the stones
simply as stones or as decorative items.  However, if I am being attacked in this park
I may perceive the same stones as potential weapons: for I wish to protect myself and,
deliberating about how to fulfill this wish, the usefulness of the stones as weapons
will become apparent to me, will become a vivid (enargon) intelligible content in my
incidental perception of the stones.  The stones are thus perceived as a means to my
end and the perceptual image is “marked” as something desirable.  Alternatively,
when, through the deliberative process described above, the physician arrives at the
idea of rubbing the patient, no further deliberation into how to do this is required
because rubbing is a basic action that he can perform straightaway.  At that point,
because of its relationship to health, the image or thought of rubbing the patient is
“marked” as something desirable to do.
As the deliberative process unfolds, the agent and his affective state are
undergoing alteration.  Bergson makes this observation nicely: “all the time that the
deliberation is going on, the self is changing and is consequently modifying the…
feelings that agitate it.”180  By analogy, consider yourself deciding how much alcohol
to drink: when you decided to drink three glasses of wine, you were not in the same
state of mind that you will be in when you have finished your third glass.  The state of
mind that formed the original decision is no longer in place, and one may go on to
                                                 
180 Time and Free Will, p. 171.
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glass number four and then five.  In this example one resolves not to do something,
but with each successive drink one becomes less and less inclined to stay true to the
original intention.  Deliberation is a similar but inverse process.  One starts with an
abstractly formulated resolution to do or bring about something, and with each
successive step toward the object of deliberation, one becomes more and more
inclined to do those particular “manly concrete deeds” that will realize one’s original
intention (quoting James again from the opening of this chapter).
Contrary to the widespread idea that reason and desire are fundamentally
opposed to one another, reason and desire fuse into one another.  The conflict is not
between reason and desire but between one desire and another – namely, one
generated by reasoning and one not.  As Aristotle states, “desires come to be opposite
to one another, which happens whenever reason and impulses are opposed.” (DA
III.10, 433b 7)181  Rather than being inherently opposed, desire catalyzes reasoning
and reason gets into desire and directs its motion.  Reason uses desire as the
craftsman uses fire, as an instrument that is employed rationally for a particular end.
Irrational desire is like a fire left to burn at random.  The cook makes use of the fire;
he does not simply throw the ingredients into a fire and leave it to the fire to
determine what to do.182  Likewise, given one’s capacity to master the appearances
and take hold of the virtuous active condition (hexis), one ought to exercise reason to
                                                 
181 This passage and its point are discussed nicely by Jeffrey Barnouw in Propositional Perception:
Phantasia, Predication, and Sign in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.  Barnouw writes, “the conflict of
reason and desire is always a conflict between competing desires or objects of desire, one of which
involves reasoning.” (p. 77)
182 Recall the passage from [On Breath], 9 quoted in Chapter 1.
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steer the fire of passion toward those basic actions that promote your long-term
interest.
In its essence, then, practical reasoning is not inherently anti-desire – quite the
contrary.  Practical reasoning intoxicates you with desire to perform the ingeniously
devised basic actions that were formerly “disguised” in predicates and incidental
perceptions that made them out to be mere “vulgar concomitants” and “squalid
particulars” (drawing, once again, from the William James quote from the opening of
this chapter).  Deliberation unmasks the good lurking amidst the circumstances that
we are in here and now, and an entirely different network of predicates and
intelligible contents becomes vivid (enargon) in one’s incidental perception.  One
thus recognizes the constitutive elements of the good as such, as opportunities to
realize the good.  They are available and completely exposed, so to speak, but they
are often disguised by a veil of unenlightened predicates and appear to be mere lowly,
pedestrian, insignificant, boring particulars. When this disguise falls away, they
become salient and are vivid as the constitutive elements of the good, just as, in
Homer’s Odyssey, Athena appears to Telemachus as the old man Mentor, and later
manifests herself to him in her true form.
This unveiling of the intelligible good amidst the particulars of perception is
itself a crucial feature of eudaimonia.  For Aristotle, eudaimonia is finally identified
with contemplation (NE X).  When the beautiful becomes fully manifest in one’s
perception of the particulars, and of the actions that are realized within them, action
becomes a means to contemplation.  This is described insightfully by Plotinus:
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“Action, then, is for the sake of contemplation and vision, so that for men of
action, too, contemplation is the goal, and what they cannot get by going
straight to it, so to speak, they seek to obtain by going round about.  For,
again, when they reach what they want [through successful action], the thing
which they wished to exist, not so that they should not know it but so that they
should know it and see it present in their soul, it is, obviously, an object set
there for contemplation.  This is so, too, because they act for the sake of a
good; but this means, not that the good arising from their action should be
outside them, or that they should not have it, but that they should have it.  But
where do they have it?  In their soul.  So, action bends back again to
contemplation, for what someone receives in his soul, which is rational form –
what can it be other than silent rational form?  And more so, the more it is
within the soul.”  (Enneads III.8.6)
In beholding the beauty of the action, one’s action becomes contemplation of
the beautiful.183  To push this contemplation all the way through action’s
manifestation in the particulars directly into the Divine Mind, to the Beautiful Itself,
is complete fulfillment.  But because we are compound beings, we cannot be in this
condition at all times, but we share in the Divine Mind’s activity in our highest
moments (See NE X.7-9).  We sustain our vision of the beautiful by performing
beautiful actions and beholding the beautiful actions of others – and recognizing them
as such.  This recognition is an intrinsically pleasurable contemplative act.184
In Plato’s Symposium, Diotima presents the “Ladder of Love” through which
one is said to intellectually ascend to the Beautiful Itself – first through attraction to
the beauty of one particular lover’s body, then through successively learning to
appreciate the beauty of bodies generally, the beauty of the soul, the beauty of laws
                                                 
183 Although I will not enter into this issue here, the observation above undercuts the longstanding
dispute on the issue of whether Aristotle takes the good life to consists solely in contemplation (argued
for by “exclusivists”) or whether he also takes it to include the life of action (supported by the
“inclusivists”).  The entire dispute rests on a misunderstanding of the way in which action is a form of
contemplation.
184 For instance, see Poetics 4, where Aristotle describes recognition – the act of beholding an imitation
of someone and apprehending it as such, realizing “that’s who this is” – is an inherently pleasurable
contemplative act.
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and institutions, the beauty of knowledge, and finally one comes face to face with the
Beautiful Itself and is initiated into “the Greater Mysteries of Love.”  Diotima
describes this “final revelation” as a “wondrous vision,” “an everlasting loveliness
which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the
same on every hand, the same then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the
same to every worshiper as it is to every other.”  And whoever had opened his eyes to
this vision would gaze upon it “in true contemplation until it had become his own
forever…”  Furthermore, “it is only when he discerns beauty itself through what
makes it visible that a man will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming,
virtue…185 And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he shall be
called the friend of god, and if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be
given to him.” (Symposium, 209E-212A)
These lines themselves are very beautiful, and are radiant with the very
“Form” about which they speak.  From Aristotle’s point of view, though, the fact that
human beings are compound beings – that is, comprised of body and soul – entails
that it is impossible for us as human beings to unendingly maintain the pure vision of
the Beautiful Itself alone.  For human beings, the pure vision – if it comes at all –
“comes and goes,” “flowers and fades.”  Unlike the Divine Mind, we grow “weary,”
and our contemplation is “intermittent.”  So we hold onto the contemplative vision of
the Beautiful both through pure contemplation and through the apprehension of
                                                 
185 Compare Aristotle’s claim that the beautiful is the end or goal of virtue. (NE III.7, 1115b 12-25)
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beautiful particulars as such.  To adapt a phrase from Wittgenstein, for Aristotle
Diotima’s Ladder of Love is not one we can kick away after ascending it.186
Now, above we have seen how practical reasoning involves a use of images
that alters our desires.  As we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, for Aristotle, images and
desires inhere in the body.  Thus, processes involving images and desires involve the
body, and have necessary consequences based upon the symmetry of the body’s
physical constitution.  Recollection is a psychosomatic process of searching for an
image in a part of the body. (On Memory and Reminiscence 2, 453a 14 – b 8)
Likewise, deliberation involves the manipulation of images and thus involves
physiological processes.  Exactly what processes?  Aristotle does not say specifically,
but we can see that from his perspective these processes, like those of voluntary
attention discussed in Chapter 2, would involve the intentional re-arrangement of
images in the body producing an alteration in the incidental perception of the
particular circumstances of action.  In this case, the sought for content is some basic
action understood as a means to the fulfillment of rational wish.  As mentioned above,
the image that conveys this content is constructed, according to Aristotle, in a manner
similar to the construction of a geometrical diagram that presents the truth of some
geometrical proposition for intellectual apprehension through an image.
As mentioned above, when the deliberative image has been constructed (that
is, when the means to one’s end has been found out), this results in deliberative desire
– that is, choice – and this desire – like all desire and all affections of soul – being
partly constituted by physical processes, has a physical power to move the body in
                                                 
186 See Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.54.
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pursuit of what is relevantly “marked.”  As Aristotle states, “the instrument by which
desire cause motion is already part of the body.” (DA III.10, 433b 19)  These facts
concerning Aristotle’s understanding of the causes of deliberate action overturn an
important line of interpretation advanced by various scholars concerning the practical
syllogism.
3.4 The Practical Syllogism
As mentioned above, intellect (nous) is directed at first principles and at
particular facts, “what is ultimate on both sides.”  Aristotle sometimes represents the
sources of action in terms of these two poles of the intellectual or noetic spectrum in
the form of the so-called “practical syllogism.”  The practical syllogism organizes the
description of the agent’s action and its sources on the model of the theoretical
syllogism.  Like the theoretical syllogism, a practical syllogism is rendered in terms
of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion.  In a practical syllogism, the
major premise expresses the agent’s wish for some good, the minor premise expresses
the agent’s recognition of a possible means to realize his wish, and the conclusion is
the agent’s performance of the relevant action (note: not his judgment that he ought to
act in some particular way).  This conclusion is said to follow the premises
“necessarily” or “straightaway.”
There are a variety of interpretations of just what the practical syllogism
signifies.  Carlo Natali describes the practical syllogism as “a formal representation of
the psychic process that generates action.”187  However, it must be noted that the
                                                 
187 The Wisdom of Aristotle, p. 67.
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process of practical reasoning – surely part of the psychic process that generates
chosen actions – is not actually displayed in a practical syllogism.  The major premise
represents practical reasoning’s stimulus (a wish for some end), and the minor
premise represents practical reasoning’s terminus (a possible means to that end).  The
inferential process through which one discovers the means and constructs the minor
premise is not part of the syllogism.  As John Cooper points out, “the practical
syllogism is not for the most part conceived of as a form of reasoning at all, but is
only a way of expressing the content of the intuitive perceptual act by which the agent
recognizes the presence and availability for action of the ultimate means previously
decided upon.”188
If practical syllogisms do not display practical reasoning, then what sort of
relationship holds between the premises and the conclusion in such a syllogism?  M.
T. Thornton claims that “The relationship of premises to conclusion [in a practical
syllogism] is, then, simply this: they [the premises] show what is good about the
action [the conclusion] (as the agent sees it).”189  A similar account is given by
Anthony Kenny (1966), who construes the relation between premises and conclusion
in the practical syllogism in terms of a “logic of satisfactoriness”: from the premises
one infers that a certain action will satisfy one’s desire for the good represented in the
major premise.  Nussbaum also treats the relationship between the components of the
practical syllogism as logical or conceptual: “The relationship between premises and
conclusion is, as we have already said, a conceptual and logical one: the aim of
Aristotle’s discussion is to elucidate the logical relationships among the concepts of
                                                 
188 Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle, p. 46-47; also see p. 55, n. 72.
189 “Aristotelian Practical Reasoning,” 72.
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desire, belief, and action.  It is part of what it means to want an end that one takes
action towards it in certain circumstances; it is of the nature of action that it is
determined by a desire and a belief.”190
These accounts have much to offer with respect to understanding the
intricacies of practical reasoning.  However, they all fail to provide any real account
of the practical syllogism because, in fact, they are concerned only with the premises
of such syllogisms.  As mentioned above, the inferential process of practical
reasoning originates in the major premise and goes no further than the minor premise.
That is when one stops thinking about what to do and starts doing it.  It is the
relationship between the premises that shows “what is good about the action (as it
appears to the agent).”  What is good about walking is that it promotes health, what is
good about picking up this stone (right now) is that doing so will threaten my
attacker.  It is only after deliberation has shown what is good about the action that the
agent desires to perform the action and does it.  My inclination to walk for the sake of
health and my thought that it would be a good idea to pick up this stone to threaten
my attacker are representative of the syllogism’s premises, not its conclusion.  The
conclusion is my act of walking or picking up the stone.  These accounts have said
nothing about the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, between the
content implicit in my impulse to act and my action.
So, in a “practical syllogism,” the transition from the premises to the
conclusion is not an inference (either on the part of the agent or someone trying to
explain the agent’s behavior).  Contrary to the interpretations described above, the
                                                 
190 Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 188.
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relationship between premises and conclusion in a practical syllogism is not logical or
conceptual.  Instead, when Aristotle states that the conclusion follows the premises
“necessarily” or “straightaway,” he means to say that the conclusion – that is, the
agent’s action – follows immediately as a result of physical necessity when the
psychosomatic conditions described in the premises – which are the sources of the
action – obtain.  As Aristotle states, “when, because of sense-perception [that is, to
use Cooper’s phrase from above, the “intuitive perceptual act”], the area around the
origin [the heart] is altered and changes, the adjacent parts change also, expanding
and contracting, so that by these means animal motion necessarily comes about.”
(MA 9, 702b 20)  Aristotle presents this view more explicitly and extensively in the
following passage:
“Hence it is with good reason that the inner regions and those around the
origins of the organic members are fashioned as they are [exhibiting the
“proper symmetry” referred to in previous chapters], so as to change from
solid to liquid and from liquid to solid, from soft to hard and vice versa.  Since
these processes happen this way, and since the passive and active have the
nature which we have often ascribed to them, then whenever it happens that
there are both active and passive elements, and neither falls short in any
respect of the account we give them, at once one acts and the other is acted
upon.  That is why it is pretty much at the same time that the creature thinks it
should move forward and moves, unless something impedes it.  For the
affections (pathê) suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the affections, and
phantasia the desire; and phantasia comes about either through thought or
through sense-perception.  The rapidity and simultaneity result from the fact
that the active and passive are naturally relative to each other.”  (MA 8, 702a 7
– 21; my emphasis)
Some of the desires that move within us and actuate our voluntary physical
motions are born through a rational use of the imagination, while others originate
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from the semi-rational “sensitive imagination.”191  The former are deliberative desires
– that is, choices – and through them our reasons to act become the causes of our
actions.  At times, however, our deliberative desires are overpowered by desires
originating in sensitive imagination.  In these instances we know or believe that a
certain action is to be avoided (or performed), and yet we find ourselves performing
(or avoiding) that very action nevertheless.  Here our reasons fail to cause our action
because they fail to awaken a strong enough desire to enact the means to our ends.
This is the condition of akrasia, to which we now turn.
3.5 Akrasia: Its Description and Explanation
To understand any phenomenon we must observe it and explain it.  Careful
observation leads to a description of the phenomenon, and explanation identifies its
causes.  For example, it is one thing to discover that your car is not working, and
another thing to figure out why it is not working.  On the one hand we “set forth the
appearances (phainomena)” (NE VII.1, 1145b 2), and on the other we uncover the
sources (archai) and causes (aitiai) of those appearances.  In the remained of this
chapter, we will consider Aristotle’s description and explanation of akrasia.  As there
is no sustained discussion of the physiological causes of akrasia in Aristotle’s extant
works, we must put together an Aristotelian explanation of akrasia from passages
spread throughout the corpus of his writings.
In short, akrasia – translated variously as weakness of will, incontinence, and
lack of self-restraint – signifies a lack of control or command over oneself that results
                                                 
191 Recall the distinction between rational and sensory imagination from §2.1 above.
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in acting against one’s own better judgment.  Does the akratic or unrestrained person
know that his action is wrong, or does he only believe it to be wrong?  Does he know
or believe that his action is wrong while he is acting, or only before and after the
relevant action?  These are questions that concern an adequate description of akrasia.
The explanation of akrasia must go on to identify through what causes this
phenomenon comes about.  Aristotle’s description of akrasia is often mistaken for his
explanation of it.  He describes akrasia in terms of actions and psychological
functions, but for its explanation – as one translator renders the passage – Aristotle
tells us to “go to physiology.”  (NE VII.3, 1147b 6)
Aristotle’s description of akrasia makes use of two important epistemological
distinctions: (1) knowledge possessed versus knowledge in use, and (2) abstract
knowledge of universals versus perceptual knowledge of particulars.  Each of these
distinctions plays a critical role in Aristotle’s account of what is taking place when a
person acts contrary to his or her own reasoned judgment about what it is best to do.
In short, the person’s perceptual knowledge of the particular circumstances of his or
her action is possessed but not active or at work because it is temporarily
overpowered by irrational desires.
In Chapter 2 we encountered Aristotle’s distinction between a capacity
(dunamis), an ability or active condition of readiness (hexis) to perform a given
activity, and actively being-at-work (energeia).  (These were labeled P1, P2/A1, and
A2, respectively.  I will refer to them as the graduated phases of being-at-work.)  We
considered the examples of a sleeping geometer, one that is awake, and one that is
actively working on geometry.  Now, as Aristotle notes, “it is not every sort of
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judgment that pleasure and pain destroy and warp, such as that a triangle does or does
not have a sum of two right angles, but judgments that concern action.” (NE VI.5,
1140b 15)  This passage goes on to discuss judgments concerning the ends for the
sake of which one ought to act (which, in the practical syllogism, are represented by
the major premise), the destruction of which leads to moral depravity.  In the case of
the akratic, on the other hand, it is judgments concerning the particular circumstances
of action (represented by the minor premise) that are warped by desire for pleasure.192
Take the often-repeated example of the akratic person who indulges in sweets
although he knows that he should not do so because they are unhealthy.  In terms of
the distinctions above, the akratic’s knowledge that this pastry is unhealthy does not
spring into action – from knowledge possessed or ready to use, to knowledge that is
actually in use (from P2/A1 to A2).  Rather, it is temporarily impeded and moves
backward in the other direction – from knowledge possessed and ready to use to
knowledge possessed only in the weakest sense, like the beginner who struggles to
figure out his geometry.  So the akratic’s knowledge that the pastry is sweet (and
therefore has a pleasurable taste) is blindingly vivid and overpoweringly active in the
akratic’s perception of the pastry, being charged with the heat of desire.
This last point concerning the relationship between the akratic’s minor
premise and his effective desire is actually worth elaborating since it seems to have
                                                 
192 Aristotle’s view that ignorance of the first principles of action (the major premises) makes one
morally depraved was discussed in Chapter 2.2 above.  There we were contrasting this form of
ignorance with the ignorance of particular circumstances that makes an action involuntary (like
Aeschylus’s reported ignorance of the fact that he was revealing secrets).  How, one might ask, is the
akratic’s failure to know the relevant minor premise at the time that he acts different from that of a
person who acts involuntarily?  (That it is, in Aristotle’s view, follows from his view that the akratic
acts voluntarily though not by choice.  See EE II.7.)  The difference is that the one who acts
involuntarily does not possess the relevant knowledge at all, while the akratic possesses it but it has
been knocked out of place by irrational desire.
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been misunderstood by certain commentators.  For there are two different practical
syllogisms – more exactly, two different minor premises – that contend with one
another in the akratic’s psyche.  We must be clear about which of the two minor
premises is at play in our discussion, and some commentators seem to have gotten
this wrong.  Consider this example of Filip Grgic’s: “Thus, for instance, from ‘I
should not smoke cigarettes’ and ‘This is a cigarette’ she either does not infer ‘I
should not smoke this’ or, on the alternative interpretation, she does infer this
conclusion but acts against it. In either case, the explanation of her failure is her
epistemic deficiency: her knowledge of the minor, or particular, practical-syllogistic
premise is weaker than knowledge of a nonakratic.”193
One problem with this example is that it has the akratic inferring (or not
inferring) the conclusion of the syllogism.  However, as we discussed above, the
conclusion of the practical syllogism must be an action.  The conclusion comes about
precisely when the agent stops inferring what to do and starts doing it.194  A second
problem with this example, though, concerns the akratic’s minor premise.  The minor
premise in Grgic’s syllogism is “This is a cigarette.”  It is surely not this minor
premise that is knocked out of place by desire when the akratic smoker gives in to his
habit!  He knows all too well that the thing before him is a cigarette, and it is his
perceptual recognition of this as a cigarette that is pleasurable to smoke that ignites
                                                 
193 “Aristotle on the Akratic’s Knowledge,” (Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, Vol.
47, Number 4, 2002 , pp. 336-358), 337.
194 In “Some Rational Aspects of Incontinence” (Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII, Supp.,
1988), Irwin also falls into this problem about the practical syllogism’s conclusion by repeatedly
referring to the conclusion as “the third proposition” of the syllogism (e.g., “taste this sweet thing,” p.
53).
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his desire to smoke it!195  As Aristotle mentions in connection with a similar example
involving sweets, the akratic’s recognition that this thing here is sweet “is at work on
him” or “comes into operation” (autê de energei), and it is this that rouses his desire.
(NE VII.3, 1147a 31)196  To grasp the situation more clearly, let us construct the two
practical syllogisms between which the akratic smoker fluctuates.  I will call the
syllogism that reflects the akratic’s actual behavior the “effective syllogism,” and the
one that he is struggles but fails to follow I will call the “ineffective syllogism.”
Table 4: The Akratic’s Alternative Syllogisms
The Akratic’s Effective Syllogism The Akratic’s Ineffective Syllogism
Major premise: Pleasurable things should
be pursued.
Minor premise: This is a cigarette
(=something pleasurable to smoke).
----------------------------------------------------
Conclusion/Action: [Cigarette smoked]
Major premise: Unhealthful things should
be avoided.
Minor premise: This is a cigarette
(=something unhealthful to smoke).
----------------------------------------------------
Conclusion/Action: [Cigarette not smoked]
The four premises in these syllogisms express things that the akratic knows or
believes.  In particular, the akratic possesses knowledge of both premises in the
ineffective syllogism.  If he simply did not know or did not believe the major premise
that he should avoid unhealthful things, then he would be a depraved individual and
                                                 
195 Cooper presents a similar example in Reason and the Human Good that makes the same mistake.
He describes the akratic’s ineffective syllogism as having the premises “Avoid chocolate (sc., because
it upsets the bowels).  This is chocolate.”  He then writes, “appetite intervenes to prevent the necessary
minor premise (“This is chocolate”) from being tacked on [to the syllogism, thus leading to the
akratic’s failure to avoid the chocolate].”  (p. 50)  Again, this certainly cannot be correct.  The akratic
is well aware that this is chocolate.  His appetite does not interfere with his awareness of this minor
premise, but is catalyzed by and unified with it!  The minor premise with which his appetite interferes
is another minor premise (namely, something of the sort expressed by “This chocolate is unhealthful to
eat”).
196 The first translation is by Sachs (2002) and the second is by Kenny (1966, p. 182).
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not an akratic.  If he simply did not know or believe the minor premise that this
cigarette is unhealthful, then his unhealthful action would be involuntary and not an
instance of akrasia.197  Why, then, does his action turn out to accord with the one
syllogism rather than the other?
In short, his failure is one of voluntary attention (discussed in Chapter 2), and
is a failure to produce relevant psychosomatic “countermotions” to restructure his
perception and resist his irrational impulses.  The akratic perceives the cigarette as
pleasurable to smoke rather than perceiving it as unhealthful to smoke (indicated in
the syllogisms above by the parenthetical descriptions under which the akratic
perceives the cigarette, which shifts back and forth like one’s perception of the duck /
rabbit image).  His knowledge or belief that the cigarette is pleasurable to smoke is
active in structuring his incidental perception of the cigarette.  This intelligible
content is amplified by his physiology and becomes vivid (enargon) in his perception.
As a result, his knowledge of the other syllogism’s minor premise – that the cigarette
is unhealthful – is ineffective.  The ineffectiveness of this knowledge is largely based
on the fact that it is not sufficiently grounded in particulars.198  In Aristotle’s
physiology of perception, what this insufficient particularity of the knowledge means
is that the images or residual sensory impressions through which the akratic knows
the given fact are too scarce, too faint, or not properly associated to render the
relevant intelligible content vivid.  As was shown in Chapter 2, these processes are
                                                 
197 Recall our discussion in Chapter 2.2 concerning the different kinds of ignorance that make one
depraved versus making one’s action involuntary.
198 In spite of the problems I have just pointed out with Grgic’s analysis of the akratic’s practical
syllogism, his account of the ways in which the akratic’s knowledge lacks an adequate basis in
experience of particulars is very perceptive and clarifying.
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governed by physiological causes.  We will turn now to Aristotle’s explicit statements
that akrasia’s explanation is to be found through the natural philosophy of the living
body.
3.6 Aristotle’s Physiological Explanation of Akrasia
At NE VII.3, 1147a 24, Aristotle refers to looking into the cause of akrasia
“from the standpoint of nature (phusikôs).”  And just below this, Aristotle states that,
with regard to the critical aspect of akrasia, “the explanation, which one needs to hear
from people who study nature (dei para tôn physiologôn akouein), is the same as in
the case of someone who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this experience.”199
These passages have been interpreted in various ways.  The central question here is
exactly what kind of explanation is Aristotle pointing to in this passage?  Grgic
interprets this passage as referring to the possession or loss of rationality.  He writes
that what the student of nature will have to answer is “How does the akratic retain her
rationality?” (p. 352)  He writes, “[The student of nature] sees the akratic eating
sweets [and seeming to know that she should not do so] and what he wants to know is
whether she is behaving rationally.”  (p. 355)200
                                                 
199 NE VII.3, 1147b 6-9.  “Go to physiology” is Rackham’s translation of the critical phrase (dei para
tôn physiologôn akouein).  Technically, the earlier part of this passage refers to the transition from
ignorance back to knowledge that takes place after the akratic succumbs to his weakness.  However, it
is undoubtedly the case that the earlier transition from knowledge to ignorance that accounts for the
akratic’s behavior comes about through the same physiological causes.  Given that this temporary
ineffectiveness of knowledge is the heart of akrasia as Aristotle describes it, the physiological
explanation of this ineffectiveness is the explanation of akrasia, as Aristotle understands it.  We will
discuss this below.
200 In The Wisdom of Aristotle, Natali notes a few interpretations of phusikôs at 1147a 24 that have
been proposed: “more specifically” (Cooper), “starting from appropriate principles” (Guathier),
“starting from facts relating to (human) nature” (Hardie, Wiggins, Etheridge).  Natali himself agrees
with Burnet and Dirlmeier that Aristotle is referring to psychology, i.e. “that branch of physics that
studies the human psyche.”  (See Natali, p. 213 n. 111)
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However, it is evident from various passages that this is not the sort of
question that the student of nature asks (and that the other interpretations in the
previous footnote are also faulty readings of the passage).  For Aristotle is clear that
the student of nature is one whose job is to inquire into both the formal and material
causes of things.  As he states,
“But the one who studies nature and the logician would define each attribute
of the soul differently, for instance what anger is.  The one would say it is a
craving for revenge, or some such thing, while the other would say it is a
boiling of the blood and heat around the heart.  Of these, the one gives an
account of the material, the other of the form and meaning.  For the one is the
articulation of the thing, but this has to be in a certain sort of material if it is to
be at all.  In the same way, while the meaning of a house is of this sort, a
shelter that protects from damage by wind, rain, and the sun’s heat, another
person will say that it is stones, bricks, and lumber, and yet another that the
form is in these latter things for the sake of those former ones.”  (DA I.1, 403a
29 – b6)
Aristotle’s discussion goes on to indicate that the true student of nature is
concerned with things in the last way mentioned: in terms of both form and material.
This interpretation is also confirmed by Aristotle’s claim that, because nature is
“twofold,” the student of nature must inquire into both form and material.  (Physics
II.2, 194a 12ff)  He illustrates this with the examples of the doctor and the
housebuilder.  The one must know both the form of health and the material in which
it is realized (e.g., bile and phlegm), and the other must know both the form and
function of houses and the materials in which they are realized (e.g., bricks and
lumber).  Additionally, in Metaphysics VI.1, Aristotle contrasts the objects studied by
metaphysics and those studied by natural philosophy with the examples of concavity
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and snubness (that is, concavity in a nose), which differ because “snub” is bound up
with material.  Thus, he states
“If then all natural things are analogous to the snub in their nature – e.g., nose,
eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general,
plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement
(kinêsis) – they always have material), it is clear how we must seek to define
the ‘what’ in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student
of nature to study even the soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not
independent of material.”  (Metaph. VI.1, 1025b 35)
These passages show that, from Aristotle’s point of view, the student of nature
is one who studies forms in their material embodiment.  But is this notion what
Aristotle has in mind in the passages about the explanation of akrasia at NE VII.3,
1147a–b that we are discussing?  To see that this is what he has in mind, let us look at
the surrounding text.  Just before suggesting we look into the cause of akrasia from
the standpoint of nature (phusikôs, 1147a 24), Aristotle notes that people who are in
states of passion are in a condition similar to those who are asleep, insane, or drunk
since, like sleep, madness, and alcohol, passions such as rages and sexual desires
“obviously also derange the body.” (1147a 17)
The fact that passions derange the body leads him to suggest we look into the
causes of akrasia from the standpoint of nature. (1147a 24)  He then differentiates the
practical from the theoretical syllogism on the grounds that the latter involves
necessarily inferring the conclusion whereas in the case of the former the agent
necessarily performs the relevant action “at once.”  We have already seen that this
immediate and necessary transition to the conclusion / action in a practical syllogism
is explained in terms of the symmetry of the active and passive powers in the body
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(critically supported by MA  8, 702a 7 – 21, discussed above).  That this same
principle applies to akrasia is also presented explicitly in the concluding lines of On
the Motion of Animals: “As for the fact that as a result of the same thoughts there is
sometimes an irrational movement in the parts, sometimes not, the reason for this is
that sometimes the passive matter is present in the right quantity and quality, and
sometimes not.” (MA 11, 703b 36)
Next in our NE text Aristotle illustrates these principles with his “sweets”
example, which ends by noting that, “while one premise says to avoid [eating the
sweets], the desire [to eat the sweets] takes the lead, since it is able to set in motion
each part of the body.”  (1147a 35, my emphasis)  This desire is able to set the body
in motion because “the instrument by which desire causes motion is already part of
the body” (DA III.10, 433b 19), and “at one time this desire wins out and knocks
away that one, and at another time that one wins out and knocks away this one, like a
ball.” (DA III.11, 434a 16)201  Having noted that irrational desire overtakes the akratic
because it moves within his body, Aristotle then tells us to seek the explanation of
akrasia “from people who study nature,” because that explanation “is the same as in
the case of someone who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this experience
[i.e., akrasia].” (1147b 8)
These observations show conclusively that Grgic, Cooper, Guathier, Hardie,
Wiggins, Etheridge, Natali, Burnet, and Dirlmeier severely misinterpret Aristotle’s
direct statements as to where we should look for the explanation of akrasia.  Anthony
                                                 
201 Here one thinks of Hesiod’s description of Eros as “the most beautiful among the immortal gods,
who loosens the limbs and overpowers the intentions and sensible plans of all the gods and all humans
too.” (Theogony line 120, translated by Richard McKirahan in Philosophy Before Socrates: An
Introduction with Texts and Commentary (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 9.)
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Kenny’s interpretation of these passages is closer to what Aristotle must mean, but
Kenny interprets Aristotle as holding that physiology explains akrasia only in
exceptional cases of madness or the “pathological inability to conform to one’s moral
professions.”202  Such cases do not seem to be genuine instances of akrasia, he says,
and it is only in these cases that we ought to listen to those who study nature (dei para
tôn physiologôn akouein).  For the explanation of ordinary cases of akrasia proper,
Kenny suggests we look back a number of lines to 1147a 24 where Aristotle speaks
of looking into the cause of akrasia “from the standpoint of nature (phusikôs).”
Kenny takes this to refer to the “natural cause” of akrasia, namely desire (epithumia),
as opposed to its unnatural causes such as madness.  He further motivates his
differentiation of akrasia proper from madness and other pathological forms of
behavior that resemble akrasia by stating that if the incontinent person is like a
madman, then the appropriate response would seem to be not punishment but
treatment. (176)  In this sense consulting the natural scientist (physiologôs) would be
necessary.
Kenny’s analysis here is flawed.  There are surely differences between the
lunatic and your run-of-the-mill dieting akratic who succumbs to the tempting cake.
However, Aristotle is not talking about their differences; instead, he is explicitly
pointing to a similarity between them – namely, the causes of their conditions are
physiological.  In addition, Aristotle makes no such differentiation between ordinary
akrasia and madness.  He simply states that “surely people who are in states of
passion are disposed [in a way similar to someone asleep, insane, or drunk], since
                                                 
202 Anthony. Kenny, “The Practical Syllogism and Incontinence,” Phronesis 11, pp. 163-184 (1966), p.
176.
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rages and sexual desires and some other such states obviously also derange the body,
and even make some people insane.” (NE VII.3, 1147a 14; my emphasis)  Like an
insane, sleeping, or drunken person, an incontinent person’s knowledge is impaired
and rendered ineffective due to conditions in the body.
Furthermore, in a sense Kenny is right that madness warrants treatment while
akrasia deserves punishment.  However, Aristotle is explicit that punishment is itself
a specific form of treatment: “Punishments indicate this too, since they come about by
means of [pleasure and pain], for they are a certain kind of medicines, and medicines
by their nature work through opposites.”  (NE II.3, 1104b 18)  While punishment is
not medicine in the literal sense (a physical substance through the ingestion of which
our body is directly altered), it does produce its medicinal effects through its
influence on the body.  For example, like all affections of the soul, the painful
experience of humiliation that often accompanies punishment is imminent in the
body.203  Aristotle takes this to be indicated by the fact that those who are ashamed
blush.  (NE IV.9, 1128b 16)  Such visible signs of shame on our faces rise up from
physiological changes in the inward parts of the body, and it is these inward changes
that effect the recovery of those who are punished.
More specifically, the experience of pleasure or pain involves heating and
chilling in the heart and other viscera. (MA 8, 701b 36)  These episodes of heating
and chilling cause alteration in the inner organs in accordance with their active and
passive dispositional propensities.  This is the process through which the inward parts
of the body expand and contract, change size and shape, change from liquid to solid
                                                 
203 See DA I.1 and Chapter 1 above.
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(and vice versa), and change from hard to soft (and vice versa).204  In this way, the
affections “prepare the organic parts.”  (MA 8, 702a 17)  When repetitions of these
changes and “preparations” in the body leave enduring traces in the symmetry of its
constituents, one’s mode of perception changes.  It is through such a change in one’s
mode of perception that character is shaped and the wrongdoer reformed.205  Thus,
even punishment influences the akratic through changes in the body.  Therefore
Kenny’s restriction of physiology’s relevance to exceptional cases of madness rather
than to both those cases and ordinary cases of akrasia does not reflect Aristotle’s
view.206
Thus, it is clear that Aristotle takes the explanation of akrasia as being
physiological in nature.  But exactly how do physiological causes lead the akratic to
                                                 
204 See MA 7, 701b 1-32 and MA 8, 702a 7, discussed in §2.1 above.
205 Recall that Chapter 2 presented a detailed account of how the symmetry of the inward parts and
powers in the body effect one’s mode of perception. That alteration in the soul is brought about
through alteration in the body is argued extensively in Physics VII.3.
206 Like punishment, reward influences character in a similar way through the use of pleasure rather
than pain.  The arts also have the power to influence character, and they too produce their effects in the
soul through their influence on the body.  For instance, music produces subtle muscular tensions and
relaxations according to the qualities of its rhythms and its harmonic “modes.”  As a form of imitation
(mimêsis), music mimics emotions and states of character by stimulating the body in ways that
simulate the physiological conditions that underlie the relevant emotions and states of character.
Paraphrasing J. G. Warry’s Greek Aesthetic Theory (p. 109), Debra Hawhee writes “learning from
music takes place through the production of tension and relaxation at muscular and nervous levels and
is thereby more direct, more powerful than learning through other means.” (Bodily Arts, p. 139-140;
although it does not concern music specifically, a relevant passage on the effects of being in the bodily
state that corresponds with a certain affection is DA I.1, 403a 22, quoted above in §2.3.5).  It is in this
way that musical rhythms and harmonies “penetrate into [the soul’s] inmost regions and there hold
fast.” (Republic IV, 401D)  A similar account would also apply to the mechanisms through which
tragedy produces katharsis by evoking pity and fear.  Consider the following passage regarding
catharsis by W. W. Fortenbaugh:  “In watching and responding to a tragedy the spectator is not only
stimulated intellectually.  He is also purged in so far as his bodily condition is altered.  He undergoes a
quasi-medical treatment (cf. Pol. 1342a10) which improves his disposition in regard to the everyday
emotions of fear and pity.” (Aristotle on Emotion, 22)  On the artist generally, once again Bergson has
an insightful comment: “The artist aims at… enabling us to experience what he cannot make us
understand.  This he will bring about by choosing, among the outward signs of his emotions, those
which our body is likely to imitate mechanically, though slightly, as soon as it perceives them, so as to
transport us all at once into the indefinable psychological state which called them forth.”  (Time and
Free Will, p. 18)
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succumb to his temptation against his better judgment?  In fact, we have already had a
glimpse of this in Chapter 2.3.2 in discussing On Dreams and how the content of our
incidental perception is put together.  Like a strong wind disrupting reflections on the
surface of a lake by creating violent currents and waves in the water, the fumes that
arise from the heat accompanying passions disrupts the “images” (phantasmata) that
structure our incidental perception, which is just what happens to those who are
intoxicated. (On Dreams, 3, 461a ff, see §2.3.2 above)
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Epilogue
Moral Development as Psychosomatic Transformation
“And, indeed, the union of the soul with the body strikes us as being very
much such a punishment.  For, as the Etruscans are said often to torture
prisoners of war by chaining human carcasses face to face with living men,
matching part with part, so also the soul seems to be stretched throughout the
body as well as tied to the sensitive parts of the body.”207
4.1 Introduction
The above passage from Aristotle’s lost work Protrepticus may express our
philosopher’s sympathies for the Orphic view, espoused by Pythagoras and by Plato,
that the body (sôma) is the tomb (sêma) of the soul. (See Plato’s Cratylus 400B-C.)
This notion recurs in Plato’s Gorgias (492E), and is expounded at length in the
Phaedo.  In the latter work, Socrates states that “each pleasure or pain nails [the soul]
as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the
things are true which the body says are true.” (83D)  Moreover, the soul comes to be
“interpenetrated… with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the
body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion
and the object of its care.” (81C)  As a result of this process, the soul is “dragged by
the body [from the changeless realm of intelligible Forms] to things which never
remain the same [namely, sensible particulars], and it wanders about and is confused
and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things.” (79C)
                                                 
207 A fragment from Aristotle’s lost work Protrepticus (preserved in the Protrepticus of Iamblichus),
translated in Aristotle: Protrepticus – A Reconstruction, by Anton-Hermann Chroust, p. 43
164
In the preceding chapters we have seen how these metaphorical images of the
soul’s imprisonment in the body do indeed capture something of Aristotle’s view of
the condition of most human beings (and of all human beings in their earliest stages
of development).  In particular, the mechanical structuring of incidental perception
(Chapter 2), and the overthrow of reasoned insights into what is good to do (Chapter
3), are governed by the non-rational powers of the body.  While our nutritive and
sensitive natures are alive and well in our bodies, in many ways our human nature is
left there for dead – but it is left there for dead by us!  As we will see, the problem is
not our embodiment per se: on the contrary, it is through our human embodiment that,
as individuated human beings, we are alive, aware of the world through sensory
experience, and endowed with a capacity for rational intelligence.208  But our capacity
for rational intelligence must be developed and held onto through our own efforts.
What keeps us dead in our bodies is our relative lack of that “care for the soul” –
namely, ethical philosophy – that Socrates encouraged us to practice and to be
concerned with above all else.209
                                                 
208 Recall that, from Aristotle’s perspective, not any random soul can be clothed in any random body,
so that our specifically human psychological powers are inseparable from our specifically human
bodies.  See §1.3 on the hierarchy of powers, propensities, and capacities in the human being’s
composition, particularly the discussion of DA I.3, 407b 21 and II.2, 414a 19-24, and the footnote in
§1.2 on the “blend” (krasis) of our material constituents and its relationship to intelligence.
209 On care for the soul see e.g. Apology 29D-30B and Timaeus 89D-90D.  It should be clear from the
above statement, and from the discussion of ethical philosophy in §0.2 above, that here ethical
philosophy includes, but is not limited to, discourse on ethical subjects.  When a person recognizes that
a possible action is beautiful and does it on account of that fact – that is ethical philosophy.  Ethical
discourse empowers one to recognize beautiful actions as such, and this is its function.  At Politics I.9,
1257a 8, Aristotle mentions that a man who wears a shoe uses it as a shoe (in its proper and primary
sense), whereas the man who sells the shoe does not.  Likewise, I would add, ethical discourse is used
in its proper sense – like the shoe worn on the foot – when it is used for the sake of improving the soul,
whereas when it is used for some other end – like the shoe being sold – it is not used in its proper
sense.  Plato’s dialogues are powerful depictions of ethical discourse thriving in its natural habitat and
practiced in its capacity as an instrument of ethical philosophy.  The Euthyphro and Apology are
exemplary cases in point.  The central question of the Euthyphro is “What is piety or holiness?” As
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What is called for, then, are actions and ways of being at work that transform
the body from the tomb of a dead human soul into the temple of a living human soul
in communion with the divine.  In this chapter I will show the sense in which
Aristotle views moral development as just such a process of psychosomatic
transformation.  For Aristotle, moral development is continuous with biological
development and simply constitutes the completion of the person’s coming into
being.  Certain mechanisms of character formation lead this developmental process to
                                                                                                                                            
Plato makes clear through the dialogue’s setting, this question does not arise out of mere curiosity, as
an exercise in disputation, or simply as an attempt by Socrates to mock Euthyphro’s limited clarity on
this concept.  Socrates and Euthyphro meet at the court of the Archon, and Plato has them ask one
another what they are doing there.  It turns out that Euthyphro is there to accuse his father of impiety,
and Socrates is there because he is being accused of impiety.  Everything that has led up to this
situation – which is of “serious magnitude” on both sides – has come to pass on account of judgments
that people have made involving the concept of piety.  Thus, Plato is displaying the examination of
piety as essential to the conditions of life, and not as an academic exercise.  As Socrates ironically
states to Euthyphro, “if you didn’t know with full clarity what the pious and the impious are, you’d
never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a day laborer.” (15D)
Incoherent conceptions of piety kill people – e.g., the Athenians’ confused conception of piety killed
Socrates.  The discourse on piety thus organically grows from the conditions in which those
discoursing find themselves.  Plato is also skillfully priming his readers for the presentation of Socrates
as the embodiment of piety in the Apology.  The discourse with Euthyphro yields as its clearest
approximation to the form of piety that it is the part of justice that involves service to the gods (worked
out from 11E-13D). Socrates asks, “at what result does service to the gods aim?,” and he later adds, “If
you had given the answer [to that question], I’d already have been adequately instructed by you about
piety.” (14C)  While the Euthyphro does not see an answer to this question, the next work in the
Platonic corpus – the Apology or Socrates’ Defense – Plato presents Socrates himself as the answer in
a living image.  In his defense speech Socrates describes his philosophical activity as “assistance” and
“service” to Apollo, the god of the Temple at Delphi. (23A-B)  He later characterizes himself as
having been stationed and commanded by the god to live practicing philosophy, examining himself
and others. (28D)  Finally, after a moving exhortation to his fellow Athenians to care for their souls, he
states “This, you may be sure, is what the god orders me to do.  And I believe that no greater good for
you has ever come about in the city than my service to the god [and we must remember here that it is
Plato who has written these words].  You see, I do nothing else except go around and trying to
persuade you, both young and old alike, not to care about your bodies or your money as intensely as
about how your soul may be in the best condition.” (30A-B)  In this way, the Socrates’ Defense of
Plato is Plato’s defense of Socrates, and in it Plato presents Socrates’ discourse on ethical philosophy
in light of the sources of its motivation – to serve the god by caring for his soul and helping his fellow
citizens to do the same.  (Although I will not pursue the matter here, I take this interpretation to
provide insight into the process of definition and the grasping of Forms by combining dialectical
argument – as in the Euthyphro – and the vivid presentation of a paradigm example – as Socrates is
presented as a paradigm example of piety in the Apology.  Whereas the dialectical phase of definition
draws a relatively precise conceptual borderline at the circumference that differentiates between A’s
and non-A’s, putting forward a perfect example of an A vivifies and anchors the definition by
identifying the exact center of the circle.)
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get mired and trapped in its early stages.  Ethical philosophy is a transformative
practice aimed at moving one out of this stasis and into being one’s “true self.” (See
DA II.5, 417b 6.)  This transformation in the soul comes about through the
psychosomatic transmutation of material elements in the living body.
4.2 Moral Development, Biological Development, and Human
Development
There are three basic ways of being at work (energeiai) that display life:
reproduction and self-nourishment, sensory perception, and the exercise of rational
intelligence.210  The three corresponding potencies (dunameis) are the nutritive,
sensitive, and rational parts or powers of the soul.   The distinctions amongst these
potencies play a critical role in Aristotle’s “function argument.” (NE I.7, 1097b 22 –
1098a 22)  In this argument Aristotle seeks to define the human good – happiness
(eudaimonia) – by identifying the work or characteristic function (ergon) peculiar to
human beings, the way of being at work in which our humanity is most distinctly
evident.
All species of living things nourish themselves and reproduce, and animals
share with us the power of sensory perception.  Among mortals, Aristotle states, only
human beings possess full-blown rational intelligence or insight (nous).  He thus
concludes that the exercise of rational intelligence is the life-activity “peculiar”
(idion) to human beings as such.  In Book X he adds that, “each person would even
                                                 
210 Aristotle considers self-nourishing to be a species of reproduction: self-reproduction – the
reproduction and replenishment of one’s own bodily form through the assimilation and re-organization
of the bodies of other living things.  See DA II.4.
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seem to be this part [of the soul (namely, nous)].”211  Happiness or the human good,
then, is a life that puts rational intelligence and insight – one’s true self – to work in
accordance with virtue or excellence (aretê), and this is the goal (telos) of moral
development.  Let us approach the idea that moral development is continuous with
biological development by examining the following passage.
“It is while they develop [in the womb, through the active exercise of nutritive
soul] that they acquire sentient soul as well, in virtue of which an animal is an
animal – I say ‘while they develop,’ for it is not the fact that when an animal
is formed at that same moment a human being, or a horse, or any other
particular sort of animal is formed, because the end of completion is formed
last of all, and that which is peculiar (idion) to each thing is the end of its
process of formation.  That is why it is a very great puzzle to answer another
question, concerning [rational intelligence or insight (nous); significantly,
Aristotle’s term here does not refer to discursive reasoning (dianoia, logismos,
syllogismos)].  At what moment, and in what manner, do those creatures
which have this principle of [nous] acquire their share of it, and where does it
come from?  This is a very difficult problem which we must endeavor to
solve, so far as it may be solved, to the best of our power.” (GA II.3, 736a 35
– 736b 9)
To begin, note that the nutritive, sensitive, and rational soul-powers do not
arbitrarily coincide in the human organism but form a functionally interconnected
hierarchy in which the exercise of one provides for the capacity for another.
Recalling Aristotle’s distinctions amongst the graduated phases of potency and being-
at-work (P1-A2), a biologically human organism comes into being through exercising
(energeia = A2) the power to reproduce and nourish the human body – on account of
this it is alive.  Reproduction generates sensory organs that give this living thing the
ready power (hexis = P2/A1) of sense perception – on account of this it is an animal.
                                                 
211 NE X.7, 1178a 3.  The connection between what is peculiar to a thing and its being is stated by
Aristotle at Metaphysics VII.13, 1038b 7: “the substance [or being (ousia)] of each thing is that which
is peculiar (idion) to it, which does not belong to anything else.”
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The human organism’s constitution endows it with the natural tendency to absorb
sensory perceptions and form from them networks and patterns of association based
on the presence of intelligible forms in the sensible particulars that it encounters, and
this tendency gives the animal a capacity (dunamis = P1) for understanding and
rational thought – on account of this it is a biologically human being.212  The
individual human being’s capacity for rational intelligence is integrated with the soul
functions that it shares with other living things.
How this capacity becomes a developed power (hexis = P2/A1), and how it
moves into the active exercise (energeia = A2) of rational intelligence, are difficult
theoretical and practical problems.  That is, constructing a theoretical explanation of
the transition of this capacity through the graduated phases of being-at-work is very
difficult (which Aristotle mentions in the passage above); additionally, the actual
advancement of one’s own capacity for rational intelligence into its complete
realization in activity – which I intend here to encompass rational intelligence in
thought and contemplation (“intellectual virtue”), and the display of rational
intelligence in one’s actions and passions (“virtue of character”) – is a difficult
practical problem which the practice of ethical philosophy, and human nature itself, is
aimed at achieving.213  Here we are treating the practical problem.214
                                                 
212 Compare DA II.5, 417b 17: “In the potency for perception, the first change [from dunamis = P1 to
hexis = P2/A1] comes about by the [reproductive] action of the parent, and when the living thing is
born it already has what it takes [i.e., the hexis = P2] to perceive, just as it has the capacity [dunamis =
P1] for knowledge.” Concerning the capacity for rational intelligence, above I am referring to the
networks of association discussed in §2.3.4 on memory, association, and incidental perception, which
centered on Aristotle’s analogy about retreating soldiers who stop and make a stand. (Post. An. II.19,
100a 10)  The tendency to organize residual sensory perceptions into such networks, recall, is
grounded in the symmetry of powers in the living body, and the establishment of such networks are the
starting-points of our capacity to reason and understand.
213 On distinguishing intellectual virtue and virtue of character see NE VI and II.5-6 (respectively).
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Now, we might say that at birth the human being is not yet being human – not
yet actively functioning in its capacity as a rationally intelligent being.  Above
Aristotle intimated that, at the completion of embryonic development, the human
organism is actively nourishing itself, able to perceive, and capable of developing
rational intelligence.  At birth, then, the soul-power that is most peculiar to and
definitive of our being is the furthest from being actively realized, and the one that is
least definitive is most fully at work.  Recalling De Caelo II.12, 292a 23ff (quoted
above in §3.2), when our lives begin we are “far removed” from our good and can
only attain it through “a complexity of actions.”  Virtue empowers one to both
discover and to choose those actions.  (NE II.6, 1107a 7; see §0.2 above)
Moreover, virtue also grows from these same insightful discoveries and
chosen actions.  Aristotle links moral development and the graduated phases of being-
at-work in NE II.1.  There he states that, from the very beginning of our existence as
human beings, we are naturally endowed with a developed functional capacity
(P2/A1) for sensory perception.  However, the intellectual virtues and virtues of
human character are not provided for us by nature, but must be developed and
perfected through disciplined practice and experience:
                                                                                                                                            
214 Concerning the theoretical problem, shortly after indicating the difficulty of determining how we
come to possess our share of nous (quoted above), Aristotle states that “It remains, then, that nous
alone enters in, as an additional factor, from outside, and that it alone is divine, because physical
activity has nothing whatever to do with the activity (energeia) of nous.” (GA II.3, 736b 27)  What
Aristotle is referring to here is not our capacity for discursive reasoning, but the activity of non-
discursive “insight.”  In saying that this noetic luminosity “enters in from outside” Aristotle is not
saying that one’s thoughts enter into one’s body from outside the physical world.  Rather, he is saying
that luminous insight “enters into” human experience from beyond the human individual (the
“individual possessor of nous”) and originates in “Nous itself,” that is the Divine Mind.  (See DA I.4,
408b 18ff; DA III.5, 430a 25; etc.)
170
“…with those things that come to belong to us by nature, we are provided
with the potencies (dunameis) for these beforehand, and we produce the
being-at-work (energeia) of them in return.  (This very thing is obvious in the
case of the senses, for it was not from repeatedly seeing or repeatedly hearing
that we took on the senses, but on the contrary, having them, we used them –
we did not get them by using them.)  But we do take on the virtues by first
being at work in them, just as also in other things, namely the arts; the things
that one who has learned them needs to do, we learn by doing, and people
become, say, housebuilders by building houses or harpists by playing the
harp.”  (NE II.1, 1103a 27 – b 1)
So by nature we are given a ready capacity for sense perception, but it is only
through our own efforts and disciplined practice of the virtues that we bring what is
peculiar to us as human beings into its full realization.  In this sense, nature makes us
animals; we have to make ourselves human!  Furthermore, for Aristotle this process
of becoming fully human is the process of becoming a good human being, a virtuous
human being, a virtuoso at being human.  Aristotle advances this view in Physics
VII.3, where he states that “each thing is said to be complete when it takes on its
excellence (aretê) – for it is then most in accord with its nature – just as a circle is
perfect when it has most of all become a circle and when it is best.” (246a 12)215  In
short, moral development is both continuous with biological development and is the
completion of human development.
Although I can only briefly allude to the matter here, there are three factors
that lead this process to get stalled or run off course: (1) Character and action are
reciprocally interdependent – one’s character expresses itself in one’s actions, and
                                                 
215 Note also the following from the commentary of Simplicius: “…anything not having its own
perfection [teleiotês] is not in the strict sense that which it is spoken of as, for a thing which is
imperfect [or incomplete, ateles] with respect to form does not admit the definition of the form either.”
(Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Physics 7, 1065, 21, p. 44, (brackets by Hagen); compare the conversation
of Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I, 340Dff, alluded to in §0.2 above.)
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one’s actions impress themselves back into one’s character; (2) we are inattentive to
the ways in which our active conditions or states of character “add to themselves”
through their reciprocal relationship with action; and (3) once an active condition is
formed and an acquired set of dispositional propensities has been accumulated
through action, we cannot simply abandon those active conditions by choice but must
overcome them through strenuous effort.  The attainment of virtue comes about by
making our “ways of being at work” – that is, our modes of thinking, perceiving,
action, and passion – be of certain sorts.
The previous chapters of this dissertation set the groundwork for showing that
the process of attaining virtue is psychosomatic in nature.  A crucial bridge leading
from that groundwork to a full account of this issue (which I will undertake in future
work) is Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of alteration (the second of which
is more properly called coming-into-being): (1) the extinction and replacement of one
condition by its contrary, and (2) a thing’s “development into its true self or
actuality,” or one’s “passing over into being oneself, namely into being-at-work-
staying-oneself (entelecheia).” (DA II.5, 417b 6; trans. Smith and Sachs, respectively)
In Physics VII.3, Aristotle argues that it is through alteration of the first kind, based in
the body, that alteration of the second kind takes place in the soul.  Moral
development is thus a process of psychosomatic transformation over the course of
which alteration in the symmetry of material powers in the body leads to the full
coming-forth of the soul in its natural condition.
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4.3 The End of Moral Development
So, logically and “in the order of being,” a human being is defined first and
foremost by rational intelligence at work in both thought and action; in the temporal
process of development, however, “in the order of time,” rational intelligence is the
last power to be developed and to come into activity.  Recall from above that “the end
of completion is formed last of all, and that which is peculiar (idion) to each thing is
the end of its process of formation.” (GA II.3, 736b 4)  This is elaborated upon
elsewhere:
“Now the order of things in the process of formation is the reverse of their real
and essential order; I mean that the later a thing comes in the formative
process the earlier it comes in the order of Nature, and that which comes at the
end of the process is at the beginning in the order of Nature… Thus, the
matter and the process of formation must come first in time, but logically (tô
logôi) the real essence (ousia) and the form of the thing comes first.” (PA II.1,
646a 25 – 646b 2)216
From Aristotle’s perspective, then, through the practice of ethical philosophy
– understood as a way of life – we are transformed (in time) into what we already are
(in being).  We thus become human beings who are actively being human (that is,
actively exercising nous – rational intelligence and creative insight into the true, the
good, and the beautiful – and displaying this in our actions and passions).  In this
sense, throughout moral development – as with all natural processes of coming-into-
being – one is “headed toward [one’s] origin” (Phys. VIII.7, 261a 14), and is on a
                                                 
216 Compare the following passage concerning the operation of nutritive potencies in the bringing-into-
being and passing-away of the living body: “[W]e find universally that what [body part] is the last to
be formed [in the process of reproduction] is the first to fail, and the first to be formed [namely, the
heart] is the last to fail.  It is as though Nature were a runner, covering a double course there and back,
and retracing her steps towards the starting-point whence she set out.  The process of formation,
genesis, starts from not-being and advances till it reaches being; that of decay starts from being and
goes back again till it reaches not-being.” (GA II.5, 741b 17-24)
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road or path (hodos) that leads from one’s nature into one’s nature (Phys. II.1, 193b
12).
From Aristotle’s point of view, then, active insight or rational intelligence is
both the source or origin (archê) and the end or goal (telos) of human action and
human being.  Aristotle points to this as the origin of human action in the opening
line of the Metaphysics: “All human beings by nature desire to know.”  Insight or
rational intelligence gives birth to wonder and amazement, and therewith lures itself
toward its own full realization in an articulate understanding of the manifest structure
of phenomenal reality and direct noetic union with ultimate being.  As Aristotle
states, “[B]y way of wondering, people both now and at first began to philosophize…
But someone who wonders and is at an impasse considers himself to be ignorant… So
if it was by fleeing ignorance that they philosophized, it is clear that by means of
knowing they were in pursuit of knowing…” (Metaph. I.2, 982b 12-21)  The yearning
of each thing is simply to fully and actively be itself.  Although we are compound
beings, our ultimate identity is rational insight in pursuit of itself.  This nature of the
human being as such is fulfilled when it is made manifest in beautiful actions, and
most paradigmatically when it reaches itself and sees itself as itself in the immortal
and undifferentiated noetic luminosity of the Divine Mind.  Accordingly Aristotle
writes,
“So if intellect (nous) is something divine as compared with a human being,
the life that is in accord with the intellect is divine as compared with a human
life.  But one should not follow those who advise us to think human thoughts,
since we are human, and mortal thoughts, since we are mortal, but as far as
possible one ought to be immortal and to do all things with a view toward
living in accord with the most powerful thing in oneself, for even if it is small
in bulk, it rises much more above everything else in power and worth. And
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each person would even seem to be this part, if it is the governing and better
part…” (NE X.7, 1177b 30 – 1178a 3)
Here Aristotle is directly in line with Plato, according to whom the aim of
philosophy is to think godlike thoughts (Theatetus, 176B) – not to think thoughts
about the divine and the immortal, but to think thoughts that are divine and
immortal.217  Plato beautifully elaborates upon this in his Timaeus, and it is Plato to
whom we shall give the last word:
“We should think of the most authoritative part of our soul as a guiding genius
(daimon) given by god – that part which we say dwells in the summit of our
body and lifts us from earth toward our celestial affinity, like a plant whose
roots are not in earth, but in the heavens; for we are creatures not of earth but
of heaven, where the soul was first born, and our divine part attaches us by the
head to heaven.  If therefore a man’s attention and effort are centered on
appetite and ambition [ambition being a function of the ‘spirited’ element of
the soul (thumos)], all his thoughts are bound to be mortal, and he can hardly
fail, in so far as it is possible, to become entirely mortal, as it is his mortal part
that he has increased.  But a man who has given his heart to learning and true
wisdom and exercised that part of himself is surely bound, if he attains to
truth, to have immortal and divine thoughts, and cannot fail to achieve
immortality as fully as is permitted to human nature; and because he has
always looked after the divine element in himself and kept his guardian genius
                                                 
217 It is clear from this statement that “thinking,” for Plato and for Aristotle, is not to be identified with
mere analytical, discursive cogitations (however complex they may be), but with a non-discursive
mystical awakening to and union with ultimate reality.  Although we cannot pursue the matter here,
except for the sophists (who, by Plato’s account, hardly deserve to be called philosophers at all),
virtually all ancient Greek philosophers are mystics.  In no way does this conflict with the fact that
most of these philosophers are also empirically minded scientists and seekers of truth for whom the
exercise of rational argumentation and discursive reasoning is indispensable.  The nature of their
mysticism is summed up nicely by Philip Merlan: “By definition we take [mysticism] to mean a
doctrine teaching that the highest moments of man’s existence are those of his absorption into
whatever he takes the divine to be, and that this absorption, usually called ecstasy, is an experience sui
generis, distinct from the ordinary human experiences.”  (Philip Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism,
and Metaconsciousness: Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed. 1963), 1.)  An additional comment of relevance is the following, from
John Burnet: “To anyone who has tried to live in sympathy with the Greek philosophers, the
suggestion that they were ‘intellectualists’ must seem ludicrous.  On the contrary, Greek philosophy is
based on the faith that reality is divine, and that the one thing needful is for the soul, which is akin to
the divine, to enter into communion with it.  It was in truth an effort to satisfy what we call the
religious instinct.…”  (Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London: MacMillan & Co: repr. 1962), 12.)
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(daimon) in good order he must be happy (eudaimon) above all men… When
that is done we shall have achieved the goal set us by the gods, the life that is
best for this present time and for all time.” (Timaeus, 90A-D)
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